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ABSTRACT 
MORAL IMAGINATION AND ADORNO: BEFORE AND AFTER AUSCHWITZ 
 
 
 
Catlyn Origitano, B.A., M.A 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
 
 
In the aftermath of national or international tragedies, appeals for action such as, 
“Never Forget” or “Never Again” are ubiquitous. Theodor Adorno makes a similar call in 
the wake of the Holocaust, proclaiming that all education should be focused on the 
prevention of another genocide. While most would agree with such a statement, 
practically how do we respond to such a call, specifically in light of Adorno’s work? 
Answering this question is at the heart of this project and I argue that imaginative 
memorials can fulfill Adorno’s criteria for post-Auschwitz education.  
I first present a theory of moral imagination by relying on contemporary accounts 
of the theory and then show how it complements Adorno’s work, specifically by offering 
an explanatory foundation to a number of his claims. I reveal that many of Adorno’s 
observations about the world are supported by recent advancements in the understanding 
of imagination and I argue that the combination of contemporary accounts of moral 
imagination and Adorno’s thought are mutually beneficial. 
After the two theories have been sufficiently discussed and integrated, I focus on 
Adorno’s arguments regarding education following Auschwitz. Adorno argues that we 
should investigate how such a horror could occur, and the people who committed the acts 
of genocide. Such information will be helpful for the prevention of another Auschwitz 
because we can attempt to overcome the values and ideas of those who perpetrated 
genocide. 
 This dissertation is unique and of philosophical importance because it fleshes out 
Adorno’s discussion of the characteristics that led to the Holocaust and argues for a 
specific form of education that meets all of the criteria of Adorno’s post-Auschwitz 
education: memorials that stimulate the visitor’s imagination. In order to make this point, 
I highlight specific Holocaust memorials that are imaginative and argue for their efficacy. 
My goal for the project is to actualize Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education initiative 
through imaginative memorials.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Imagination has had a rollercoaster relationship with Western philosophy. At its 
zenith, it is credited with the creation of artwork; at its nadir, it’s a faculty of delusion, 
leading us astray from truth and reason. When it comes to ethics, imagination has only 
recently come onto the scene.
1
 For most of the history of Western Philosophy, rational 
measurements in the form of golden means or hedonic calculations have been the 
methods of choice for determining the best moral action.  
Recently, within the latter half of the century, imagination has begun to grow in 
importance as the study of it, especially within ‘hard sciences,’ develops. Cognitive 
science and neuroscience have begun to focus on imagination’s role in our moral lives 
and philosophy is, fortunately, joining in the conversation. This project is meant to add to 
the ever-growing ranks of academics championing imagination’s role in our lives. 
Though I think that imagination is present and required in most of our cognitive 
activities, in this project I am going to focus primarily on imagination’s role in morality, 
most often referred to as moral imagination.  
While I explore the major contemporary theories of moral imagination, I also 
extend them to Critical Theorist Theodor Adorno, specifically his work on education 
after Auschwitz. I look to integrate the two theories in order to realize Adorno’s project 
of an education that combats the features that led to Auschwitz.  
                                                     
1 At least explicitly—it can be argued that imagination has always been discussed in connection 
with ethics, even if not named. For instance, contemplating the mean between excess and 
deficiency requires holding two possibilities in the mind and comparing them. Such activities 
seem to rely heavily on imagination as we know it. 
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An aim of my research is to establish a clarified and unified understanding of 
moral imagination, merging contemporary accounts and focusing primarily on 
imagination’s role in moral deliberation and perception. From there, my objective is to 
unite the theory with Adorno’s, revealing how the two are mutually beneficial, as well as 
compatible. The ultimate aim of the project is to offer a possibility for education post 
Auschwitz. In particular, I suggest that certain imaginative memorials and museums can 
have a powerful impact on their visitors in such a way that the museums can possibly 
prepare visitors for future, similar experiences. By using data on the efficacy of 
imagination, as well as Adorno’s work on the causes of the Holocaust, I offer an 
education that weds the two, as well as concrete examples of museums that utilize the 
education I discuss. Ultimately, then, my project will contribute to a body of literature on 
genocide education in a unique way by focusing on the role of imagination therein. 
I was initially drawn to the topic of moral imagination through imagination itself. 
My early interest in philosophy was in aesthetics (and certainly such an interest remains). 
In most aesthetic theories, imagination is hailed as an important and necessary 
component to the creation of artworks and the appreciation of those works. Imagination 
was often touted as the ‘lawless’ feature that allowed for creativity and for those feelings 
of awe in front of artworks. It was here that I first became interested in imagination, but 
such an interest was not completely fleshed out until I moved out of aesthetics and 
studied in greater depth the history of philosophy. Here I saw my favorite faculty dragged 
through the mud. Not only that, but it seemed that many of the descriptions of the mental 
faculties, or activities that philosophers praised, were impossible without some of the 
features of imagination; if the faculty wasn’t being criticized, its role was being denied. 
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It was this rejection that led me to study the role of imagination throughout the 
history of philosophy, and ultimately to moral imagination: the role of imagination in our 
moral lives. I was drawn to this specific area because, more than ever, imagination seems 
fundamental to our moral activities. Insofar as morality plays an integral role in our 
everyday lives, I thought it was important to investigate imagination’s role therein. It 
wasn’t until Dr. James South, my advisor, introduced me to Theodor Adorno that the 
other piece to the puzzle fell into place. 
Adorno’s work provides a solid framework within which moral imagination fits. 
His critique of reason offers a good place to suggest the benefits of moral imagination. 
His critiques of society, in particular the way, in which he blends psychoanalysis, and 
Marxist work, serve as a great place for imagination to lend its voice.  
Further, his work focused on the Holocaust brings moral imagination into a place 
where it can have a real impact: an education post-Holocaust that addresses the 
conditions that led to it and attempt to counteract them. I have for a long time, like many, 
been fascinated by the Holocaust. It is an event that captivates many as it seems to defy 
comprehensibility. How could so many die and so few do anything to stop it? How could 
so many camps be built, and so much horror take place? I wanted to add to the large body 
of work on the Holocaust in a way that both looks back to understand, but also forward to 
move ahead. Further, introducing and incorporating imagination into the picture provides 
unique insights into what happened and what can happen: many people say that the 
Holocaust is ‘unimaginable’ but it wasn’t, it was imagined, and it took place. 
Discussing imagination in terms of understanding what happened, as well as tools 
for education post-genocide, seems an interesting and necessary direction for my project. 
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While I am interested in rigorous philosophical theory, if it doesn’t have a foot in the 
everyday world, or attempt to do so, I worry that the philosophy isn’t robust enough. 
Rather, I think that philosophy, or at least the philosophical projects that I find interesting 
and relevant, require some form of application. In particular, work centered on morality, 
and even more so, around genocide, cannot merely remain theoretical, but must strive for 
applicability. 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
 
 
In Chapter One, I outline the major contemporary theories of moral imagination 
as presented by Mark Johnson, Martha Nussbaum, and Patricia Werhane. Each discusses 
moral imagination within their own areas of expertise: cognitive science, for Johnson, 
literary criticism, for Nussbaum, and business ethics, for Werhane. I explain the major 
tenents of each account and draw out their similarities under Lawrence Blum’s 
dichotomy of moral perception and moral deliberation. 
Blum argues that our moral lives are made up of a number of different, though 
overlapping, activities including perception and deliberation. Generally, moral perception 
includes our seeing something as morally relevant (For example, seeing a joke as a racist 
joke). Moral deliberation, on the other hand, concerns the decision making process after 
one has perceived a joke as racist, for example. Calling the person out, reporting the joke 
to a superior, and laughing at the joke, are all outcomes that are produced as a result of 
moral deliberation.  
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Johnson, Werhane, and Nussbaum’s accounts all emphasize the different 
imaginative activities found in both moral perception and deliberation. Johnson, for 
example, argues that we use metaphors to see and understand our moral choices. He 
discusses the Social Accounting Metaphor in which we use words and phrases associated 
with accounting, like debit, in our discussion of morality: “I am forever in your debt,” for 
example. This is not merely a semantic shortcut, but actually impacts the way we see and 
deliberate about morality: when you view moral harm and help in terms of accounting, 
you think that there is a finite amount of it, just as there’s a finite amount of other 
resources, and you become unlikely to help others so that you don’t deplete your ‘moral 
reserves.’ Thinking of morality in terms of a metaphor utilizes imagination because it 
projects one set of rules or ideas onto another: morality is not actually accounting. This 
metaphor, which relies on imagination, impacts both our moral perceptions, as well as 
our moral deliberations and is one of the many examples that Johnson, and others, offer 
as to the reason imagination’s integral to our everyday moral lives. 
In Chapter One, for the most part, I focus most exclusively on Johnson’s account 
as his is the most robust and well-rounded. I do outline through the major contributing 
ideas of both Nussbaum and Werhane, primarily to spell out the similarities between 
accounts. I conclude Chapter One by turning my focus to Nussbaum because she, more 
so than Johnson and Werhane, offers a prescriptive element to her theory of moral 
imagination. Essentially, Nussbaum argues that if it is the case that imagination is crucial 
to moral activity, then it is prudent that we cultivate our imagination in order to better 
handle and process moral perceptions and deliberations. Nussbaum recommends the 
reading of fictional narratives as the best method for such cultivation, preferring the work 
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of Charles Dickens. In particular, Nussbaum argues that the reading of literature allows 
the reader to practice the imaginative activities required in their moral lives, and see 
paradigms of such activity. For example, reading about a character's choice allows the 
reader to see what the character does and model their behavior off of it, or allows them to 
practice perspective taking, for instance.  
Ian Ravenscroft, a cognitive scientist, takes Nussbaum’s thesis a step further 
arguing that our understanding of mirror neurons further supports her claim. Primarily, 
that just as athletes are encouraged to imagine running and winning a race, so too should 
people ‘preparing’ for moral activity. The reason being that the same neurons fire in both 
instances, so imagining the activity fires the same neurons as actually doing the activity, 
thereby the former serves as a type of training or preparation for the latter.  
Chapter Two springboards off the foundation of Chapter One by bringing the 
major themes of moral imagination to the work of Theodor Adorno. I begin Chapter Two 
by outlining the major themes in Adorno’s work including, for instance, his discussion 
and critique of Enlightenment. By Enlightenment, Adorno, and his co-author and peer 
Max Horkheimer, don’t necessarily mean a strict era of time, but rather a series of related 
intellectual practices that focus on removing mystery or spirituality from the world in 
favor of strict adherence to science and scientific pursuit. For example, Adorno argues 
that the way in which we view a concept transforms, or deforms, it from a complex 
concept to a simple concept. A tree, for instance, can be conceptualized in a number of 
different ways, such as a potential resource for lumber, housing for animals, shade for 
plants, and so forth. However, when we view or understand the tree as only one of these 
things, as a resource for humans, then you take something that is complex and makes it 
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simple, thereby deforming what it is. This simple way of viewing an object ultimately 
makes it easy to use or manipulate the object: it is easy to chop down the tree when it is 
only viewed as a resource for human and all other ways of being are ignored.  
Adorno and Horkheimer are critical of such ways of viewing and understanding 
the world, as it ultimately makes everything simple and easily destroyed in service of 
humanity. After I outline the major tenents of such critique, I show how easily Adorno’s 
theory fits with the theory of moral imagination outlined in Chapter One. For example, 
the idea of simple vs. concept concepts that I briefly mentioned, maps onto Johnson’s 
theory of the imaginative work in conceptualizing concepts. Additionally, both theories 
decry an overreliance on reason, especially insofar as it leads to a renunciation of other 
cognitive activities.  
Further, the two theories are mutually beneficial insofar as moral imagination 
offers Adorno a way to respond to his biggest critique: that he only provides a negative 
philosophy. If his theory is injected with imagination, a positive theory begins to emerge: 
the way in which one moves from a view of the world as simple concepts to a complex 
concept, is by integrating more imagination into their thought processes. On the other 
hand, the theory of moral imagination can be, and has been, criticized for its lack of 
clarity: what do we mean by the term ‘imagination’ and how is moral imagination 
different from other cognitive activities? While there are ways in which the theory makes 
inroads into such answers, a major feature of the theory is that it isn’t clearly delineated 
and defined with necessary and sufficient conditions. With the backing of Adorno, in 
particular his critique of an overreliance on reason, the theory of moral imagination can 
be afforded the flexibility it needs.  
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Chapter Three takes the now integrated theories and focuses further on a specific 
topic within Adorno’s oeuvre, the Holocaust, or has he refers to it, Auschwitz. In 
particular, I focus my attention on Adorno’s “Education After Auschwitz,” a radio-
address-turned-article, which calls for education to be focused on the prevention of 
another genocide. In the article, Adorno’s main argument is that we need to focus on the 
conditions that created the Holocaust and work at counteracting them. In Chapter Three, I 
examine and analyze the major conditions that Adorno discusses, as well as beginning to 
examine the methods for counteraction. Included in this analysis, is a bit of pulling at 
Adorno’s work to develop it further. For instance, Adorno doesn’t fully discuss the 
different parties involved in the genocide, but focuses primarily on the victims and 
perpetrators, as if the two are easily defined. I challenge such clear definitions and call 
for a bit more flexibility therein. Generally, however, the third chapter is dedicated to 
fleshing out and understanding Adorno’s conception of a post-Auschwitz education, 
including negotiating any inconsistencies or lack of clarity.  
The fourth and final chapter of my project synthesizes the work of the first three. 
The chapter focuses on actualizing Adorno’s education initiative by incorporating 
imagination into the education plan. In particular, I argue that Nussbaum and 
Ravenscroft’s theory from Chapter One, that imagination can serve as a tool of 
preparation for actual events, can be applicable here: an imaginative education can 
encourage people to practice fighting against the conditions that created the Holocaust. 
While Nussbaum and Ravenscroft limit their discussion to fictional narratives, I expand 
the potential educative sphere to memorials and museums. I focus on three Holocaust 
memorials (Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, the Memorial to Murdered Jews of 
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Europe, and the Stumbling Blocks) and argue that each are highly imaginative, though in 
different ways, and because of their imaginative components, are highly effective forms 
of education post-Auschwitz. Further, I claim that these memorials fulfill the 
requirements for Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education initiative. I continue my argument 
in favor of an imaginative education by addressing two recent studies that reveal that 
current educative initiatives, in particular initiatives that rely heavily on reason or are 
strictly fact based, are not helping to counteract the conditions or attitudes that led to the 
Holocaust, and in fact are harmful. Integrating imagination into a post-Auschwitz 
education, then, is important and necessary for a number of reasons: one, it fulfills 
Adorno’s criteria for post-Auschwitz education, two, it can help cultivate one’s 
imaginative capacity and potentially provide a practice space for future moral activity, 
and three, the current educative initiative, which is very much devoid of imagination, is 
failing and many of the reasons for its failure is a lack of the things that imagination bring 
to the table.  
As the title of my project suggests, I am concerned not only with combining 
Adorno’s work with moral imagination, but also looking at the ways in which such an 
integration works both in his article and ideas for education after Auschwitz, and then the 
ways in which such combination also functions before Auschwitz, or rather in the 
Adornian theories that precede and influence his specific work on Auschwitz. It is my 
hope that this project will merge a number of interesting discussions about education and 
imagination in a way that can be beneficial to education initiatives moving forward.   
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A CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT OF MORAL IMAGINATION 
 
 
 
The history of philosophy is, for the most part, dominated by discussions of 
reason, abstract thought, and general rules. In response to this overwhelming tradition, 
some philosophers challenge reason’s dominance in our thoughts and lives. My project is 
to unite two such challengers: Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) and Mark Johnson’s (1949-
present) work on moral imagination. 
Adorno is best known for his contributions to the Frankfurt School and Critical 
Theory by way of a number of ‘negative’ critiques. An ever-present theme in his work is 
the analysis and critique of an over-reliance on reason in our everyday dealings with the 
world and each other. He argues that many of our current social issues are due in large 
part to a way of thinking that is dominated by reason. I will outline in depth Adorno’s 
major concerns in Chapter Two and discuss his writings on the Nazi Party and the 
Holocaust, which he also sees as a direct result of a reason-only way of thinking, in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
Another major challenger to a reason-centric philosophy, and a theory I want to 
connect to Adorno’s work, is moral imagination. Moral imagination belongs to the 
tradition in ethics that advocates for other, supposedly non-rational elements as central to 
our moral lives. While its roots extend back to Aristotle, my project is more 
contemporary, focusing primarily on the work of Mark Johnson. It is here, in Chapter 
One, where I outline a theory of moral imagination, including its definition, purview, and 
prescription.  
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 I begin by outlining Mark Johnson’s work on moral imagination. I will rely most 
heavily on his findings throughout this project because he gives the most complete and 
well-supported account. Next, I briefly outline two other contemporary scholars on moral 
imagination, Patricia Werhane and Martha Nussbaum, in order to give more depth to the 
picture of moral imagination. I then draw together their theories under Lawrence Blum’s 
discussion of moral perception and deliberation in order to argue that imagination is 
necessary for moral perception and moral deliberation. Finally, I briefly discuss the 
prescriptive element of moral imagination: if imagination is necessary in our moral lives, 
then we must cultivate it and we ought to do so through the reading of fictional 
narratives. Ultimately, the goal for this chapter is to arrive at a rich understanding of the 
contemporary work on moral imagination, as well as its use in our moral lives in order to 
use the theory in explicating Adorno’s work. 
 
 
Mark Johnson and Moral Imagination 
 
 
 
The overall aim of Mark Johnson’s work in Moral Imagination: Implications of 
Cognitive Science for Ethics is the revelation of human beings as fundamentally 
imaginative moral agents.
2
 In order to show this, Johnson puts forth both critical and 
constructive claims: the former is that the traditional conception of ethics as entirely 
rational is false, while the latter argues that one’s moral understanding and deliberation 
are imaginative. In order to support both theses, Johnson reveals our moral understanding 
                                                     
2 Johnson, Mark.(1993). Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1. 
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and deliberation to rely crucially on imaginative activities rather than abstract laws 
derived from reason and it is this discovery that he calls moral imagination. 
 Yet, what exactly is moral imagination for Johnson? One possible way of 
understanding this term is by first addressing and describing imagination as a unique 
mental faculty and then demonstrating the role this faculty plays in our moral lives. Such 
a tactic is not unheard of: Kant does something very similar, though with reason, in his 
account of ethics. This is, not, however, Johnson’s method. One reason why Johnson 
does not address imagination per se is due to his critique of the tradition of philosophy 
that attempts to separate cognitive functions and assign specific tasks to each.
3
 As we see 
in Kant, for example, the faculty of reason produces universal maxims, while the faculty 
of imagination produces fantasy.
4
 Johnson argues that advancements in cognitive science 
support a collapsing of distinct faculties rather than a separation. Because Johnson is 
critical of imagination as a distinct faculty, he does not, then, discuss moral imagination 
in such a way. 
 A second reason Johnson’s account does not answer the question about moral 
imagination with a strict definition of imagination and its role in our moral lives is 
because of what Johnson sees as the aim of his project. Johnson is not establishing a new 
normative account of ethics in which, at the end, by employing imagination, we are given 
a recipe for determining right from wrong. Rather, Johnson’s argument is that when we 
participate in the world as moral agents, we use certain cognitive activities and these 
activities are imaginative. This is just what we do: we understand and deliberate about 
                                                     
3 Johnson, personal communication, August 4, 2013. 
4
 Kant writes, “The power of imagination, insofar as it also produces images involuntarily, is 
called fantasy.” Kant, Immanuel. (2008). Anthropology, History, and Education. Trans. Allen 
Wood, Paul Guyer, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 7:168. 
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morality through and with the imaginative devices known as metaphor, prototypes, and 
narratives. Since Johnson’s project is to describe moral activity with the help of recent 
work in cognitive science, rather than give a new normative theory, his account of moral 
imagination is more descriptive than prescriptive.  
 Despite the fact that Johnson does not treat imagination as its own separate and 
unique cognitive faculty, but rather identifies it by a certain set of activities and devices, 
there is a unifying sense of imagination that Johnson employs throughout his work. In a 
private communication, Johnson admits to thinking of imagination in a Kantian way, as a 
capacity for making sense of our experiences and holding images in the mind.
5
 For the 
former, Johnson claims that imagination is “a capacity to give form and meaning that 
both precedes and makes possible our conceptual systems.”6 As we will see, Johnson’s 
argument is that morality is highly imaginative and he supports this claim by pointing to 
a number of imaginative devices, which are different ways of performing this 
sensemaking work. While for Kant, the sensemaking work of imagination is purely 
conceptual and comes about in the form of synthesis, Johnson argues that the 
sensemaking need not be purely cognitive nor done solely by synthesis.
7
 Johnson, unlike 
Kant, seems to take a very general understanding of imagination’s capacity for 
sensemaking, namely, that imaginative devices literally are tools that humans use to make 
sense of the world around us. Further, identifying imagination as sensemaking is 
important because it allows us to see why certain devices, like metaphors, prototypes and 
narratives, are, for Johnson, imaginative devices rather than belonging to some other 
                                                     
5 Johnson, personal communication, August 4, 2013. 
6
 Johnson, personal communication, August 4, 2013. 
7 Kant, Immanuel. (2009). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer & Allen Wood. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, B:103-105, 210-211. 
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cognitive activity. In order to understand Johnson’s use of imagination as sensemaking, 
we will briefly examine his imaginative inspiration, Kant.  
 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, among other things, lays out the structures 
of experience including the mental faculties involved in ordering space and time, 
grasping concepts and so forth. As his title suggests, reason is his main focus. He does 
discuss imagination, though he often slights the faculty calling it “a blind though 
indispensable function of the soul” and referring to its activities as a “mere effect.”8  
Despite these remarks, Kant credits imagination with a very crucial function namely, 
synthesis. Synthesis is the “action of putting different representations together with each 
other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition.”9 This synthesis, Kant 
argues, is crucial for experience since without it we would not be able to grasp cognitions 
and deliver them to understanding. For example, if there are representations of red, 
sphere, and hard, it is imagination that allows me to synthesize all three of these 
representations into one cognition and then hand that cognition over to understanding 
which can place said cognition into a category and recognize the object as “ball.”   
Not only is imagination responsible for synthesizing, it is also “the faculty for 
representing an object even without its presence in intuition.”10 The description of 
imagination as the ability to entertain in the mind an object that is not actually present is 
the one most frequently given to the faculty. For example, if one pictures a unicorn in 
one’s mind, this would be done by imagination since the object; here unicorn is not 
present anywhere on earth. The same goes for picturing things less fantastic like trees, 
shoes, and people; although they might not be physically present in front of you and you 
                                                     
8
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are not using your senses to grasp them, you can, nonetheless, “picture” them thanks to 
the faculty of imagination. 
 Although Johnson is influenced by Kant’s understanding of imagination, Johnson 
does not merely adopt Kant’s usage. In fact, as we will see in Werhane’s discussion, 
Kant’s account of imagination is much more complicated and can be understood in three 
distinct ways, though Johnson invokes only one. Additionally, Johnson does not want to 
merely adopt Kant’s distinction between cognitive faculties and even discusses 
imaginative rationality, suggesting that Kant’s distinction between reason and 
imagination is false. Johnson, however, does adopt the spirit of Kant’s work by making 
imagination responsible for sensemaking and holding images or ideas in the mind that are 
not actual. Since, as I have pointed out, Johnson’s account of moral imagination focuses 
on certain cognitive activities that are responsible for making sense of the world, in order 
to better understand Johnson’s project it is necessary to examine these specific cognitive 
activities. 
 
 
The Activities of Moral Imagination 
 
 
 
Metaphors are the first, and most discussed, imaginative device or activity that 
Johnson addresses. Johnson draws from the work of George Lackoff, a cognitive linguist 
who has conducted a “massive systematic analysis of the fundamental conventional 
metaphors of the conceptual systems that underlies the semantics and syntax of 
English.”11 In an earlier book written with Lackoff, entitled Metaphors We Live By, the 
two investigate the extent to which our conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical 
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in nature.
12
 There they define metaphor as “understanding and experiencing one kind of 
thing in terms of another.”13 In Moral Imagination, Johnson continues his earlier work 
but focuses on the ways in which metaphors are pervasive in our conception of moral 
situations.  
In the introduction to Moral Imagination Johnson argues that moral reasoning is 
based on metaphoric concepts at two basic levels: first, that “our most fundamental moral 
concepts (e.g., will, freedom, law, right, duty, well-being, action) are defined 
metaphorically, typically by multiple metaphoric mappings for a single concept,” and 
second, that “The way we conceptualize a particular situation will depend on our use of 
systematic conceptual metaphors that make up the common understanding of members of 
our culture.”14 Johnson’s argument relies on two major sources of evidence: linguistic 
evidence concerning the way we talk about morality and the patterns of inference in our 
moral reasoning that are based on metaphoric concepts.
15
 In order to clearly understand 
Johnson’s point about the importance of metaphor, I will focus on a specific metaphor: 
the “Social Accounting Metaphor.” 
 In the Social Accounting Metaphor, well-being is understood as wealth, and one’s 
actions earn credit or create debt to others.
16
 For example, if I am doing well I can be said 
to have a “rich life” and if I am down and out perhaps it is because I have made “poor 
choices.” Further, if I have done something morally helpful for you, it can be said, “You 
owe me” or, “You are forever in my debt.” Conversely, if I have harmed you then I may 
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ask, “How can I repay you?” or you may proclaim, “I’ll make you pay for what you did!” 
We see that Social Accounting sets up a framework that allows us to recognize when we 
have rights and duties in terms of letters of credit and debts owed. It does not, however, 
define good or bad, or fully assess what we owe or what is owed to us. Rather, the 
metaphor constitutes “our primary conception of the way in which people can accumulate 
moral credit and moral debt.”17  
Johnson argues that this metaphor, and others like it, serves as the foundation of 
our moral understanding; that it is not merely an easy semantic short cut, but rather 
shapes the way in which we make sense of or conceptualize morality itself. Additionally, 
because metaphors serve as the bedrock of moral understanding, they can guide us in 
thinking about “what we ought to do about [a given situation].”18 Therefore, even our 
reasoning or deliberation will be based on metaphors. For example, I will consider, if I 
have harmed you, how I could “enrich” your life through favors or begin to consider what 
action would be likely to cancel (or balance) my previous harm. Again, the Social 
Accounting Metaphor will not tell me unequivocally what to do or what is considered 
good. Rather, it will inform the way I reason about a possible action: debt or the 
canceling of it informs my reasoning. Ultimately, one does not find herself in a moral 
situation and consciously look for and employ a metaphor to assist in her understanding 
and deliberation of that situation. Rather, Johnson argues it is a matter of fact that we 
think through a moral event with metaphors. 
 Although the Social Accounting Metaphor does seem to capture our current way 
of understanding and deliberating about morality, one could ask why this and other such 
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metaphors are considered an activity of imagination.
19
 Our answer is found within 
Johnson’s description of the activity we perform when we use metaphors: “we project 
from one source domain to another thereby constructively bring structure from the source 
domain into our understanding of the target domain.”20 First, we see here that metaphors, 
such as the Social Accounting Metaphor, are tools of sensemaking: they help us make 
sense of when we have harmed someone.
21
 Johnson’s activity of sensemaking is adopted 
from Kant: for both the power of making sense of a situation is due to imagination. 
Second, metaphors require us to project beyond what is actual or given. For example, 
when I project ideas present in the concept of commodity, like debt, value, and so forth, 
onto ideas in morality, I am entertaining in my mind something that is not actually 
present in the world. As we have seen, such activity of entertaining in the mind 
something not present is credited to imagination. The two activities of metaphor, 
sensemaking and projection, are what, for Johnson, makes the device one that belongs to 
imagination.  
 A second question that may arise is, “Why metaphors are particular to moral 
imagination rather than other forms of imaginative reasoning?” Johnson admits that 
metaphor is not specific to morality but rather that our conceptual system in general is 
largely metaphorical. His earlier work, Metaphors We Live By, makes the same point by 
investigating metaphors that permeate a variety of contexts and situations. For example, 
in the opening sections of the work, Johnson and Lackoff examine the concept of 
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argument as understood in terms of war (e.g., “Your claims are indefensible,” “He 
attacked every weak point in my argument,” “I demolished his argument,” and so forth).22 
Metaphors, then, are not unique to moral reasoning and this is due in part to Johnson’s 
argument that there is not a great deal of difference between reasoning about everyday 
things and moral reasoning. In the Introduction to Moral Imagination he argues that 
recent empirical work in cognitive sciences reveals that our general concepts and our 
reasoning are grounded by various imaginative processes and that “since moral reasoning 
makes use of these same general cognitive capacities, it, too, is…imaginative through and 
through.”23 Metaphors, then, are an imaginative device that helps us make sense of the 
world by a projecting exercise. While they aren’t unique to morality, they are 
fundamental to our everyday moral understanding and deliberation and Johnson includes 
metaphors in his description of moral imagination.  
A second imaginative device or process that is crucial to one’s moral 
understanding and deliberation is the use of prototypes. The theory of prototypes, which 
has been advocated by psychologists like Eleanor Rosch and linguists Linda Coleman 
and Paul Kay, concerns the creation and stability of categories. The theory of prototypes 
argues that categories are not definable by a rigid list of features (the position taken 
traditionally), but rather are defined by “identifying certain prototypical members of the 
category,” as well as recognizing and identifying nonprototypical members.24 Categories, 
in the theory of prototypes, are radially structured: in the center, or core, there is a 
prototype, which is a certain central instance of a concept that is easily and non-
controversially recognized. This prototype is surrounded by a large number of other far 
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less clear-cut cases about which we may be less certain as to whether they belong in the 
category. In order to determine whether the radial examples, those at the border of the 
concept, in fact belong in the category, cognitive scientists argue that we imaginatively 
explore the connection and whether it belongs. This imaginative exploration includes 
holding a specific instance in our mind and comparing its context, use, and definition to 
the core case to determine whether the new instance belongs to the particular category. 
Let us, again, focus on a specific example in order to elucidate and simplify our 
discussion.  
One category that is frequently of import in traditional ethics is the lie. We often 
see this category used in commands or maxims that require one not to lie. In order for this 
command to make sense, for people to follow it and accurately assess to what extent 
someone has broken or upheld this command, one must first understand the category of 
lie. Traditional understanding of categories suggests that there must be necessary and 
sufficient conditions in order for a speech act to constitute a lie. For example, a lie must 
conform to three conditions: 1) the speaker believes the statement is false, 2) the speaker 
intends to deceive the hearer, and 3) the statement is actually false.
25
 Let’s say that I steal 
something from you and then, when asked, deny having done so. This is a traditional 
example of a lie since my speech act contains all three conditions of a lie. The theory of 
prototypes, on the other hand, rejects sole reliance on necessary and sufficient conditions 
and argues that categories are determined by identifying prototypical members of the 
category. Our example of stealing and saying otherwise would be considered a 
prototypical example of a lie because it is easily and non-controversially identified by 
those who hear it as a lie. 
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While clear-cut examples are easy to distinguish in both the traditional and the 
prototype understanding of categories, it is when we are faced with examples that fall at 
the fringes of categories that the latter, unlike the former, proves superior. For example, 
let us imagine that you and I have a bit of an angling rivalry. I go fishing alone over the 
weekend and report back to you that I caught a whopper of a fish that was three feet long 
when in fact it was only two feet long. Here, my tale fits all the necessary and sufficient 
criteria of a lie: I know the story to be false, I do intend to deceive you, and my statement 
of the size of the fish is in fact false. However, we do not, as a culture, treat this speech 
act as a lie, worthy of punishment, or one that lessens your trust in me. Proponents of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions model would have to call this a lie, despite it seeming 
more like a mere exaggeration, a speech act which is responded to in a very different way 
than a lie. The theory of prototypes explains that we do not see this exaggeration as a lie 
is because “the concept [lie] exhibits prototype structure, and it functions and gets its 
meaning only in conjunction with certain background models of knowledge and 
communication that are presupposed by us in most of our mundane communicative 
interactions.”26  
In order to determine whether my angling story is a lie one must take the context 
into account and imaginatively explore to what extent the speech act fits within the 
radially structured category of lie. This imaginative exploration could include the 
following: First, was the deceit malicious? That is, I tried to deceive you but was I doing 
so in order to harm you or did I have a less malicious motivation? Also, how important is 
it that my statement is false? If we just have a friendly rivalry, then there are little to no 
consequences about my false speech act. If we had $1,000 bet on it, however, that 
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background context would affect the categorizing of my speech act. Within these 
questions we are postulating in the mind possibilities, including motives and contexts, 
and trying them out to see if they affect the placement of the speech act. These questions, 
the answers to them, and the reasons we give are the imaginative exploration required in 
the theory of prototypes.  
Prototypes, similar to metaphors, are part of Johnson’s account of moral 
imagination because they serve as cognitive activities of sensemaking. Because, as 
Johnson and other linguists have argued, ordinary moral concepts are not defined in 
themselves, but get their meanings and moral force from background idealized cognitive 
models, prototypes are essential to understand how we make sense of such concepts.
27
 
Besides the sensemaking component of prototypes, Johnson suggests imagination is 
necessary in order to perform the cognitive work required in the extension of a concept. 
This extension requires one to postulate or imagine within the mind something not given. 
For example, in order to determine whether a speech act fits the prototypical example of a 
lie, one must imagine the intentions of the speaker, the possible consequences of the 
speech act, and other prototypical examples of a lie. The imaginer must see whether the 
context, intention, and consequences match up closely enough with other, past examples 
of lies, and in doing so she will be able to determine to what extent the specific speech 
act in question fits the prototype of a lie and some of its radial applications. Again, 
prototypes, like metaphors are not unique to moral situations; we may use these devices 
in thinking about the category of art, friendship, fashion, and so forth. Rather, Johnson’s 
point here is that we rely on prototypes in moral situations and they are part of the 
devices that make up moral imagination. 
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The third major imaginative device or process that Johnson finds to be 
fundamental to our moral understanding and deliberation is the use of narrative. Johnson 
defines narrative in a broad sense as, “linguistic stories we tell to others and sometimes 
write them down in words.”28 One of the first instances in which narratives are used as a 
tool of sensemaking concerns the way in which we make sense of ourselves as moral 
agents.  Johnson argues, “human beings try to understand and justify themselves by 
constructing broad narrative contexts within which they locate their identities.”29 In order 
to support his claim Johnson references a “Hooker’s Tale” in which a young woman 
explains the reason for getting into her profession. Johnson argues that not only is she 
telling part of her life story, “she is explaining herself and her actions from a moral 
standpoint, trying to justify herself through a narrative.”30 For example, the hooker 
explains how it was easy for her not to feel any guilt the first time she turned a trick since 
she was used to seeing sex as a kind of transaction in which if a man bought you dinner 
on a date, you owed him at least a kiss. Therefore, having sex for money was just another 
form of this transaction she had been taught.
31
 Johnson remarks that not only is the 
woman telling us the steps by which she became a hooker, but also, “She is trying to 
construct a narrative explanation that will be morally acceptable in her social and cultural 
setting.”32 This “Hooker’s Tale” is not unique to the woman or her situation, but rather is 
what we all do in our lives every day; we too make moral sense of our lives in the form of 
a narrative, we tell the story of our lives, and in doing so we include explanations for 
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actions, editing of certain events, and perhaps even the introduction of fictional 
circumstances.  
Not only are narratives crucial to our self-understanding, and therefore a tool of 
sensemaking, they are also inherent in our moral deliberation. For example, if a young 
woman finds herself with an unwanted pregnancy, she does not exclusively employ some 
sort of hedonic calculator, nor does she only attempt to find a universal maxim under 
which she subsumes her action. Rather, when she deliberates, she does so in a form of 
narrative that explores possibilities for actions. She asks herself what kind of life, or 
story, she wants to see for herself and what kind of actions or events would be produced 
depending on what choice she made. These questions are a form of projection because 
they require the agent to contemplate and picture activities and ideas that have not yet 
come to fruition. 
 Ultimately, Johnson argues, “human life…is a narrative enterprise” because both 
understanding ourselves and acts of deliberation utilize narratives.
33
 It is the synthesizing 
of various choices, actions, and events into a narrative unity that best describes the self, 
as well as our projecting possible narratives into the future that best describes our process 
of moral deliberation. The fundamental use of narratives plays into Johnson’s critical 
thesis because, in revealing their import, Johnson shows how one does not in fact merely 
use a set of rules that tell one what to do without additional imaginative activity. It is, 
rather, the imaginative activity of the narrative that best explains our moral understanding 
and deliberation. 
 Yet narratives themselves require other frameworks in order to function. For 
example, when we deliberate about potential activities we picture in our mind possible 
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activities and these possibilities require us to employ metaphors, exemplars, and past 
experiences. As Johnson argues: 
Sometimes we recall previous situations where we acted well or poorly that are 
similar to our present one and so we use those as a model to guide 
us…Sometimes we try to imagine how those we regard as exemplary moral 
characters might act in our situation…And sometimes we consult 
conventionalized moral precepts or principles…But in each of these cases there 
are broader narrative frameworks in the background which make it possible for us 
to grasp the meaning, importance, and relevance of a particular exemplar, 
anecdote, or principle.
34
  
 
It is in these imaginative explorations that we can and do bring into other cognitive 
activities, such as memory or exemplars. Yet these too rely on imagination: in order to 
compare our actions to an exemplar, we must first imagine what the exemplar might do, 
or in order to compare our previous actions with our present situation, we must hold both 
events in our mind. Not only do we see here how moral imagination requires other 
cognitive activities, we can also begin to see how moral imagination can be a tool for 
moral guidance: through these imaginative activities we can be guided toward an action 
though moral imagination alone doesn’t prompt us in one direction over another. 
 
 
The Importance of Moral Imagination 
 
 
 
Now that we have understood Johnson’s account of moral imagination as a 
number of ways of thinking, or more specifically sense-making and projecting 
possibilities, in moral situations, we must ask why moral imagination is important, that is, 
what is lost if one does not recognize the imaginative components in our moral lives? The 
first thing that we must take into account is that, for Johnson, moral imagination itself 
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will not tell us the right thing to do. Moral imagination, then, is not important due to its 
ability to discover ethical principles or maxims because the activities of metaphor, 
prototypes, or narratives will never give us universal moral commands. Rather Johnson’s 
theory of moral imagination describes how we go about moral understanding and 
deliberation. He says, “That is just the way our mind works…there is nothing 
intrinsically good about metaphor, or any other imaginative device.”35 The closest that 
moral imagination gets to being normative is that it can give a kind of guidance once we 
come to recognize the imaginative structures of our experience.
36
 As we saw in Johnson’s 
discussion of narratives, if we imagine what an exemplar might do, we could use that 
thought experiment to guide our actions. Yet, again, this guidance is not by definition 
good, nor does it necessarily direct one to do good, because the exemplar I imagine may 
not be a good one.   
What I need to make clearer here is that Johnson is not necessarily arguing that 
imagination per se is the only cognitive activity required for moral activity. As I 
mentioned, Johnson argues that there is not a distinct mental faculty of imagination and, 
therefore, he would not advocate for a normative theory that relies solely on imagination. 
Rather, Johnson’s project is to illuminate the variety and importance of a number of 
imaginative activities that we use in our everyday moral activities. As I revealed in the 
examples of metaphors, prototypes, and narratives, a number of different cognitive 
activities came into play: memory, exemplars, and rules. All of these normative 
components have imaginative elements or are closely linked to imagination.   
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His focus on imagination then comes from his idea that imagination is a crucial 
element to morality that has been missing from most major ethical treatises.
37
 Further, 
Johnson himself admits that moral imagination, by itself, without any principles or some 
form of grounding is “arbitrary, irresponsible, and harmful.”38 Johnson’s project, then, is 
much more descriptive than prescriptive, though he does, as we will see, offer a bit of 
guidance at the conclusion of his work regarding the cultivation of moral imagination.  
One of the reasons Johnson argues that his theory of moral imagination will not 
tell us the right thing to do is that he thinks there is “not one and only one right answer, 
and there is no simple method for deciding how to act.”39 Moral situations are 
complicated and do not often simply repeat themselves so there will not be one rule that 
can determine all action. Rather, Johnson argues, if we admit that moral situations are 
complex and multifaceted, we will see that no ethical treatise that argues for a single right 
thing to do with a single path of reasoning will ever be sufficient. Instead, Johnson argues 
we should understand the theory of moral imagination in the same manner as scientific 
theories.  
Psychological theories, for example, do not tell us how to be better, more fulfilled 
people, at least not directly. However, “knowledge of the nature of cognition, motivation, 
development, learning, and so forth, can have some bearing on how we live our lives. 
Such knowledge, will not, however, give us rules for living.”40 Some theories can tell us 
how to be more fulfilled people, but Johnson’s argument here seems to be that most 
explanatory psychology, by explaining the behavior of humans, does not directly or 
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necessarily tell us exactly how to become better people. In the same way, the theory of 
moral imagination tells us about the nature of moral understanding and reasoning, in 
particular the imaginative structure of our moral concepts and reasoning. The theory of 
moral imagination, then, will have implications for our lives and can give us some “very 
general guidance” because “knowing oneself and knowing how human beings work can 
help us understand situations, examine problems, and work out constructive solutions.”41 
Recognizing, for example, that lies are not always clear cut or universalizable concepts, 
can allow one to see a moral situation with more clarity and respond differently than if I 
held the false idea of a lie as a rigid, concrete concept.  
 While moral imagination gets its importance from its activities, and the 
pervasiveness of its activities, Johnson does argue that once one has recognized the 
importance of moral imagination, two major obligations arise. First, an obligation to 
know that human cognition is in large part imaginative and the implications that arise 
from that knowledge, such as the importance of context and the need to move away from 
necessary and sufficient conditions. The second obligation is to cultivate moral 
imagination in ourselves and others.
42
 As we have already outlined the imaginative 
activities of human cognition, we are on our way to achieving his first obligation, his 
second obligation, however, entails a bit more explanation. 
 Johnson’s requirement of cultivating moral imagination specifically means, 
“exercising our capacity for envisioning new possibilities, and imaginatively tracing out 
the implications of our metaphors, prototypes, and narratives.”43 One part of this exercise, 
Johnson argues, would be to develop our moral sensitivity through fictional narratives. 
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Since, as he argues, our lives are structured by narratives, we should, moving forward, 
read and consume narratives because they can prepare us for recognizing metaphors and 
narratives in our everyday lives.
44
 A second part of the exercise is developing empathetic 
imagination understood as imaginatively taking up the part of others. This ‘taking up the 
place of another’ is, according to Johnson, “an act of imaginative experience and 
dramatic rehearsal…We must [sic] go out toward people to inhabit their worlds, not just 
by rational calculations, but also in imagination, feeling, and expression.”45 Empathy then 
is, for Johnson, merely a different form of practice, akin to narratives. Empathy, broadly 
understood, requires one to imaginatively rehearse what a situation might be like. This 
rehearsal, according to Johnson, will give us more information about ourselves (e.g., 
what would I do in this moral situation?) as well as more information about the world we 
inhabit (e.g., I didn’t realize people were in such moral situations). Empathy, as Johnson 
explains it, is not necessarily connected with care, but merely with identification of 
another’s experience and the imaginative rehearsal of it in our own mind. Through 
narratives or the taking up of the perspective of others, we will strengthen and develop 
our moral capacity but, not necessarily in order to make good moral decisions or become 
good moral agents. Rather, the development and practice of the imaginative activities 
involved in moral situations will only allow us to better employ our imaginative faculties. 
Ultimately, if we do not recognize the importance of narrative and metaphor, and then go 
out and do not become further acquainted with such devices, we will find difficulty fully 
utilizing both devices 
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 In the following chapters I will refer to and rely on Johnson’s account of moral 
imagination most heavily. His account is thorough, well-supported, and clear. I want, 
however, to address two other scholars’ contributions to moral imagination in order to 
demonstrate that Johnson’s work is in line with his contemporaries, though more 
developed, and so that we have a clear and robust conception of moral imagination 
moving forward. Both Patricia Werhane and Martha Nussbaum offer accounts of moral 
imagination and, despite their different starting points (Kant for Werhane and Aristotle 
for Nussbaum), they ultimately arrive at similar conclusions regarding the importance of 
imagination in morality.  
 
 
Patricia Werhane and Moral Imagination 
 
 
 
 Patricia Werhane in her work, Moral Imagination and Management Decision-
Making, aims at developing new insights into two questions that plague the business 
ethics community: first, “Why do ordinary, decent managers engage in questionable 
behavior?” and second, “Why do successful companies ignore the ethical dimensions of 
their processes, decisions, and actions?.”46 In order to address these questions Werhane 
offers, in a manner similar Johnson, both a critical and constructive thesis. The critical 
thesis comes at the beginning of her work when she shows the limitations of the current 
answers and insights into these questions.  
Werhane begins her account of moral imagination with a definition of 
imagination as, “the ability to form mental images of real or unreal phenomena or events 
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and to develop different scenarios or different perspectives on those phenomena or 
events.”47 She goes into further detail, expanding her definition by focusing on and 
adopting Kant’s three forms of imagination.48 Throughout Kant’s three critiques he 
distinguishes between three kinds of imagination: reproductive, productive, and 
reflective, or free play. As I noted in Johnson’s conception of imagination, the first type 
of imagination, reproductive, is concerned with synthesis. It is the reproductive 
imagination that synthesizes all of the sensations we receive into representations so that 
perception and memory is possible.
49
 This leads Werhane to conclude that the 
reproductive imagination works in three ways: “(1) it forms images or representations 
from collections of sensations, (2) it connects these representations to produce those 
images in memory, and (3) it connects images with other similar images, thus enabling 
recognition.”50  
 Kant’s second form of imagination is the productive imagination. The productive 
imagination is much more active and, according to Werhane, has at least three functions. 
First, it is responsible for structuring, schematizing, and providing order to 
representations by way of categories of understanding, which makes experience possible. 
Second, it assists us in making sense of pure categories of understanding such as 
“quantity,” because it allows us to think about abstract categories without needing a 
concrete representation. Third, “it synthesizes all our experiences as “ours” from the 
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locus of what Kant called the “transcendental unity of apperception…” the “I” that is the 
subject and unity of all that we call “my experiences.””51   
 The third form of imagination appears in Kant’s final Critique, which concerns 
aesthetic judgments. Here we see imagination in a free play with understanding in order 
to produce aesthetic judgments. The free play occurs when we judge an aesthetic object 
like a painting or flower and rather than subsume that flower under a specific, determined 
category, imagination “plays” with what we know from experience and “also sometimes 
manipulate[s] the categories of understanding.”52 An aesthetic judgment is defined by a 
connection of imagination and understanding, unlike other judgments in which 
understanding just subsumes an object under a category. Imagination, because it is 
lawless, allows the intuition to move back and forth, or play, between itself and 
understanding, and this back and forth is what constitutes an aesthetic judgment. It is in 
this third form of imagination that we get at a sense of creativity; imagination here is not 
limited by reason, categories of understanding, purpose, function or any other laws and 
this freedom allows imagination, in tandem with other faculties, to give rise to aesthetic 
judgments. 
 Werhane uses these three different forms of Kantian imagination in order to give 
a “finely tuned definition of moral imagination.”53 She begins her account of moral 
imagination by saying when moral imagination begins, namely, “with a particular case, 
scenario, or event.”54 Rather than beginning with abstract laws, like ‘thou shalt not steal,’ 
and moving into specific situations in which we test certain rules, Werhane argues that 
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we must begin our discussion of ethics in the specific situation, which may or may not 
involve the temptation to lie. Her reason for starting here with moral imagination is 
because “ethical issues arise in specific real-life situations, not in abstract moral 
theory.”55  
Werhane argues that moral imagination functions analogously to Kant’s three 
forms of imagination, beginning with the reproductive imagination. Kant’s reproductive 
imagination is responsible for the synthesizing of sense data that allows for an experience 
to occur. This task of allowing for an experience to occur, Werhane also posits, is the first 
step of moral imagination. Specifically, Werhane argues that here awareness is crucially 
performed by the reproductive imagination including: 
(1) awareness of the character, context, situation, event, and dilemma at issue; (2) 
awareness of the script or schema function in that context and role relationships 
entailed in that context, and (3) awareness of possible moral conflicts or dilemmas 
that might arise in the situation, including dilemmas created at least in part by the 
dominating script or the situation itself.
56
 
 
 The awareness aspect of the reproductive imagination is necessary when one is first 
engaged in a moral dilemma. For example, let us imagine that I am a police officer who 
is going through a financial hardship and am offered a bribe by someone I pulled over. I 
am currently engaged in the role of police officer, which has certain obligations such as 
upholding the law, but I also have obligations to my family to financially support them. 
My various roles and the duties that accompany them are essential to a moral dilemma 
per se. Further, while Kant’s reproductive imagination synthesizes sense data to allow for 
an experience, here moral imagination is synthesizing more than merely colors, or 
shapes, but rather experiences as understood as the context of the situation, the people 
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involved, the roles they are playing in the event and so forth. By entertaining in the mind 
something that is not present before me, such as roles, responsibilities, social norms, and 
so forth, I am able to see the particulars that constitute the moral situation. It is 
imagination here, in the first stage that “enables us to become aware of the moral 
dilemmas of particular events and the conceptual schemes or mental models operating in 
specific contexts.”57  
 The second form of imagination, productive imagination, is relevant for Werhane 
because “the human mind seldom rests on the particular” and because, “Almost all of us 
always generalize from a particular case to other similar and dissimilar characters, 
situations, or experiences.”58 Just what Werhane means by the term ‘generalizing’ is not 
readily clear, though she does use an example which can help us understand how she is 
using the term. She cites two bonds traders who bought bonds for their clients without 
their knowledge, thereby illegally buying more treasury bonds than are allowed. Werhane 
argues that these traders took a particular situation, like buying a bond for a client, and 
traced that action to what they perceived to be the operative script at their company. In 
this example, generalizing seems to be taking that particular situation or event that we 
find ourselves within and, through the productive imagination, abstracting it to other 
situations, events, or even to larger scripts (such as a company’s motto). In our police 
officer example, I may become aware of the specific moral situation I am in thanks to 
reproductive imagination, and then it is the productive imagination that allows me to take 
this particular bribe and begin to abstract it to other events when I encountered a bribe, to 
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my training for the police, to an idea of justice, to my family and what they might think, 
and so forth.  
 In order to begin to evaluate the situation that we are in, namely by generalizing 
from the particular moral event to other moral events, or other scripts, one needs to be 
able to disengage from the specific role or script that one is in and take a step back. This 
disengaging is what allows us to be critical of a certain role and allows us to recognize 
that we are more than just one role and that we have more than just one set of obligations 
or duties and to see the situation from a more objective perspective.
59
 This distancing 
seems to be a type of awareness, so one might want to say that the second form of moral 
imagination is merely another iteration of the first. While the second form can be 
construed as a form of awareness, it is different than the first. In the second form of moral 
imagination, unlike the first, we are able to distance ourselves from our individual roles 
and see the bigger picture of the conflict. The second form of moral imagination is also 
much more critical than the first: as productive, moral imagination “accounts for our 
ability to reframe our experiences in different terms, so that we can evaluate our 
operative mental models and critique role demands.”60 
 The third and final form of moral imagination is analogous to Kant’s free 
reflection. Werhane argues that this form of moral imagination “helps us to project 
beyond the constraints of particular scripts or biases. Creative imagination facilitates the 
ability to envision and actualize novel, morally justifiable possibilities through fresh 
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points of view.”61 Just as Kant’s free imagination allows one to step outside of the rules 
of understanding in aesthetic judgments, Werhane’s creative moral imagination allows 
one to get distance from certain roles or role responsibilities and begin to envision 
possibilities for action that are not immediately present. This freedom and flexibility is 
important because if I am only involved in my role or script of familial support, I feel as 
if my possibilities for action are limited: I must take the bribe. If I can step back, 
however, and get some distance and evaluate the situation, then I can employ a creative 
aspect of imagination that allows me to see that there are a number of possibilities for 
action: I can turn down the bribe and perhaps in doing so I will receive a promotion and 
thereby satisfy all of my obligations.  
 
 
Martha Nussbaum and Moral Imagination 
 
 
 
 Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge investigates the role of literature in moral 
theory. Nussbaum, similarly to Werhane and Johnson, presents her readers with both 
critical and constructive theses, which intertwine in order to achieve her main aim: the 
importance of literature for moral understanding. Nussbaum’s critical thesis is a 
challenge to traditional moral theory that privileges abstract thought and general rules 
that apply universally. Her constructive thesis argues that ethical theories need to 
incorporate features such as the value of emotions, the priority of perception, and the 
ethical relevance of uncontrolled happenings because these features reflect “what we 
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actually do when we ask ourselves the most pressing ethical questions.”62 She argues that 
novels support these features and allow us to explore important questions about our 
lives.
63
  
 Nussbaum’s account of imagination is inspired by Aristotle. According to 
Nussbaum, Aristotle’s account of imagination (or phantasia) can be found in both 
perception and deliberation. In perception, Nussbaum argues that Aristotelian 
imagination is a capacity “of focusing on some concrete particular, either present or 
absent, in such a way as to see (or otherwise perceive) it as something, picking out the 
salient features, discerning its content.”64 Nussbaum also stresses the importance of 
imaginative deliberation (or what she calls “deliberative phantasia”) as the “ability to 
link several imaginings or perceptions together.”65 In both its perceptive and deliberative 
activities, Nussbaum argues that imagination, “works closely in tandem with memory, 
enabling the creature to focus on absent experienced items in their concreteness, and even 
to form new combinations, not yet experienced, from items that have entered sense-
experience.”66 Ultimately, Nussbaum argues that Aristotle’s phantasia does much of the 
work of imagination as we know it: it focuses on absent or unexperienced items. Yet, 
Aristotle’s account, she argues, also emphasizes imagination’s selective and 
discriminatory character.
67
  
In order to understand Aristotle’s dual description of imagination let us look at an 
example: I find myself at a party where a person makes a joke in which a woman is told 
                                                     
62 Nussbaum, Martha. (1992). Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 24. 
63 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 25, 142, 189 & 290. 
64 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 77. 
65
 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 77.  
66 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 77. 
67 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 77. 
  38         
to go back to the kitchen, where she belongs, and make a sandwich. In this instance, 
according to Nussbaum, imagination functions in two ways. First, imagination picks out 
the concrete particulars of the event so as to allow me to see the joke as something, 
specifically here as misogynistic. Imagination does this selective activity by allowing me 
to hold in my mind certain aspects of the event, like the context, things I know about the 
person who said the joke, my conception of jokes, and in doing so assists in my seeing 
the joke as misogynistic. This activity is imaginative, as opposed to some other cognitive 
capacity, because one must hold in the mind phenomena that are not present before us 
and compare them to each other. Certainly, imagination is not working alone in this 
activity; memory, for example, is needed to have past experiences to compare to this new 
experience. But insofar as we hold multiple phenomena in our minds and compare them 
to each other, some of which are not physically present, imagination is at work in 
perception. Second, imagination is involved in my deliberation by allowing me to think 
of other times when I heard a misogynistic utterance and responded, and see if such a 
response would fit here. I can also imagine possibilities for actions that I have never done 
before but that might be appropriate now. This activity is imaginative because I am 
linking my perceptions and previous memories in order to deliberate about the best 
course of action.  
Nussbaum’s conception of imagination focuses on perception and deliberation 
and her account of moral imagination follows suit. In “Finely Aware and Richly 
Responsible” Nussbaum connects moral imagination to perception by arguing that the 
task of moral imagination is, “The effort to see and really to represent,” in particular this 
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seeing and representing is done in the “face of constant…muddlement.”68 Moral 
situations are often riddled with muddlement: what is the right thing to do? What duties 
carry more weight? What kind of consequences will my actions have? Imagination, then, 
will help clear away some of this muddlement by helping us better perceive the situation. 
For example, imagination can help us see a moral situation from multiple points of view 
and in doing so can help us better understand the consequences for our actions, or how 
violating a duty might feel to the other involved. Nussbaum also ascribes to moral 
imagination a more creative endeavor. She writes, “the work of the moral imagination is 
in some manner like the work of the creative imagination, especially that of the 
novelist.”69 Here we see imagination as creative, in particular, as allowing for the novelist 
to create works of art. In a similar way, imagination will help us as moral decision 
makers to be creative when it comes to our actions and responses to moral dilemmas.  
 One of the most important features of our moral lives for Nussbaum is 
perception, specifically perception of the particular. This feature, which Nussbaum calls 
both “the Priority of Perception” and “the Priority of the Particular,” is the most often 
discussed feature in Love’s Knowledge.70 Nussbaum defines the priority of perception as, 
“the ability to discern, acutely and responsively, the salient features of one’s particular 
situation.”71 In making her case for the importance of moral perception, Nussbaum turns 
to Aristotle and argues that Aristotle is one of the first to praise perception in his account 
of ethics. Aristotle’s privileging of perception is, according to Nussbaum, a “praising [of] 
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the grasping of particulars.”72 For example, in order to determine or deliberate about what 
action is the most virtuous, one must first pick out and perceive the relevant features of 
an event. If I am in a battle and want to deliberate about the courageous action, I must 
perceive the relevant information about that battle that will make up my deliberation: the 
number of enemies, not the color of my hair; the type of weapon I have, not how much I 
miss my mom. Perception of particulars is important because rather than beginning with a 
universal law or rule, Nussbaum and Aristotle suggest that perception is the first step in 
moral deliberation.
73
 Part of this need, early on, for perception is that Nussbaum argues, 
“Situations are all highly concrete, and they do not present themselves with duty labels 
on them.”74 Rather, moral dilemmas, and life for that matter, are complex and messy. In 
order to cut through some of that complexity and deliberate well one must first perceive 
the important aspects of the situation.  
While perception of particulars is necessary to be a good perceiver, Nussbaum 
argues that good deliberation is like an actress doing improvisation or a jazz musician 
doing the same.
 75
 The factors of improvisation that make it analogous to moral 
deliberation are that for both, “what counts is flexibility, responsiveness, and openness to 
the external.”76 The improvising actress will be constrained by some rules, like the 
physical limitations of her stage, the actors with which she can interact, and perhaps a 
general guideline for the scene. However, what distinguishes an improviser from an 
actress enacting a script is the latter’s ability to create within that space new stories, 
actions, and responses. The good moral deliberator must do the same; she must be able to 
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respond in a way that is not entirely predetermined beforehand, but she must be creative 
in her ability to contemplate and enact new and unique responses to moral dilemmas.  
 Now that we have seen the importance of perception of particulars and creative 
deliberation, I want to show how, for Nussbaum, imagination is responsible for both. In 
order to do so, let us turn to an example she discusses frequently in Love’s Knowledge: 
Maggie Verver in Henry James’ The Golden Bowl. Nussbaum argues that Maggie is a 
paradigmatic perceiver and deliberator, and I will show how Maggie’s exemplar status is 
due to her imagination. In one particular instance, Nussbaum gives a two-page excerpt 
from the book in which we, the reader, get to see Maggie’s process of deliberation 
regarding her father. In particular, Maggie is torn between the love of her father, Adam, 
who has been her everything for most of her life, and the love for her new husband. Both 
men are making conflicting demands on her and she must determine to whom her duty 
lies and what course of action she must take. 
Maggie’s perception, according to Nussbaum, is paradigmatic because she 
recognizes the situation as highly complex. Maggie “allows herself to explore fully the 
separate nature of each pertinent claim, entering into it, wondering about what it is, 
attempting to do justice to it in feeling as well as thought.”77 The claims that Nussbaum 
references here are the ones being made of Maggie by the different men in her life. In 
order to fully see the claims and what values they may have, Maggie must hold them 
together in her mind and compare them. In her mental activities of comparison, she can 
explore to what extent the claims come into conflict and why. Maggie cannot do this 
work in the abstract but rather must focus on particulars: “[Maggie] must consider not 
simply what, in a general way, her duties [are]…She must think what they are given 
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[this] concrete situation.”78 In order to see these particulars, Maggie must imaginatively 
hold the claims and see them in their complexity. 
Another place where we see imagination connecting to perception has to do with 
the specific people in Maggie’s life. Nussbaum writes, “[Maggie] is prepared to 
recognize non-repeatable and unique items as morally relevant alongside the 
universalizable. “Father” does not exhaustively describe the morally salient features of 
her situation with Adam.”79 Here Maggie is using her imagination to extend beyond one 
way of viewing her father, and recognize that in fact there are a multitude of ways of 
perceiving him: “By finding a way to perceive him, to imagine him not as father and law 
and world but as a finite human being whose dignity is in and not opposed to his 
finitude.”80 Maggie has, for too long, idealized her father by making him a god-like 
figure who gave her rules, responsibilities, and a purpose. Now, however, she has a new 
man in her life who challenges the duties and status of her father. In order to see the 
situation better, she must see her father better and this seeing requires imagination. 
Maggie must hold in her mind the various roles of her father and the particulars that make 
him who he is. These particulars are not present before her but held only in the mind. By 
comparing them, she is able to see her father anew, namely as something more than an 
authority figure. It is only with this new sight that Maggie can fully address and assess 
the situation she finds herself in.  
In both examples we see imagination helping perception in a particular way, 
namely as being open, or as Nussbaum puts it, surprised. Nussbaum argues that “vision 
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of particularity involves a willingness to be incomplete, to be surprised by the new.”81 In 
the first instance, Maggie must let herself be surprised by the claims being made. She 
cannot merely see all claims or obligations placed on her by her father and husband as 
equal since they are not. Neither can she set the claims to a universal maxim and expect a 
wholly positive outcome. Rather, Maggie must be open in her perceptions. She must try 
out, and not be closed off to particular perceptions from the outset. In the second 
instance, Maggie must be open in perceptions of her father. She must be willing to see 
him as more than one thing (i.e., an authority figure). Without this openness in her 
perceptions, Maggie will fail to see her situation as complex. It is Maggie’s imagination 
that allows her to experience this openness: because imagination allows us to see things 
not present and link them with other experiences and memories, imagination allows us to 
experience or perceive things in new and unique ways.  
Not only does Maggie employ a highly imaginative perception, she is also, 
according to Nussbaum, imaginative in her deliberation. In another scene from The 
Golden Bowl, Maggie is faced with a moral situation and imagines a number of possible 
responses to her situation. One such response, Maggie imagines, would cause suffering 
for her friend. Maggie’s deliberation, then, according to Nussbaum, includes “attempting 
to understand [the situation] and its implications for her choice, allowing herself vividly 
to picture and imagine the suffering of her friend.”82 This rich mental picturing makes 
Maggie’s deliberative activities paradigmatic because she becomes the improvising 
actress, which Nussbaum advocates as the best type of deliberator. Nussbaum writes, 
“Maggie sees herself as an actress improvising her role, we must remember, too, that the 
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actress who improvises well is not free to do anything at all. She must at every 
moment…be responsively alive and committed to the other actors, to the evolving 
narrative, to the laws and constraints of the genre and its history.”83 Maggie is 
constrained by the relationships that she has, the people with whom she cares about and 
these serve as her constraints; she does not want to hurt her friend so she will imagine a 
response that will avoid such hurt. Maggie does not merely apply an abstract rule to her 
situation, but rather imagines a number of possibilities of action and in those imaginings 
takes into account the potential harm or help that may result from her actions. Her 
decision is then based on this imaginative activity, and therefore requires her to be open 
and flexible, rather than merely follow predetermined laws.  
Nussbaum’s example of Maggie Verver illustrates to us the ways in which 
imagination assists in our perception and deliberation of moral events. Maggie is the 
paradigmatic moral perceiver and deliberator because she is open to new perceptions as 
well as creative possibilities for response. It is Maggie’s constant employment of 
imagination that allows her to be Nussbaum’s paradigm: by seeing her father, her friends, 
and her situation in a certain way, by connecting those details with other experiences and 
memories, and by imagining and mentally trying out certain responses, Maggie is truly 
richly aware and finely responsible.  
 
 
Johnson, Werhane, and Nussbaum Connected 
 
 
 
 In order to conclude the discussion of the contemporary work done on moral 
imagination I am going to draw out the major similarities between all three accounts and 
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argue for a picture of moral imagination that I will use going forward. I define moral 
imagination as the use of imagination in moral situations. My reason for structuring my 
definition of moral imagination as such is due to the ways in which Johnson, Werhane, 
and Nussbaum speak of moral imagination. For all three, they begin their respective 
works with a discussion of imagination per se and then specify how it works in our moral 
lives. Their basic definitions of imagination are also similar: for Johnson it is a capacity 
for mental projection and sensemaking, for Werhane it is a holding of phenomena in the 
mind and for Nussbaum it allows a creature to focus on absent experienced items. In all 
three definitions, imagination is the ability to hold in the mind something that is not 
necessarily present before us, which is the prototypical understanding of imagination.  
Additionally, all three scholars advocate for the necessity of imagination in moral 
situations. I want to go further by drawing all their arguments together and suggest that 
each require imagination as necessary for moral perception and deliberation as defined by 
Lawrence Blum. Blum defines moral perception as “anything contributing to or 
encompassed within the agent’s take on the situation—his salience-perception—prior to 
his deliberating about what to do.”84 The situation Blum has in mind is a moral one: 
moral perception constructs what an agent is faced with in a moral situation in the first 
place by tuning into a morally significant feature of the situation. For example, Tim, a 
white male, is waiting for a cab next to a black woman and her daughter. A cab pulls up, 
passing the family, and stopping in front of Tim who gets in. Blum argues that it is Tim’s 
moral perception that allows him to see this event as morally significant, rather than just a 
standard cab ride. Let us use the cab example as a tool for illuminating Blum’s 
conception of moral perception. 
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 First, Blum argues that inferences are “within the rubric of moral perception.”85 
Tim can use his knowledge about racism or injustice to infer that the cab driver passed 
the family because “he just prefers not to have blacks in his cab, or does not want to go 
into the sort of neighborhood where he imagines the woman will ask him to go.”86 
Second, Blum considers retrospection to be a part of moral perception. Again in the cab 
example, Blum argues that Tim can put the pieces of the situation together after he is 
already in the cab and see the driver’s actions as not merely picking him up, but rather in 
a different way as passing by two black people because he is racist. Moral perception, 
then, is not necessarily an immediate act of perception like seeing the color red. Rather, 
for Blum one can be morally perceptive during an event or after it has taken place since 
he defines moral perception as merely preceding moral deliberation. Tim, for example, 
will not deliberate about how to respond to the taxi driver until he has seen, or inferred, 
the driver’s actions as racist. This seeing can come after the initial pick up and perhaps 
while Tim is in the car or after he has arrived at home.  
Imagination is needed for a number of the activities that constitute moral 
perception.
87
 For example, Johnson argues that metaphors constitute our primary method 
of understanding morality and shape the way we see moral harm and help; namely, as 
creating debt or credit. Metaphors are imaginative because they require us to project 
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mentally beyond what is actual or given. Projecting ideas present in the concept of 
commodity, like debt, onto ideas of morality, require us to entertain in the mind 
something that is not actually present in the world. Metaphors since they shape the way 
we see moral harm, are tools of perception. Tim could, for example, see the passing of 
the black family as a harm and think that the cab driver owes him an explanation or owes 
them an apology; Tim, then, sees the cab driver’s action as creating a debt to either 
himself or to the family.  
Additionally, prototypes are a tool for moral perception because prototypes are 
ways of categorizing our thoughts or events and assist in our ability to see events as 
something. In Tim’s case, he may think of a prototypical case of racism and hold this 
current event in his mind to see if the event fits within the category of racism. This 
perception through prototypes is a type of inference, which Blum places in the category 
of moral perception.  
Narratives are also a form of moral perception. As we saw in Johnson’s 
“Hooker’s Tale,” the woman in question saw her life in terms of a narrative. Not only 
that, she saw her moral choices in terms of a story and used it in order to explain her 
actions to herself and to others. Tim could conceptualize his life in terms of a story about 
social justice: Tim’s life choices are made in service of promoting social justice. Because 
Tim sees his life in this way he is more sensitive to injustices and therefore will see the 
cab driver’s actions as an injustice.  
Werhane’s first stage of moral imagination also fits Blum’s definition of moral 
perception. In reproductive moral imagination, one becomes aware of the character, 
context, situation, event, and dilemma as a moral issue. In order to do so, Werhane 
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argues, imagination takes all of the information about the event and synthesizes it in 
order for us to see the event as a moral dilemma. This synthesizing requires one to project 
in the mind things that are not actually present. Although Werhane claims that moral 
imagination is necessary for moral decision making, I want to argue that her first form of 
moral imagination actually falls within the purview of moral perception. Because the 
reproductive moral imagination is focused on awareness, it is much more closely tied to 
perception than deliberation. Further, reproductive moral imagination is the first step for 
Werhane in moral decision making, just as moral perception is the first step in a moral 
situation for Blum. Werhane does not separate the different stages or processes in a moral 
situation, but lumps them all together under the heading moral decision making. Despite 
this lumping, because the reproductive moral imagination concerns only awareness, and 
because it is the first step in a moral situation, it belongs under Blum’s category of moral 
perception.  
Further, the synthesizing awareness in reproductive moral imagination is exactly 
what Blum has in mind with his conception of moral perception; the reproductive moral 
imagination allows us to see the event as morally salient previous to moral deliberation. 
For Werhane, we become aware by recognizing roles or schemas, and we can see Tim 
doing something similar: he can become aware of his role as a passenger in a cab, but 
also his role as defender of justice or his commitment to stopping racism. Once he 
becomes aware of these roles, he can recognize with better clarity what the cab driver has 
done and how it violates Tim’s duties to uphold justice. 
Finally, Nussbaum, as we saw, places a great deal of importance on one’s ability 
to perceive particulars in a moral event. These particulars are perceived thanks to 
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imagination’s ability to hold in the mind experiences, memories, or imaginings that are 
not necessarily present. As we saw in Nussbaum’s paradigm of Maggie, she perceives the 
morally salient features of her father by holding in the mind different actions, emotions, 
and roles of her father. Tim becomes ‘finely aware’ by seeing the situation as something, 
namely as one in which an injustice as occurred. He can only see the situation in this way 
if he focuses on the particulars of what occurred, namely the cab driver passing up the 
black couple. Tim is able to focus on these particulars by bringing together in his mind 
his idea of justice, memories of racism, and what he imagines it must be like to be a black 
family who has been passed up by a cab.  
 The second component of a moral situation that all three of our imagination 
scholars discuss in conjunction with moral imagination is deliberation. Blum argues that 
perception comes first before “deliberating about what to do.” For our purposes then, 
moral deliberation will be understood as the activity following moral perception and 
involves considering what action one should take in response to a given situation. 
Included within this idea could be applying a principle or maxim to the event, like trying 
to determine which action would bring about the greatest amount of happiness or which 
action conforms to a universal maxim. In like fashion to our discussion of moral 
perception, I will show how moral imagination is used in moral deliberation.  
Narratives as well as being a tool of moral perception are also used in order to 
figure out what one should do by employing a number of possible narratives in order to 
see potential responses to an event. These possible narratives require us to hold in the 
mind events or ideas that are not present or actual but could be. Like we saw in our 
unwanted pregnancy example, the young woman must picture events about what her life 
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would be like if she got an abortion, what her life would be like if she kept the child, and 
so forth. Tim, for example, may think of what narrative or story will be produced if he 
calls the cab driver out for his actions. 
In Werhane’s second form of moral imagination, in order to evaluate one’s 
current situation, one generalizes a specific situation to other similar situations. This 
activity requires one to hold in the mind events that are not present and then use those as 
tools for comparison. The evaluative aspect of this second form is a tool of moral 
deliberation. Further, in the productive moral imagination one is required to get distance 
from the role she finds herself in and become critical of the situation. In order to become 
critical, one must already be aware that she is within a moral dilemma. For that reason, 
this productive moral imagination fits Blum’s account of moral deliberation. In order for 
Tim to critically assess his situation he must distance himself from his initial position as a 
passenger of a cab. He must take a step back and recognize that there is a great deal more 
going on in the situation. If he, however, remains stuck in his viewpoint as a tired 
passenger, he may not be able to see the cab driver’s actions as racist.  
Additionally, according to Werhane, the reflective form of moral imagination 
allows one to see from a different viewpoint in order to assess unique or creative 
responses to a moral event. This activity requires one to step outside of her own role and 
try to put herself in another person’s shoes. From this new viewpoint, one can 
contemplate possibilities for actions that she might not have seen before. This reflective 
activity requires one to hold in the mind a perspective that is not their own, but is 
imagined, as well as possibilities for action that are not present but could come to 
fruition. Because this third form of moral imagination focuses more on possible 
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responses to an event, it falls into the category of deliberation, rather than perception. 
Tim, in the reflective moral imagination, is free to create possibilities for action by 
combining previous experiences or imagined outcomes to the situation.  
Finally, for Nussbaum, imagination is also involved in deliberation, or what she 
calls being richly responsible. In particular, imagination allows us to create new 
possibilities for action within our mind and try them out there before we act. Again, this 
is done by imagination’s ability to combine in the mind, experiences, memories and 
imaginings in order to produce new connections. Maggie, as we saw, performs this 
responsive activity when she deliberates about an outcome that might cause her friend to 
suffer. As an agent who is richly responsible, Nussbaum argues imagination creates new 
possibilities for action by linking up our imaginings, experiences, and memories in new 
ways. Tim could be ‘richly responsible’ here by picturing in his mind unique responses to 
the cab driver’s actions, like getting out of the cab and insisting the cab driver take the 
family, or calling the cab driver’s authority figure and reporting him.  
Through Blum’s example of the racist cab driver we have seen how the major 
activities described by our three scholars are imaginative tools of moral perception or 
deliberation. We have also seen that imagination is not the only component required for 
moral perception or deliberation; one can also employ maxims in deliberation or 
memories in perception. Although imagination is not sufficient for either moral 
perception or deliberation, it is necessary.  
 
 
Moral Education Through Narratives 
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 As all three authors demonstrate, moral imagination is necessary for our moral 
lives. They also agree that, given the integral role of imagination, we must work on 
cultivating it. Johnson ends his work with the obligation that we must rehearse or practice 
the imaginative activities required for morality and advocates in favor of Nussbaum’s 
suggestion that we do so through fictional narratives. Werhane, as well, discusses 
cultivation through narratives, though she focuses the least on a prescriptive element 
noting only that teaching mangers via general rules will not produce good moral 
decisions and agrees that teaching through narratives would be a more preferable tool.
88
 
Ultimately, both Johnson and Werhane’s projects were to set out a holistic picture of 
moral imagination and only briefly suggest methods of cultivation, though they do stress 
that the mere memorization and application of general rules will lead to poor moral 
agents. It is Nussbaum, in Love’s Knowledge, who advances an argument for the 
cultivation of imagination through fictional narratives. It is also her work that is adopted 
by cognitive scientists and supported through recent advancements therein. I will, 
therefore, focus on elucidating her project.  
Nussbaum, as we saw, adopts an Aristotelian understanding of imagination and a 
corresponding Aristotelian conception of perception and deliberation. Her discussion of 
education also follows an Aristotelian framework, in particular focusing on the need of a 
paradigm and practice in order to cultivate one’s moral activities. The paradigm is, for 
Aristotle, often referred to as an exemplar or a person of practical wisdom. This exemplar 
is someone to whom a young, developing person can turn and look to in order to see an 
example of a good moral agent. By turning to this moral exemplar, the developing moral 
agent can mimic the actions of the exemplar and also use the exemplar as a real life test 
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of what to do.
89
 For example, if I am a developing moral agent and I am faced with lying 
to my parents, I can look at a person of practical wisdom and ask myself, “What would 
she do in this situation?” and then model that behavior. I can also see what the person of 
practical wisdom has done in the same situation and mimic that response.  
 In addition to a paradigm, Aristotle argues that one must cultivate a habit of 
continually choosing between excess and deficiency.
90
 In order to cultivate this habit, one 
must actively and constantly be choosing.
91
 One cannot just hope that she will form the 
habit, that is, the habit is not merely some theoretical goal or ideal, but rather is 
something that must be practiced. If I want to be a courageous person, for example, I 
cannot just hope that I will be, but rather I must, when faced with opportunities of 
courage, respond in a courageous way. Nussbaum’s claims about the educational aspects 
of novels follow closely to Aristotle’s: novels can give paradigms and practice for future 
moral agency; in particular, novels can give paradigms and practice for moral perception 
and moral deliberation. Nussbaum also claims that novels fit the Aristotelian idea of habit 
building, or what I am calling practice, by requiring us to perform similar cognitive and 
affective activities.
92
  
Nussbaum’s greatest paradigm of moral activities is the fictional Maggie Verver. 
Maggie is a paradigm for Nussbaum because of the way she sees, specifically that she is 
‘finely aware.’ This way of seeing has to do with attending to particulars, like seeing a 
person as a friend, brother, and father and all of the particular duties and rules that each 
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entail. Maggie, then, when we read about her is a paradigmatic example of a moral 
perceiver. We can see what actions Maggie takes and model our behavior after them.  
A large part of what makes Maggie a paradigmatic seer is her imagination, 
specifically for Nussbaum, her ability to focus on concrete particulars and see them as 
something (i.e., seeing Adam as more than a father). While reading about Maggie’s 
process of perceiving her father, I am given a model of how one should see, specifically 
how one should see a person in a concrete way; how all of the particulars about the 
person, such as your relationships, the duties you have, and so forth, constitute how you 
perceive the person. Maggie’s way of seeing, in particular, the imaginative activities she 
employs therein, can serve as exemplary behavior and one which the reader can and 
should mimic.  
Further, Maggie is an exemplar not only because she is ‘richly’ aware but also 
that she was not always. Nussbaum argues that Maggie, earlier in the novel, used to see 
people as works of art and that this method of seeing is incorrect: “We are shown that this 
ideal, followed out to its strictest conclusion, generates an extraordinary blindness to 
value and ends by subordinating the particular claim of each commitment and love to the 
claims of harmony.”93 Maggie’s initial perceptions refused to view people as entire 
human beings and rather treated them as idealized things. The reader, then, observes the 
transition in Maggie’s way of seeing from dull to refine. Accompanying this transition, 
the reader is given access to the failings and ill consequences that arise with Maggie’s 
poor perceiving, contrasted with her growth and maturity found in her more robust form 
of seeing at the end of the novel. Not only, then, do we get the paradigm of Maggie in her 
perceptions, we also, as readers, are given her transformation here to: we see her 
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struggles, how she overcame them and the benefits she gets with her new, finer 
perceptions.  
We also, because of the nature of narratives, have access to Maggie’s inner 
thoughts and motivations, which is something we wouldn’t get with a normal exemplar. 
Because in novels, more so than in our everyday lives, we are given the thoughts and 
motivations of characters in moral situations, I want to suggest that characters in novels 
can sometimes be better, more helpful, paradigms than real people. With a real life 
person, I only see the result of choices and, often only the negative effects of poor 
choices. For example, if I have a real life paradigm to whom I look up to and model my 
behavior off of, I do not necessarily see every time she has struggled with telling the 
truth, and I am not given the intimate reasons for many of her life choices. Certainly 
times at which she may have failed to be virtuous are seen if they produce negative 
consequences and a few times I might be privy to her self-reported decision making 
process. Yet, for the most part, I am not given all of the components that are truly 
necessary to model my moral perception or decision-making processes. I am not given 
reasons for many of her virtuous decisions, nor shown how she, internally, deals with 
conflicts of duty. With fictional characters, in particular characters within novels, I can 
and often am given such access. Maggie, then, could be a better paradigm because we get 
to see her struggles, her transitions, her thoughts, and motivations.  
 Not only do novels give us a positive paradigm, someone we can and should 
model our behavior from, they can also give us negative models. Nussbaum also 
discusses the character Fanny whose perceptions are too colored by imagination and 
fantasy so that she regards “complicated people and predicaments of the world with an 
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aestheticizing love.”94 Fanny is a poor perceiver because she is too much in a fantasy of 
her own creation. This poor perception leads Fanny into problematic situations and 
relationships. Although, Fanny is not a positive paradigm that we should emulate, she is 
important to the idea of novels offering paradigms. In particular, Fanny shows us what 
not to do and this lesson is made even stronger when Fanny is put in contrast with 
Maggie. 
Additionally, fictional narratives allow us, the reader, to practice the activities 
involved in our own, moral perceptions. For example, in our reading of novels we 
imaginatively put ourselves in the position of a fictional character: “We are certainly 
called upon to picture the scene as we read. And since the world of the scene is given to 
us from the point of view of a single character, we are asked to enter, in our imagining, 
into that point of view.”95 
Further, the content and style of fiction promotes the practice of an exploratory 
form of seeing, in particular when we read novels we are engaged in a number of 
activities including “searching for patterns.”96 The act of finding patterns is very much in 
line with Blum’s discussion of inferences in moral perception. Tim, if we remember, 
could see the cab driver’s actions as racist because he inferred it: Tim could have other 
experiences with racist actions and see if this current activity fits his situation. Novels, 
then, offer a method of practicing the cognitive activities of exploration in particular 
those closely associated with imagination. Johnson’s prototypes, for example, require an 
imaginative exploration, that is similar in kind to the exploration described here. 
Nussbaum’s perception phantasia (as the capacity to focus on a particular in order to see 
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it as something by picking out the salient features) also fits the description of this 
exploratory seeing: searching for patterns requires one to see a number of things as 
related in some way. We get from novels, then, a method of practicing the imaginative 
activities required for moral deliberation.   
 Finally, novels offers us the opportunity to see and, in a way, experience events or 
moral dilemmas that we might not have encountered before. This additional content gives 
us a means to practice our perceptions as Nussbaum argues, “A novel, just because it is 
not our life, places us in a moral position that is favorable for perception and it shows us 
what it would be like to take up that position in life.”97 In novels we are given the 
opportunity to see and, in a way, experience events or moral dilemmas that we might not 
have encountered before. Yet, we can now practice what it may be like to be in that 
situation. This additional content, then, gives us a means to practice our perceptions. 
Fictional narratives can also give us, like moral perception, paradigms for 
deliberation. By putting herself in her friend’s shoes, Maggie, for instance, is attempting 
to find a decision that will produce a lack of suffering. She then, can be seen as a model 
for which we should follow: we too should, in contemplating what to do, imagine how it 
may harm those around us and consider such imaginative content when we act. 
 While fictional narratives offer us paradigmatic perceivers, which we can mimic, 
they also, according to Nussbaum serve as a method for practicing our own deliberative 
skills. Nussbaum argues:  
What I now want to suggest is that the adventure of the reader of this novel, like 
the adventurer of the intelligent characters inside it, involves valuable aspects of 
human moral experience that are not tapped by traditional books of moral 
philosophy…For this novel calls upon and also develops our ability to confront 
mystery with the cognitive engagement of both thought and feeling. To work 
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through these sentences and these chapters is to become involved in an activity of 
exploration and unraveling that uses abilities, especially abilities of emotion and 
imagination, rarely tapped by philosophical texts.
98
  
 
Our very reading of novels is a practice for the imaginative skills that are required in our 
everyday moral deliberations. For example, novels are often rich with detail and 
complexity, in ways that very much mirror our real life. In order to deliberate about what 
to do in the face of complexity, we must explore it with our imagination. The content, 
then, of novels allows us to practice for future moral decisions because it can mirror real 
life but also extend it by giving us new possibilities to imagine and contemplate.  
 In addition to the mystery and complexity found in fictional narratives, we also 
undertake the imaginative activity of putting ourselves into another world and another’s 
shoes, which is very characteristic of our real life moral decision making process. 
Nussbaum writes, “Interpreting a novel or play involves one, indeed, in a kind of 
sympathetic reason-giving that is highly characters of morality; for we ask ourselves, as 
we try to enter into the plot, why the characters do what they do, and we are put off of our 
inquires lead to nothing but mystery and arbitrariness.”99 Since many of the imaginative 
activities involved in moral decision making are performed by the reader in her study of 
fictional narratives, Nussbaum argues that exposure to these literature works can train 
one for future moral decision making. 
Nussbaum, as well as Johnson and Werhane to a lesser extent, give thoughtful 
arguments that reading novels can cultivate imagination and these arguments have lead 
contemporary cognitive scientists to further investigate and support these arguments, 
most notably Ian Ravenscroft. In his article, “Fiction, Imagination and Ethics,” he 
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attempts to defend Nussbaum’s claim with contemporary accounts of imagination. 
Ravenscroft begins his support by arguing that if an athlete or musician imagines running 
a race or playing an instrument, including the motor skills required to perform both 
activities, then she will have improved motor performance when she actually undertakes 
the activities.
100
 Ravenscroft notes that the reason for this success is that, “Enhanced 
motor performance due to motor imagery is not surprising given the overlap of neural 
substrates of motor imagery and motor performance,”101 that is, when one imagines doing 
X the same neurons are fired as if one actually undertakes X. It is this overlap in the 
brain, which has led Ravenscroft, and others, to postulate, “imagining provides 
opportunities to rehearse—and thereby improve—performance.”102 Ravenscroft claims 
that if, as Nussbaum argues, reading fictional narratives allows us to rehearse many of the 
cognitive activities, specifically the imaginative ones, involved in morality while reading, 
then this practice will have real impact on our future, actual moral perceptions and 
deliberations.  
 Further, researches have long noted that, “subjects who observe another’s 
behavior are more likely to engage in that behavior than subjects who have not witnessed 
the behavior.”103 Mirror neurons, and their discovery, can explain this behavior. Mirror 
neurons fire when either of two conditions is satisfied: “(1) the agent observes an actor 
performing an action, or (2) the agent herself preforms the same action.”104 Imitation, 
understood and defined as, “mentally mediated replication,” is closely tied to imagination 
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because one can imaginatively imitate and some argue the ‘mental mediation’ is 
performed by imagination.
105
  
The discovery of mirror neurons supports Nussbaum’s idea that novels can serve 
as a paradigm for moral imagination because seeing another perform an action influences 
our behavior. Training via paradigms, then, is not merely a good theory or suggestion, but 
in fact, has a real effect on our cognitive faculties. Ravenscroft connects this imitation to 
fiction by arguing that, “In dramas and films, the consumer may be able to directly 
observe the character’s emotional expressions and thus be able to behaviorally imitate 
them.”106 Because with fiction we can imaginatively go through, and therefore mimic, the 
emotions of the fictional characters, fiction “can scaffold empathetic experiences and 
thereby improve our ability to respond empathetically. Practice makes perfect. 
Nussbaum’s nondevelopmental thesis is thus supported by our current understanding of 
imagination and imitative processes.”107   
I have presented a holistic picture of moral imagination as understood in 
contemporary literature. I have discussed from where the theory has emerged (i.e., a 
desire to move away from theories that solely rely on abstract reason), detailed the major 
activities involved in the theory (i.e., metaphors, prototypes, and narratives), and outlined 
the ensuing prescription (i.e., read novels to cultivate one’s imagination). I will utilize the 
theory set forth in this chapter in the subsequent chapters by connecting moral 
imagination to the work of Adorno. I will argue that the two theories are ripe for 
connection and then use moral imagination to deepen Adorno’s work on the Holocaust. 
Noting the prescriptive element of moral imagination will be important in the final 
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chapter of my project because I will utilize it in order to suggest a practical, imaginative 
form of education that can fulfil Adorno’s demand that education should focus on the 
prevention of another Auschwitz.  
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MORAL IMAGINATION AND ADORNO 
 
 
 
The theory of moral imagination presented in Chapter One was, in large part, 
conceptualized in reaction to a dominate way of thinking about the world, which 
privileged reason and in doing so shunned or ignored imagination. Critical Theorist, 
Theodor Adorno, has a similar catalyst for his work, and as I argue, a theory that is 
complementary to moral imagination. In this chapter, I examine a number of major 
themes in Adorno’s work, beginning with his overall critique of the Enlightenment and 
then focus on particular examples of Enlightenment thinking/\. Additionally, I connect 
Adorno’s theory to that of moral imagination outlined in Chapter One. I reveal the 
similarities between both theories through their particulars (i.e., Adorno’s theory on the 
conceptualization of objects closely matches Johnson’s theory on the same topic). I also 
argue that where Adorno claims a change or shift should occur in our way of thinking or 
relating to the world, that the inclusion of imagination would fulfill his requirements for 
said change. I conclude the chapter by arguing that connecting Adorno’s thought to moral 
imagination is mutually beneficial because such a connection assists in responding to 
critics of both theories and gives both theories explanatory support. My goal for this 
chapter is to unite the two theories so that I can, in the final two chapters, focus on 
Adorno’s work on Auschwitz while having moral imagination play a significant role 
therein. 
 
 
Enlightenment 
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 The Dialectic of Enlightenment contains the most thorough and most scathing 
critique of what Adorno and Max Horkheimer call the Enlightenment. The two writers do 
not classify the Enlightenment in the traditional sense (i.e., a series of 17
th
 and 18
th
 
century philosophers). Rather, “they use [the Enlightenment] to refer to a series of related 
intellectual and practical operations which are presented as demythologizing, secularizing 
or disenchanting some mythical, religious or magical representation of the world.”108 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s new definition opens their book, “the Enlightenment has 
always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty.”109 The fear, 
as we will see, is of nature and the sovereignty they speak of is also one over nature. In 
order to establish sovereignty, ‘the Enlightenment’ changed our way or thinking about 
and relating to the world, as Adorno and Horkheimer mention a number of times: “The 
program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of 
myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy;”110 “In the Enlightenment’s 
interpretation, thinking is the creation of unified, scientific order and the derivation of 
factual knowledge from principles;”111 and, “the philosophy which equates the truth with 
scientific systematization.”112 The best way to explain Adorno and Horkheimer’s talk of 
disenchantment, nature, and ‘the Enlightenment’ is through an example. 
 Before our technological advances, the cause of rain was not thought of as a result 
of a water cycle containing terms, such as precipitation and condensation. Rather, some 
peoples and some societies thought that the amount and time of rainfall had supernatural 
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causes, specifically a god or the gods. Dances, prayers, or animal sacrifices were thought 
necessary to encourage a god to bring forth rain and immorality was believed to incur the 
wrath of god and in doing so stop the rainfall. For these societies and these people, the 
cause of rain was attributed to a mythical, supernatural god rather than climate patterns or 
meteorology. 
 The idea that the gods alone control the weather is an example of the mythic 
thinking to which ‘the Enlightenment’ wants to respond and correct. In order to do so, 
people in these societies began to examine and study the clouds, weather, and rain. They 
performed experiments, looked for patterns, and made a science out of the weather by 
reasoning about it and trying to understand it. Rain, then, is no longer thought to be a 
mysterious, mythical act of god, but rather a reasoned (or reasoned about), fairly 
predictable, and known science. Knowing rain scientifically, as we do now, disenchants 
nature: nature is no longer a mysterious or magical event; instead, it is a fully-known and 
understood science. 
 In order to further understand Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of ‘the 
Enlightenment,’ it is important to note that they are working with particular concepts of 
both ‘science’ and ‘reason.’ Science has, as Adorno explains, undergone a shift in its 
conception:  
[Science] once used to mean the requirement that nothing be accepted without 
first being examined and tested: the freedom and emancipation from the tutelage 
of heteronomous dogmas. Today one shudders at just how pervasively 
scientificity has become a new form of heteronomy for its disciples. They imagine 
that their salvation is secured if they follow scientific rules, heed the ritual of 
science, surround themselves with science.
113
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At first, science was a way to break free from dogmatic myths, like studying the water 
cycle in order to break free from the idea of a god to whom you must please. Adorno now 
sees science as merely replacing myth; it has itself become dogmatic and god-like: if you 
need the answer to any question, science will provide it. If science does not have the 
answer, which is highly unlikely, the question will be dismissed. Science, then, comes to 
dominate the people just as the myths of gods once did. As Robert Witkin notes, 
“Science, which claimed to enlighten the world through overcoming myth is…in reality 
the successor of myth. It is a more complete or more perfect instrument for the mastery of 
nature and with it the mastery of society.”114 
The movement of ‘the Enlightenment’ is precisely this movement away from the 
fantasy and mystery of nature to its domination and scientification. In this movement, we 
begin to see with greater clarity Adorno and Horkheimer’s two theses: “myth is already 
enlightenment and enlightenment reverts to mythology.”115 The idea that one thing, 
science, can explain completely why and how something happens is the same as thinking 
‘the gods’ can explain everything. Science just becomes the new god or the new catch-
all-phrase for examining anything and everything. Adorno, as I will demonstrate 
throughout this chapter, does not think anything can be known completely. Objects and 
concepts, for Adorno, are historically and culturally constituted and the ways in which a 
culture, for instance, thinks of an object will contribute to what that object is, or the truth 
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of that object, as I will elucidate with an example momentarily.
116
 The idea, then, that 
science can come along and fully explain everything turns science into a myth. 
 Enlightenment thinking also, rather than moving away from myth, creates a 
supernatural force in the form of fate. Simon Jarvis and Alison Stone comment, 
respectively, “Everything which is, is thus presented as a kind of fate, no less unalterable 
and uninterrogable than mythical fate itself;”117 and, “enlightenment thinkers try to avoid 
appealing to mythic beliefs—in gods, supernatural forces etc.—by sticking to the 
facts.”118 Previously, in our rain example, because the gods were thought to cause rain, 
prayer and sacrifice were human actions that could affect the outcome of rain. Now 
because science has told us that rain is caused by a natural cycle, we think that everything 
is out of our control (as opposed to possibly influenced by us via dance or prayer) and a 
matter of one cycle or another. If a chain of cause and effect made a particular drop of 
water hit my eye and that drop of water caused me to blink and that blink caused me to 
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bump into the person in front of me, then our meeting is a result of fate. Such thinking 
makes fate a supernatural and mysterious entity (i.e., a myth) because like the gods, it is 
in full control of the world and always greater than us. 
 In addition to moving from one myth-system (i.e., gods) in favor of another (i.e., 
science), ‘the Enlightenment’ also radically changes our relationship with nature to one 
of domination, mastery, and manipulation: “What men want to learn from nature is how 
to use it in order to wholly dominate it and other men,”119 which is done through, “the 
conversion of nature into manipulable material.”120 When we begin to study weather 
patterns, agriculture, mining, etc., what we are doing is moving away from a relationship 
with nature in which it is mysterious and frightening, to one in which we use nature to 
keep us safe and comfortable. With advances in irrigation, we no longer have to rely on 
specific timely rainfall but can save water and use it later when it is needed. We can 
transport water and sell it to our neighbors who don’t have enough, changing water into a 
traded good. We can create dams to control water flow and stop its destructive flooding. 
We are working toward further climate control through the seeding of clouds to force rain 
when and where we want it.  
Water, in the form of rain, is just one example of the many ways in which 
advancements in our scientific understanding of nature has made us the perceived masters 
of nature. We can control nature, stop it, destroy it, and sell it. As Stone argues, 
“Enlightenment distances us from nature by positioning us as masters over—not parts 
of—nature and by enhancing our ability to use abstract concepts.”121 In being able to do 
all these things, we think we know nature completely. However, in the water example, we 
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saw a progress in what water is from something to fear, to something to sell, to something 
to stop. In all of these movements, the concept of water changes. It is, as I mentioned 
previously, historically and culturally situated. Water’s definition will depend on who is 
giving it: for a capitalist society it could be defined and known as a commodity, for 
instance. The idea that the more control we have over nature, the more we know it isn’t 
necessarily true because the very actions involved with rationally understanding nature 
changes it. 
 Along with the mastery of nature, comes a change in the way we understand 
ourselves. As we began to see in the previous paragraph, we certainly move from seeing 
ourselves as a mere part of nature, to now above nature as a master or dominator. When 
we transition to a position of domination, Adorno and Horkheimer claim, we try and 
distance ourselves from nature, namely by placing ourselves above it as masters. 
However, as Stone points out, “The more earnestly people pursue enlightenment project 
and try to distance themselves from nature, the more they submit to their natural 
impulses,”122 and “Adorno and Horkheimer take mastery over nature to be indissolubly 
entangled not only with mastery over human nature, the repression of impulse, but also 
with mastery over other humans.”123 Stone also explains: 
For Adorno, humanity repeatedly distances itself from previous systems of 
thought by criticizing them for being merely mythical. This progression is fuelled 
by humanity’s desire to gain increased practical control over nature. Human 
beings have hoped that, by freeing themselves from mythical views of nature, and 
gaining greater insight into the real workings of nature, they could enhance their 
ability to intervene into these natural processes for their own benefit.
124
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In our attempt to control nature, we include our own nature: ‘the Enlightenment’ tells us 
that we are not merely beasts, but rational animals; we have something special and 
unique (i.e., reason) that allows us and perhaps even grants us via fate, dominion over all 
of nature. We must live our lives logically and rationally and suppress all non-rational 
impulses such as passion and imagination. We must, according to Enlightenment 
thinking, use reason to rise above our brutish nature and our base natural impulses. 
However, in doing so, we end up serving the most basic of animal instincts: self-
preservation. Our motivation to control and dominate nature is to avoid death. Therefore, 
the more we try to rise above nature, the more we are tied to it.  
 Adorno and Horkheimer’s aim in Dialectic of Enlightenment is, ultimately, not to 
reverse ‘the Enlightenment’ or offer us concrete ways of reversing it, but rather to reveal 
its origin and its flaws.
125
 One of the most common criticisms of Adorno’s work, as we 
will see, is that he offers significant and thorough critiques without an equally positive 
movement or plan forward. What Adorno and Horkheimer are looking to do is describe, 
not prescribe; as Jarvis points out, the Dialectic of Enlightenment, “is fundamentally 
concerned with how we can think today,” by starting, “out from where we are now, from 
the assumptions about concepts and about the world which we habitually deploy, very 
often without recognizing that we are making these assumptions.”126 As a result of our 
movement toward reason and domination of nature, a number of destructive and 
manipulative ways of thinking and relating to the world have emerged. My project here 
will be to examine the particular results of Enlightenment and compare them to the theory 
of moral imagination laid out in Chapter One. 
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Instrumental Reason 
 
 
 
Instrumental reason is the first result that follows directly from Enlightenment 
thinking. Jarvis writes, “The consequence is a kind of rationality which is a tool, blindly 
applied without any real capacity either to reflect on the ends to which it is applied, or to 
recognize the particular qualities of the objects to which it is applied… [They] call this 
unreflective rationality instrumental reason.”127 As J.M. Bernstein clarifies, “enlightened 
reason is instrumental reason, the constituting action of which is abstraction and the 
consequent identifying and subsuming of different particulars under some common 
universal.”128 The idea of instrumental reason has its roots most notably in Horkheimer’s 
solo work, Eclipse of Reason, where he developed the idea in his discussion of, what at 
the time he called, subjective reason. He writes: 
But the force that ultimately makes reasonable actions possible is the faculty of 
classification, inference, and deduction, no matter what the specific content—the 
abstract functioning of the thinking mechanism. This type of reason may be called 
subjective reason. It is essentially concerned with means and ends, with the 
adequacy of procedures for purpose more or less taken for granted and supposedly 
self-explanatory.
129
 
 
 Moreover, “Having given up autonomy, reason has become an instrument…Reason has 
become completely harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the 
domination of men and nature, has been made the sole criterion. Concepts have been 
reduced to summaries of the characteristics that several specimens have in common.”130 
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We can see here a number of features that were present in the discussion of 
Enlightenment thinking, including the domination of nature. What we also grasp from 
Horkheimer’s early work on the topic is the idea that this type of reason operates 
primarily through abstraction; an abstraction that reduces and simplifies objects in the 
name of turning them into means. Horkheimer’s work is certainly an influence on the 
later projects of instrumental reason as all of its major features and even the name can be 
traced back to him.
131
 
 As we began to see in Horkheimer’s discussion, instrumental reason gets its name 
from the idea that rationality, as a whole, is only instrumental.
132
 I think there are two 
ways this ‘insturmentalization’ of reason can be understood. The first way to understand 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s phrase is to think of reason as a kind of instrument, like a tool. 
The tool of reason is used to make everything clear; reason becomes like a Swiss army 
knife or skeleton key as every object and concept is applied to it in order to know them. 
The second way the instrumental part of instrumental reason can be understood is in 
terms of an instrument as a measuring device, such as a ruler or beaker. Reason is used to 
measure everything in our world: want to know something about nature? Look for a 
pattern, explain it in terms of holistic cycles. Want to understand ourselves better? 
Construct rational arguments over the mind/body relationship. Anything that does not 
measure up to reason is discarded as useless or distracting, like passions and imagination. 
In both these ways of understanding instrumental reason, reason becomes a supremely 
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powerful, singularly focused, god-like entity; reason becomes the only tool used to 
discover or learn about things in the world to the point that everything else is disregarded. 
 In order for reason to be the arbiter of all, it begins by making all objects and 
concepts conform to it and it is through abstraction and identification through 
subsumption, as mentioned previously, that instrumental reason operates. I will go into 
greater detail regarding both later in the chapter when I discuss identity thinking and 
constellations. What is important to note about instrumental reasoning in general is that 
its activities result in domination and repression. 
For instrumental reason, domination comes in more than one form, including 
manipulation.
133
  Everything in the world is determined by the subject and, as we 
discussed with Enlightenment, is transformed into an object of use by humans. We, then, 
dominate all objects by seeing and knowing them only in ways that we find useful. 
Domination also arises because reason dominates all other forms of thinking or forming 
relationships with the world. 
 Repression is the other result of instrumental reason. Repression, as well, comes 
in different forms. For instance, instrumental reason represses our other ways of thinking. 
Experiencing the world passionately or imaginatively must be repressed in favor of 
calculation and “encyclopedic thinking.”134 This repression causes imagination to 
atrophy.
135
 Repression is also seen in our relationship to objects in the world: we must 
repress the particulars of objects in favor of abstraction and simplicity. We can never, in 
our thinking, actually destroy an object's particulars; we merely repress particulars so that 
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it seems as if they do not exist. For instance, if I say that I am a woman and identify 
myself only in this way, then all my decisions, ideas, and norms are driven by this 
identification alone. Rather than view myself as complex and multi-faceted (both woman, 
partner, teacher, and student, etc.), I repress the other aspects in favor of clear and simple 
definitions or ideas.  
 The domination and repression of instrumental reasoning ultimately leads reason 
to be unreflective. Adorno and Horkheimer explain, “Thinking objectifies itself to 
become an automatic, self-activating process.”136 Jarvis echoes this idea by noting that 
unreflective rationality is instrumental reason.
137
 The unreflective nature of reason arose 
because, if reason determines truth and knowledge, one never has to test reason to see if it 
is right or preforming its job well because by definition it is. For instance, those who 
argue, or reason, that the best way to understand humans is as rational animals appeal to 
rational arguments to do so. Once such an assertion is made, no other capacity can be 
appealed to in order to unseat reason because it would be dismissed as irrational and 
therefore, inferior and unworthy of discussion. Reason, then has no way to get outside of 
itself and critique itself because with instrumental reason, it is the measurement of 
correctness and the tool for creating it as well.  
 The project of moral imagination fits closely to the project of Adorno and 
Horkheimer, particularly in this critical stage. Moral imagination gets much of its 
motivation from criticizing current or previous moral theories that exalt reason and 
usually banish non-rational elements. Moral imagination challenges the idea that a 
reason-centric theory is actually the best and also whether such a theory is even possible. 
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Moral imagination and Adorno, then, share the critique of theories that exalt reason to 
god-like status. Further, similar to Adorno, Johnson does not want to abolish reason. 
Rather, Johnson wants to make room for non-rational elements by revealing the 
imaginative nature of reason or what he calls rational imagination. 
 
 
Identity and Nonidentity Thinking 
 
 
 
While instrumental reason is the larger idea of making reason an all-purpose tool, 
it is through specific ways of thinking, most notably identity thinking, that the abstraction 
and subsumption mentioned earlier, occurs. Identity thinking is a phrase Adorno uses to 
discuss a type of thinking about objects or concepts in the world that he finds to be 
distorting. The concept of identity thinking has its roots in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
where it was originally called the principle of immanence and there entails that an object 
is known only when it is classified in some way.
138
 In Negative Dialectics, Adorno names 
and develops identity thinking and sets it in contrast with nonidentity thinking, which he 
sees as a better way of thinking about the world. In identity thinking, the subject 
subsumes an object under a universal concept. Let us say that I am out for a walk and I 
come across a very large, very old tree. When I see this particular tree, I subsume it under 
a universal category, perhaps ‘oak’ or simply ‘tree.’ This subsumption, Adorno claims, is 
nothing extraordinary but rather is a result of our habit to classify things and objects and 
ensure that “all things have their place.”139 Identity thinking, then, gets its name because 
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when I think about an object, I am quick to identify it and I identify it by subsuming the 
particular object under a universal concept. 
 Such subsumption may appear harmless because it is so automatic, but Adorno 
sees the activity as destructive. In subsuming my particular tree under the universal 
concept ‘oak’ or ‘tree,’ I am, according to Adorno, doing so in order to subsume 
particulars under universals so as to dominate and manipulate the particular tree.
140
 For 
instance, a tree is a raw material. By subsuming the particular phenomena in front of me 
under a universal, which has, as part of its identity, a natural resource, I can now use and 
manipulate this tree; after all, it is only a tree and trees are resources. Further, the 
subsumption of a particular under a universal, as is done in identity thinking, “obliterates 
the particularity of objects, their differences from one other, their individual development 
and histories, along with their unique traits.”141 As I began my example, I noted that the 
tree was tall and old, but in identity thinking, it becomes just ‘a tree’ because all of the 
particularities that make it are repressed. For example, the tree may house a number of 
animal nests and be more than a resource for humans but also a home and refuge. Identity 
thinking represses all of the tree’s history and its particularity, in favor of a universal 
concept that allows manipulation and use.
142
 Adorno scholars agree that this subsumption 
is destructive and manipulative: Stone notes, “When I conceptualize something as an 
instance of a kind, I see it as identical to all other instances of the same kind. This means 
that conceptual thinking gives me no knowledge about what is unique in a thing.”143 
Cook writes, “By subsuming objects under concepts and laws, and concepts and laws 
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under explanatory systems, we wrongly substitute unity for diversity, simplicity for 
complexity, permanence for change and identity for difference.”144  
 Another way to understand identity thinking is that it transforms complex objects 
or concepts into simple concepts or objects. Bernstein explains this transformation by 
calling identity thinking the law of the simple concept because, in identity thinking, the 
simple concept reigns supreme.
145
 For example, when I saw the tree on my walk, in my 
identity thinking, I took a unique thing and made it simple. If, for instance, when I look at 
the tree I see it as a natural resource I am thinking of it in terms of a simple concept 
because I am taking a highly unique particular and simplifying it into one thing. In 
identity thinking, when one employs simple concepts, she is only allowing a basic, single 
perspective definition or understanding of the concept. Ultimately, identity thinking, 
through simple concepts requires “conceptual and linguistic determinacy, banning 
vagueness and indeterminacy.”146  
 Simple concepts and our frequent use of them are a result of Enlightenment 
thinking. Instrumental reason’s attempt to put everything in neat, clearly defined 
categories gave rise to the idea that by naming something we have fully identified it. As 
Bernstein clarifies, “Adorno identifies the impulse to orient ourselves toward the object 
in this way as the impulse to name the object, as if naming were not labeling but an 
always complex perfected expression of the thing itself.”147 For example, “That is a tree” 
or, “A tree is a natural resource.” Both of these sentences take the phenomenon present 
and in naming it as X, subsume it under a simple universal. Adorno distinguishes this 
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naming from communication because in the former one manipulates the object in the 
naming of it, while with the latter, one remains open to the possibilities present in the 
object.  
In addition to his discussion of naming, Adorno also explains the problem of 
simple concepts through a discussion of complex concepts. Complex concepts are 
different from simple concepts because they get closer to revealing all of the intricacies 
and particulars of objects. Bernstein explains complex concepts as possessing two axes 
on which the object can be found, much like a point can be located on two mathematical 
X and Y-axes.
148
 The first axis is the logical axis and this is akin to the simple concept. 
The logical axis is the different ways in which a tree, for instance, can be named: as a 
natural resource, an oak, a nest, etc. It is true that the specific tree can be thought of by 
way of these particular concepts because simple concepts are not entirely incorrect. They 
are wrong only insofar as they assume that all the object is, is a natural resource, or that 
in naming it as such we have completely understood it. 
  The second axis that constitutes a complex concept is the material axis. The 
material axis includes the historical and social aspects of the object or concept. For 
instance, the tree also serves as a home to squirrels or could be used to make a canoe and 
thereby as a way of sustaining a family or village. The tree, in certain religions, can be a 
deity or a place of worship. All of these ways of conceptualizing a tree are determined by 
different historical and societal contexts. Again, none of these completely captures the 
entire concept of tree or the object in front of me, but they all contribute to it. It is the 
combination of the material and logical axes that constitute the complex concept. For 
example:   
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Material 
Logical 
Oak 
Wood 
Plant 
Mother Gaia 
Shelter 
 
The concept tree is not some mere point on one of these axes because a concept is never 
easily defined with just one idea or one sentence. Rather, whenever we identity think via 
simple concepts, the X we think of (e.g., a tree is a natural resource, where natural 
resource is X), is only a particular form of awareness of the concept that is context-
dependent.
149
 Certain societies and histories have different interests, which all influence 
their awareness and perhaps focus on one more prominently. This focusing can take over 
to the point where the concept is simplified to just the one awareness and then a simple 
concept is born. A complex concept, in contrast is: 
[L]ocated, like life itself, in change and transition. Only if transition is 
constitutive of cognition will concepts have to be affirmatively conceived of as 
intrinsically indeterminate. The movement of the concept is not from 
indeterminate to determinate, but always a movement of conceptual 
redetermination.
150
 
 
Complex concepts, in direct contrast to simple concepts, make room for possibility via 
indeterminacy.
151
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 Complex concepts, and their constant movement and flexibility, are in contrast to 
the rigid simplicity found in identity thinking and are, rather, a part of Adorno’s 
nonidentity thinking. Cook explains that identity thinking says what something falls 
under, nonidentity thinking, on the other hand, seeks to say what something is.
152
 The 
difference between the two is that the former, by saying what something falls under, 
removes the uniqueness of the object in exchange for a classification that seems simpler. 
In seeking to say what something is the emphasis is on seeking rather than finding. The 
seeking is similar to Bernstein’s ‘conceptual redetermination:’ in nonidentity thinking, I 
am open to repositioning myself, to looking at something from different points of view 
and this looking does not seek to fully determine or understand the concept, but to 
explore it in a number of ways.  
In addition, nonidentity thinking focuses more on the object by seeking what it is, 
rather than what it falls under. In the ‘falls under’ of identity thinking, the abstract 
concept is the goal and the object is secondary to it. In the case of nonidentity thinking, 
we seek to say what something is and this means that we grasp objects in terms of 
possibilities. Stone writes, “But falling under concepts is not all there is to things. Each 
thing is also unique; this aspect of things is the “non-identical” element in them…Adorno 
criticizes identity thinking for disguising the fact that things have a unique side.”153 In 
non-identity thinking, the particularities and uniqueness are privileged rather than the 
universal concept.  
 It may seem that identity thinking has its merits and should not be completely 
disregarded. After all, a tree is a natural resource and denying such identity is impossible 
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Adorno does not, in fact, want to do away with identity thinking entirely because, 
“meaningful judgments, by their very nature, express both the identity and nonidentity of 
object and concept.”154 Rather, Adorno wants to illuminate and make room for the 
historical and social contexts that shape our understanding of the object. He wants to let 
in flexibility and indeterminacy in our discussions of concepts and objects. Adorno is not 
advocating for a purely historical, material axis way of viewing concepts: “the reduction 
of the object to pure material, which precedes all subjective synthesis as its necessary 
condition, sucks the object’s own dynamics out of it.”155 Further, “the category of 
nonidentity still obeys the measure of identity.”156 Nonidentity thinking then does still 
identify, but it identifies “to a greater extent” than identity thinking.157 For instance, ‘tree 
as resource’ is a way of identifying a tree, but ‘tree as resource, home, and potential 
shelter’ captures the idea of tree to a greater extent.  
 Adorno’s discussion of identity/nonidentity thinking and simple/complex 
concepts obviously adds to his critique of the Enlightenment. Further, as Bernstein points 
out, it also contributes to his view of ethics: “the logic of the complex concept dispenses 
with the idea there is moral insight into the good…there is no “the good”…there are, or 
were, only the particular forms of awareness.”158 The idea, then, that there is a single 
conception of the good, a lie, a harm, and so forth according to Adorno, is a mistake.  
Adorno’s dispensing of rigid, universal concepts in favor of flexible particulars 
closely aligns him with the major ideas in moral imagination. Johnson’s prototypes for 
instance share a number of similarities to Adorno’s complex concepts and nonidentity 
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thinking. Both privilege particulars over universals, both reject the traditional view of 
static concepts, and both require the thinker to seek and explore within the concept. 
Further, both Werhane and Nussbaum also advocate for the importance of particulars, 
flexibility, and a movement away from traditional theories’ rigidity. All three scholars 
credit imagination with the work described by Adorno in nonidentity thinking: picking 
out particulars, flexibility, and exploration of possibilities. Because of Adorno’s critique 
of reason, it seems unlikely that more reason-only thinking will get us to the qualities in 
nonidentity thinking. Rather, it is much more probable that a faculty like imagination, 
given its prototypical definition and use, would be crucial to accomplish the kind of 
activities Adorno requires for nonidentity thinking.  
 A further reason to suspect that imagination should play a crucial role in Adorno’s 
work is found in Bernstein’s discussion of simple and complex concepts. In one of his 
attempts to explain the differences, Bernstein appeals to Kant’s distinction between 
determinate and reflective judgments.
159
 In a determinate judgment, one subsumes a 
phenomenon under a concept and in doing so judges it to be something. For instance, 
someone might experience the raw sense data of red, hard, and sphere. As I discussed in 
Chapter One, according to Kant, when I experience this data, I synthesize them into what 
he calls an intuition and thereby know they are related to each other. This intuition then 
goes to my understanding where it is determined as something, here as a ball. My 
understanding makes a determinate judgment and in doing so subsumes the intuition 
under a concept.
160
 The similarities between Kant’s determinate judgments and Adorno’s 
simple concept are clear: both take a particular and subsume it under a universal and then 
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call that knowledge. Adorno’s theory, however, ascribes negative connotations to this 
subsumptive activity, while for Kant this is much more a matter of fact.   
 Reflective judgments are the other major type of judgment discussed by Kant. 
The most substantial discussion of reflective judgments comes in Kant’s work on 
aesthetics, The Critique of the Power of Judgment. Briefly, a reflective judgment differs 
from a determinate judgment because the former requires a great deal more flexibility. 
The best way to understand Kant’s reflective judgment is through an example. For Kant, 
an aesthetic judgment is a type of reflective judgment, so when we judge something as 
aesthetically pleasing, either a work of art, like a Picasso, or one of nature, like a flower, 
we are making a reflective judgment. If I were to come across a flower and judge it to be 
beautiful, according to Kant, something different happens in my mind than in a 
determinate judgment. The flower, according to Kant, stimulates my understanding, 
which tries to subsume it under a concept. However, it is unable to and the understanding 
passes the intuition off to imagination and imagination sends it back. Kant calls this 
interaction a free play between imagination and understanding. It is this freeplay that we 
find pleasurable, and this pleasure makes us proclaim that the flower is beautiful.
161
  
 Reflective judgments are akin to Adorno’s complex concepts because both do not 
settle for the subsumption of an object under a universal concept. Both also require 
flexibility as it pertains to understanding concepts. What is interesting to note is that, for 
Kant, the major difference between a determinate and reflexive judgment is that in the 
latter imagination comes on to the scene and plays a crucial role. For Kant, it is the 
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lawlessness of imagination that allows for the flexibility in the reflexive judgment.
162
 
Though Bernstein uses Kant’s work to explain Adorno, and in doing so points out the 
extent to which Kant influenced Adorno, Bernstein does not highlight the reason for the 
different judgments in Kant’s theory. Given the requirements Adorno gives to nonidentity 
thinking and complex concepts (i.e., flexibility, focus on particulars, exploration) and the 
similarities they share to Kant’s reflective judgment, I think we have good reason to think 
that the inclusion of imagination into Adorno’s theory would help him achieve his ideal 
ways of thinking. Further, the very movements necessary in the viewing of our tree as a 
complex concept requires imagination, specifically in seeing the tree as different 
potentialities: imagining the tree as a canoe or a nest without it actually being the case, or 
at least without it being the case for me.  
 
 
Constellations 
 
 
 
Another major method for combating identity thinking, specifically its destructive 
way of seeing concepts and objects, is by thinking of them instead through constellations. 
Constellations are, very simply, a way of thinking and writing about objects or 
phenomena. In Adorno’s later work he writes in constellations: short texts on different 
topics that are ultimately connected. Constellations are also discussed in Negative 
Dialectics as a way of looking at objects.  
In order to better understand Adorno’s constellations, we must look at from where 
he draws his inspiration for the discussion, primarily Walter Benjamin’s theory of 
constellations and Max Weber’s ideal types. For Benjamin, constellations are eternal, 
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unchanging and distinct from ideas.
163
 In the prologue to his book, The Origin of the 
German Tragic Play, Benjamin claims that, “ideas are to objects as constellations are to 
the stars.”164 Jarvis explains that, for Benjamin, this means that ideas are not concepts of 
objects, nor laws, and do not contribute to the knowledge of phenomena.
165
 There are two 
important differences between Benjamin’s and Adorno’s conceptions of constellation. 
First, Benjamin makes a radical distinction between concepts, which he understands as a 
way of classifying particulars under universals, and ideas, which he thinks of as “merely 
positive knowledge.”166 Adorno does not hold such a distinction because, as we have 
seen, he doesn’t think it is possible to separate ideas from concepts. Because our 
experiences are always mediated by relations to other objects and things and, importantly, 
by history and time, Adorno does not subscribe to the notion that we can have an idea 
that is not influenced or related to a concept. The second distinction to be made between 
Benjamin and Adorno’s conceptions of constellation is as Jarvis explains, “Just as a 
constellation is nothing without the stars, Adorno’s constellations are nothing in 
themselves but a relation between particulars (necessarily time-bound).”167 As I will 
explain in further detail, Adorno’s constellations are not related to one another through 
timeless bonds, but are constituted by the bonds themselves, which can shift with time 
and social change. Benjamin, however, disagrees and instead, maintains that, “ideas are 
timeless constellations.”168 
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Benjamin not only serves as a direct influence on Adorno, he also, if we set the 
two theories in contrast, helps us see Adorno’s theory with greater clarity. Benjamin 
views constellations in a way that is akin to an archaic or simplistic understanding of star 
constellations. The constellation Ursa Major, for example, appears in the sky as a sort of 
everlasting and easily recognizable set of stars. At first, it seems that this constellation is 
eternal, like Benjamin’s use of the term. However, once we begin to refine our 
understanding of constellations through continued study we realize that the relation 
between the stars in a constellation is not at all unchanging or eternal. Ursa Major, for 
instance, is a group of related starts that travel as a cluster at the same velocity. The 
cluster is, however, slowly dispersing meaning that at some point the constellation will 
no longer exist because “stars within [a constellation] rarely have substantial 
astrophysical relationships to each other and their apparent proximity when viewed from 
Earth disguises the fact that they are far apart.”169 Constellations, then, are not the eternal, 
closely related patterns that Benjamin claims they are for the sake of his analogy, but 
rather constellations are actually much closer to the way Adorno envisions them. 
As Adorno claims, a constellation is a way to understand a concept. Rather than 
there being a single solitary idea that fully captures the concept, a concept is best 
understood as having many different parts, like the way in which many different parts 
make the constellation. For example, a possibility for the constellation of water might 
look like this:
 170
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In this constellation, one of the points does not in and of itself capture the totality of the 
concept water. For Adorno, nothing can capture the totality of anything because concepts 
are always historically derived and socially constructed. As we can see, some of the 
points in my constellation reveal such historical and social influences: water as a scarcity 
may be a truth about the concept of water for those in a drought or who lack proper 
systems of irrigation and treatment. Water as an obstacle and also as a mode of 
transportation is influenced by an individual or groups’ access to boats.  
 This water constellation is similar to our better understanding of star 
constellations for a number of reasons. First, Adornian constellations maintain, like 
Benjamin’s and traditional constellations, a relationship between all of the points that 
constitute the constellation. Yet, for Adorno, the relationship between the points is 
neither eternal nor unchanging. Just as Ursa Minor is beginning to disperse, so can ways 
of conceptualizing water. For instance, water is more increasingly being seen as an 
energy resource and also as a scarcity. Both of these more prominent ways of 
conceptualizing water are due to our neglect and maltreatment of the planet. Second, just 
Figure 2.Water Constellation. Created by author. 
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as most constellations do not actually have any astrophysical relationship, but are only 
seen as connected by humans, the same is true for Adorno’s view of constellations. 
Constellations, like our water example, are entirely constructed by humans on Earth (e.g., 
water may be very different to ants and elephants). Water is never, for Adorno, 
completely defined or totally understood because context is required and that is 
constantly shifting. 
Further, Adorno’s constellations, as described by Cook, are, “opposed to identity 
thinking, which abstracts from objects when it subsumes them under concepts.”171 
Rather, a constellation of concepts illuminates “the specific side of the object, the side 
which to a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden.”172 An 
object has many sides, perspectives or ways of understanding it. Water is a prime 
example of this: it can be seen as a scarcity, a job opportunity, H2O, a necessity and so 
forth. A constellation illuminates one such side when we focus on it. For instance, if I say 
water is H2O, this is true but is not all that water is; it doesn’t totally define water. 
Discussing water in terms of a constellation allows one to focus on water as H2O, while 
maintaining the other definitions. 
 Adorno’s idea of truth is closely aligned with his conception of constellations as 
he defines truth as a “constellation of subject and object in which both penetrate each 
other.”173 Truth then, as Cook points out, is not static. Rather, truth is constantly 
evolving, though accessible through constellations of concepts.
174
 The constant evolution 
that occurs with constellations is due, in large part, to the idea that objects are never static 
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or finished. Because concepts are historically and socially constructed and because 
history and society is always changing and evolving, so are the objects. A constellation of 
an object is the closest we get to a complete picture of an object. As Stone explains, 
“Adorno’s constellations capture the particular historical relations that have shaped an 
object, rather than whatever universal kinds the object may embody. And a constellation 
of concepts can only ever capture some of these relations.”175 Constellations are never 
complete, then, but constantly open to evolution and change.
176
  
The other influence on Adorno’s conception of constellation is Weber and his 
ideal types. Adorno notes that Weber discusses ‘ideal types’ as the activity of gathering 
concepts round the central one that is sought and in doing so attempting to express what 
the concept aims at.
177
 The ones that gather around are “composed of individual parts 
taken from different points in history to make up the ‘ideal’ type or concept.”178 As 
Weber writes, “An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more 
points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, diverse, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena.”179 Adorno’s constellations 
differ from Weber’s ideal types because, as we will see, though Adorno agrees with the 
historical aspect of concepts, he disagrees with the idea that there is one concept to which 
all others aim. 
 Adorno’s constellations share a number of similarities with Johnson’s prototypes. 
First, both Adorno and Johnson do not intend for their theories to do away with stability 
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in objects or concepts entirely. Johnson maintains a stable core with which to test new 
examples of the concept while Adorno maintains, “Definitions are not the be-all and end-
all of cognition…but neither are they to be banished.”180 Second, both theories have 
similar requirements for the construction of a constellation or prototype; specifically that 
they are determined by social and historical contexts. The similarity in their construction 
also means they share a certain sense of flexibility: as the context changes so will the 
object or concept. Third, both writers, in the construction of their theories, give 
preference to particular over abstract universals. Even with Johnson’s core, it is a 
particular example of a lie that serves as the prototype with which other particulars are 
compared and tested. For Adorno, the particular also takes center stage, as Cook 
explained clearly and as Adorno writes, “there is no step-by-step progression from the 
concepts to a more general cover concept. Instead, the concepts enter into a 
constellation.”181 A general, abstract concept is not the goal for either scholar and both 
would agree: “We are not to philosophize about concrete things; we are to philosophize, 
rather, out of these things.”182  
 There are, of course, differences between the two theories, though the differences 
are insignificant. For Johnson, the flexibility in prototypes is due in large part to our 
ability to imaginatively extend concepts and stretch categories, while Adorno does not 
necessarily name a cognitive capacity as assisting in the process for constellations. 
Johnson, for the most part, discusses prototypes in relation to concepts, while Adorno, 
differing from Benjamin, employs constellations to discuss objects as well as concepts. 
Despite their different foci, I don’t think either would object to having their theories 
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extended from object to concept and vice versa; Adorno because he doesn’t maintain a 
strict division between the two and Johnson because he sees much of the world, including 
our knowing objects, as requiring imaginative activities found in our exploration of 
prototypes.  
Further, even the movement of thinking in constellations is similar to the 
movement in thinking of prototypes. Johnson argues that when we encounter a particular 
we begin to see whether it falls into the prototypical definition of something like it. Our 
example in Chapter One was the concept of a lie, and when we encounter a speech act, 
we test to see whether or not the context surrounding the speech act allows it to be 
subsumed under the category lie. In order to do this testing, one must engage with her 
imagination and hold other instances of lying in her mind in order to compare this recent 
one and also must imagine possible reasons for the speech act, things she knows about 
the person committing the speech at, and so forth. The individual uses her imagination to 
extend categories and concepts in order to determine what particular fits into, or does not, 
what concept.  
As Stone describes it, Adorno’s constellation is remarkably similar: Adorno 
claims that all concepts are limited and that “we inevitably strive to extend our concepts 
when they prove limited.”183 Stone continues, “Adorno suggests that the range of 
concepts that are gathered around a thing “illuminates” or gives insight into that 
thing…he expands on this point with the metaphor of unlocking something by using a 
combination of numbers rather than one single number.”184 Looking to extend our 
concepts in constellations is remarkably close to the imaginative activity required in the 
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theory of prototypes; one must use her imagination to see if a current concept can extend 
to the speech act or object present. Adorno also writes, “Cognition of the object in its 
constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object. As a constellation, 
theoretical thought circles the concept it would like to unseal… [it opens] not to a single 
key or a single number, but to a combination of numbers.”185  
 A final similarity between Johnson’s prototypes and Adorno’s constellations is 
that each theory can be accused of the same flaw: ultimately, they lead to relativism. 
Without any necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing X from Y, categories 
might ultimately become meaningless. If a lie is so determined by the context, then how 
could we ever rely on it or agree on a lie? If, a concept is a forever-changing cluster of 
historically and socially derived concepts or ideas, how will we ever know the truth of 
any concept? Both men answer these questions in a similar way: concepts as historically 
and socially constructed does not mean that they are entirely relative or subjective. In the 
theory of prototypes, for instance, the core example of a concept offers stability to the 
concept and is often determined as the core because it is an agreed upon example of the 
concept. The society and history in question generally agrees on the prototype though as 
the society changes, those in power shift or their values refocus, so too can the 
prototype.
186
 The core, then, gives the theory of prototypes an anchor to which it can 
respond to the relativist charge. Adorno agrees with the social and historical construction 
of concepts, and much like Johnson, does not see it as a sign of pure subjectivity as, 
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again, there is a consensus surrounding concepts and ideas because they are defined and 
understood only through their relation to history and society. For both scholars the 
indeterminacy that some may say is a sign of subjectivity is seen as much more positive: 
“indeterminacy in the concept corresponds to possibility in the object”187 
One may argue that there is an important difference between the theory of 
prototypes and that of constellations and it is the stable core found in the former. With 
our previous example of lie in the theory of prototypes, it is important that some form of 
necessary and sufficient conditions make up the prototypical lie and serve as the static 
concept with which all other examples of lie revolve around. This static core is in direct 
contrast to Adorno’s conception of a constantly evolving constellation. Although the two 
may seem to be in contrast with each other, I argue that the difference is not that great. 
One way to see that this divide is minute is to look at what Stone claims is a potential 
objection to Adorno’s account of constellations: “it seems that constellations can never 
exhaustively grasp an object because of the nature of objects, specifically the fact that 
their histories—which make them the particular objects they are—are unfinished, ever 
ongoing.”188 This description of objects is one with which I think Johnson would agree, 
given the importance he places on context. In order to determine whether a speech act is a 
lie, one must look to, among other things, the context in which it was uttered, the person 
who uttered it and so forth. All of these are of course historically and societally 
determined. For instance, I may trust what my mother says more often, or excuse more of 
her speech acts as exaggerations rather than lies because I know her better and know her 
personality and sense of humor. I may be more likely to classify a speech act as a lie 
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instead of a joke or exaggeration if the person has lied to me before or if I greatly dislike 
them. What I constitute as a lie, then, is never finished but always changing and 
developing as I encounter new people, new contexts, and new speech acts. Johnson’s 
core, then, is open to revision and just as Adorno claims, the revision continues as new 
contexts arise.  
Further, even the static core that Johnson discusses is not necessarily static in the 
traditional sense. Johnson’s reasons for establishing the static core is that it does seem to 
capture something about how we view lies, that is, it does seem to be the case that we 
agree on what a lie is. What is important in that previous sentence is who constitutes 
‘we.’ Since Johnson stresses the importance of metaphorical language in our moral and 
everyday lives, he would surely acknowledge that metaphors are different from culture to 
culture, through history, and in different societies. The static core then, is much less static 
than someone who requires everlasting necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, if we 
understand the core in a more Adornian way, namely that the core is created and 
acknowledged as a core by different societies in different times, then the theory of 
prototypes is not that different from Adorno’s theory of constellations of concepts. Since 
the core is always open to revision and historically dependent, even though it has a sense 
of stability, it is still never finished, nor fully evolved.  
Adorno’s constellations and Johnson’s prototypes present us with similar ways of 
looking at how we group and associate phenomena in our world. Both stress the 
importance of context for such grouping but without advocating for total subjectivity. 
Johnson credits imagination with much of the work for the flexibility in his theory and it 
is easy to see a similar imaginative activity at work in Adorno’s constellations. In our 
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water constellation example, the object ‘water’ can be understand from a number of 
different points, which are each historically and socially determined. Water as a scarcity 
is not, for example, a truth about water for me. How then would I be able to ‘illuminate’ 
this part of the constellation? Such illumination is possible because one engages with her 
imagination; by trying to put oneself in another’s position or attempting to disengage 
from one’s own perspective, other points of the constellation can come to the fore.  
Further, I think that the connection between points, and ultimately that which 
keeps the constellation a cluster is also dependent on imagination. In particular, the 
movement of checking the connection is the same as Johnson’s exploratory movement in 
prototypes. Since the points are constructed by context and that context can and does 
change, in order to see and test the connection between the points, one must perform the 
imaginative exploration found in prototypes. What makes this point a truth about the 
object and to whom? How does this point relate to another point in the constellation? 
Does this point belong to this constellation or another? All of these questions are 
explored and possibly answered by imaginatively holding multiple points in mind and 
comparing them, and by imaginatively trying out different contexts to see how far they 
may or may not extend. Ultimately, the similarities present in the two theories, 
specifically, the focus on context, flexibility and particulars, suggest that a similar 
explanatory background for one is applicable to the other.  
Finally, one could also claim that Johnson’s prototypes are much more similar to 
Weber’s ideal types than Adorno’s constellation. Weber and Johnson do share the idea 
that there is a single, central concept but not necessarily the remaining part of Weber’s 
theory: that this single concept is the one to which all other concepts aim to be like (for 
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instance, we try to make all lies conform to the prototypical lie). Rather Johnson, like 
Adorno, focuses more on particulars: the core is not a general concept but a particular 
example that seems (though is always up for revision) to be a central example. The other 
particulars do not aim for this central one, but rather use it as a test to see if there is a 
connection. Therefore, Johnson’s focus on particulars, which maintain their particularity, 
aligns him less with Weber and closer to Adorno. 
 
 
 
Barter and Accounting Language 
 
 
 
Another similarity between Adorno’s work and the theory of moral imagination 
concerns their understanding of language. Language is very important, for instance, in 
Johnson’s account, specifically the metaphorical language of morality. Johnson explains 
that our thinking and discussing of morality is done in terms of a social accounting 
metaphor in which harms are thought of in terms of debt, for instance. Adorno offers a 
similar discussion in his barter system of language. 
 Adorno’s discussion of the barter system of language is a part of a larger theme 
concerning the importance of language. We have already begun to see this theme in our 
discussions of constellations and identity thinking: naming something is often perceived 
as knowing it. Language, then, has contributed to our Enlightenment destructive thinking. 
Adorno’s theory of language is much more involved than our discussion will be here. We 
will merely be focusing on his work on the barter system of language since it so closely 
matches with Johnson’s and gives us a clear and succinct picture of Adorno’s theory. 
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 As a Marxist thinker, Adorno is concerned with the ways in which labor, 
exchange, and human interaction connect. As O’Connor points out, “For Adorno, the 
logic of exchange—a fundamental instrument of capitalism—informs the very processes 
of socialization.”189 Adorno is concerned that we have come to think, talk, and relate to 
others primarily through a barter principle and Adorno defines the principle thusly, “The 
barter principle, the reduction of human labor to the abstract universal concept of average 
working hours, is fundamentally akin to the principle of identification.”190 Adorno 
worries that by abstracting human’s labor to the idea of working hours we begin to 
identify human’s labor, and soon a human, in the same way. This barter system not only 
affects our view of labor, but also, as Adorno notes, seeps into our conception of 
morality: “Wealth as goodness is an element in the world’s mortar: the tenacious illusion 
of their identity prevents the confrontation of moral ideas with the order in which the rich 
are right, while at the same time it has been impossible to conceive concrete definitions 
of morality other than those derived from wealth.”191  
Adorno, then, shares with Johnson the idea that morality is infused with exchange 
connotations. Adorno does not view the connection of morality with exchange as a good 
thing because it makes it impossible to conceive of morality outside of wealth. Adorno is 
critical of systems or terms that are abstract and inflexible. Further, as a Marxist, Adorno 
is not going to advocate for a method of moral interaction based on class, especially one 
that equates poverty with moral failings and wealth with moral success. Johnson, on the 
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other hand, does not offer a critical reflection on the metaphorical nature of moral 
language. Rather, as the aim of his project states, he tries to offer an account of what we 
do when we are engaged in moral deliberations and decision-making. 
 Adorno’s barter system and Johnson’s social accounting are nearly the same 
theory and, because of their similarities, they can offer support and strength to each 
other’s work. For instance, Johnson’s explanation regarding how and why the metaphor 
works (i.e., imagination) can also be applied to Adorno’s work: in the barter system, we 
imaginatively extend concepts of commodity to our ideas of morality. Also, Adorno’s 
criticism of the barter system can deepen Johnson’s discussion of the Social Accounting 
Metaphor. Johnson’s account, despite his claim to be matter of fact, is actually quite 
biased insofar as it presents only the most positive picture of this exchange. The other 
side to such a metaphor is as Thomas McCullough points out, “when our imaginations 
are dominated by the metaphor of the market place, we are likely to act as anxious and 
hostile competitors in an economy of scarcity.”192 Imagination’s domination on our 
conceptualization of ethics can in fact lead to the many problems it has also been credited 
with reversing: namely, that because our thinking is dominated by a metaphoric market 
place, we are going to be less likely to expand our conception of community to others and 
include them within our web of shared resources. Rather, we will be more inclined to 
draw the line between others and ourselves and put ourselves in imagined competition for 
resources. The negative aspects of the barter/accounting metaphor do not negate 
Johnson’s claim concerning the metaphorical nature of moral language. Rather, they help 
to deepen and enrich the account by revealing the wider implications of the metaphor, as 
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well as the extent of its pervasiveness. As we will see later in my project, this metaphor, 
has dire consequences in connection with the Holocaust.
193
 
 
 
Adorno on Imagination 
 
 
 
 A possible objection to my connecting Adorno to an account of moral imagination 
is that Adorno’s conception of imagination per se could be antithetical to the project of 
moral imagination. After all, most systematic philosophers, especially the ones Adorno 
draws from and replies to, have accounts of imagination and its role in cognition and 
therefore Adorno’s theory of imagination could stand in opposition to my unification 
attempts. As it turns out, Adorno doesn’t have an extremely detailed picture or theory of 
imagination, yet I argue that what he does discuss complements moral imagination. 
 Shierry Nicholsen is an Adornian scholar who dedicates the most time to 
Adorno’s conception of imagination in her work Exact Imagination, Late Work. 
Nicholsen draws the name of her book from the eponymous phrase Adorno uses in his 
aesthetic theory. She writes, “Adorno’s term “exact imagination” marks this conjunction 
of knowledge, experience, and aesthetic form,”194 and  “the term points provocatively and 
explicitly to the relationship between exactness—reflecting a truth claim—and the 
imagination as the agency of a subjective and aconceptual experience.”195 She also 
references Adorno’s work in “Actuality of Philosophy:” “An exact imagination; an 
imagination that remains strictly confined to the material offered it by scholarship and 
science and goes beyond them only in the smallest features of its arrangement, features 
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which of course it must produce itself.
196” As Nicholsen elucidates, ‘exact imagination’ is 
a very specific form of imagination for Adorno because it is focused on a particular, 
hence the ‘exact’ nature of it. Exact imagination is also, according to Nicholsen, 
responsible for truth claims and knowledge, in fact a very specific kind of knowledge: 
“nondominating knowledge.”197 Exact imagination is, then, a type of imagination that by 
closely focusing on particulars, produces nondominating truth or knowledge. This 
activity and result is in direct contrast to the identity thinking discussed previously that 
instrumental reason produces. Therefore, for Adorno, it is imagination, granted a specific 
kind, that is responsible for what seems to be his most positive account of nonidentity 
thinking. 
Further, exact imagination is described very similarly to Johnson’s imaginative 
activities in prototypes. For instance, in both, imagination extends slightly beyond the 
concept in question in order to arrive at a flexible understanding of a concept or object. 
Adorno’s description of exact imagination then offers additional credence to my previous 
claim, in the discussion of nonidentity thinking, that the inclusion of imagination can 
assist in the realization of nonidentity thinking because its characteristics are exactly the 
nondominating ones required. Here, in the discussion of exact imagination, we see a 
similar claim being made.  
 Another type of imagination that appears frequently in Adorno’s scholarship is 
the reproductive imagination. This phrase is drawn from Kant and it is from Kant that 
Adorno takes his lead. In the reproductive imagination, as we discussed in Chapter One 
and as I briefly mentioned in the section on determinate and reflective judgments, it is 
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imagination that is responsible for holding a number of related intuitions in the mind and 
synthesizing or comparing them. We find examples of Adorno referring to Kant’s 
reproductive imagination in a number of places, for instance: 
Adorno perceives an adumbration, almost a concession, of this thesis in Kant’s 
conception of the reproductive imagination. In order for a present perception to be 
meaningful the immediately previous moments of experience must be held in 
mind and coordinated with it...Adorno interprets Kant’s employment of the 
reproductive imagination as a “trace of historicity.”198 
 
 Further, “For Adorno, by contrast, we might learn that without memory, without what 
Kant termed “reproduction in the imagination,” no worthwhile knowledge can be 
obtained.”199 Adorno himself in Dialectic of Enlightenment discusses imagination in a 
way that is in line with Kant’s reproductive imagination: “Every perception contains 
unconsciously conceptual elements…Because truth implies imagination, it can happen 
that distorted personalities take the truth for fantasy and the illusion for truth. The 
distorted individual draws on the elements of imagination residing in truth by constantly 
seeking to expose it;”200 and “This ability [to take into account the true interests of 
others] is the capacity for reflection as the penetration of receptivity and imagination.”201 
In all of these examples, Adorno discuses imagination in terms of the ability to hold a 
number of events, ideas, or concepts in the mind and in doing so perceive or arrive at 
truth or knowledge. This reproductive imagination, as I demonstrated in Chapter One, is 
an integral part of moral imagination: it is used in Johnson’s theory of prototypes and in 
Werhane’s discussion of moral imagination. Again, we see in this account of imagination 
a theory that fits well with our overall theory of moral imagination. In the reproductive 
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imagination, as we discussed, one synthesizes two things and in doing so is able to claim 
knowledge. While for Kant such knowledge claims are absolute and irrefutable, for 
Adorno they are much more flexible and open. 
 Beside these two specific forms of imagination, the last major source for 
Adorno’s discussion of imagination comes in his genealogy and critique of 
Enlightenment. For example, he claims that Enlightenment, “transforms the meaning of 
‘reason” as ground and motive into only ground; it transforms a complex experience 
involving feeling, imagination and thought, into thought only;”202 “It [Adorno’s work] 
hopes to interpret this damaged life with sufficient attention and imagination to allow 
intimations of a possible, undamaged life to show through;”203 and, “Yet most often the 
imagination cannot be developed at all because it is mutilated by the experience of early 
childhood. The lack of imagination that is instilled and inculcated by society renders 
people helpless in their free time.”204 In all of these examples, Adorno views imagination 
as somehow damaged or repressed as a result of Enlightenment and that damaging or 
removal of imagination from our lives and our thought processes ultimately leads to more 
damage and destruction. These comments on the removal of imagination from our lives 
are important because they support my claim that Adorno would advocate for a greater 
inclusion of imagination and imaginative activities: he agrees that a reason-centric theory 
is distorting and that without imagination we suffer. Therefore, it seems clear that 
bringing imagination back into our cognitive processes can be a way of combating the 
destruction experienced so far. 
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Another possible objection to my connection of Adorno to moral imagination, is 
that there are philosophers from whom Adorno draws his theory that hold competing 
views of imagination. Therefore, Adorno would not ascribe to the contemporary accounts 
of the mental faculty. Two primary influences on Adorno’s work, Freud and Marx, each 
given accounts of imagination that may have influenced Adorno. Detailing their influence 
on Adorno, in particular as it concerns imagination is not within the purview of my work 
here. I will, however, briefly address this concern and demonstrate that neither’s account 
is incompatible with what I have put forth.   
 Marx does not have a detailed or robust description of imagination. He does not, 
like Johnson, enumerate the many ways in which imagination works it our lives or the 
devices to which it operates. Marx does, however, discuss imagination and does so in a 
way that is not inconsistent with Johnson’s work. The most extensive place in which 
Marx mentions imagination is in his discussion of money.
205
 Found both in The 
Economic Manuscripts of 1844 and Capital, Marx notes the influence imagination has in 
giving money its potency: “The value, or in other words, the quantity of human labour 
contained in a ton of iron, is expressed in imagination by such a quantity of the money-
commodity as contains the same amount of labour as the iron.”206 He continues to note 
that “commodities are equated beforehand in imagination, by their prices, to define 
quantities of money.”207 Imagination then is crucial to the movement of placing the value 
of an object or labour into another object, namely money. Marx’s account of the work of 
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imagination is similar in kind to Johnson’s insofar as both credit imagination with the 
ability to extend objects or ideas beyond their normal bounds. For Marx, such 
imaginative extension comes in the form of money, while for Johnson the imaginative 
extension to metaphors, prototypes, and a number of other imaginative activities. 
Although Marx’s account of imagination is nowhere near as complete or detailed as 
Johnson, I do not see, given Marx’s limited discussion of the topic, that his theory 
presents any conflicting ideas or arguments regarding imagination’s work. Rather, he 
shares with Johnson imagination’s role in extending categories beyond their normal 
bounds and further it seems he shares the idea that imagination can be powerful: if 
imagination is what extends value to money, it must be powerful given the value our 
capitalistic society places on money.  
 Freud is another major influence on Adorno and more so than Marx, offers an 
account of imagination throughout his works. In the writings on his patients like “Studies 
on Hysteria,” he often describes his patients as engaging with their imagination. One 
specific patient he describes as, “living through fairy tales in her imagination.”208 There 
are frequent references of this kind in Freud’s description of his patients insofar as many 
of the false ideas of his patient’s he ascribes to imagination. In this way, Freud has a very 
traditional view of imagination: it is the faculty that produces fantasy and falsity. 
 It is in Freud’s work in “The Interpretation of Dreams,” that he delves into detail 
regarding imagination. He writes:  
[B]y way of contrast, the mental activity which may be described as 
‘imagination,’ liberated from the domination of reason and from any moderating 
control, leaps into a position of unlimited sovereignty. Though dream-imagination 
makes use of recent waking memories for its building material, it erects them into 
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structures bearing not the remotest resemblance to those of waking life; it reveals 
itself in dreams as possessing not merely reproductive but productive powers. Its 
characteristics are what lend their peculiar features to dreams. It shows a 
preference for what is immoderate, exaggerated and monstrous. But at the same 
time, being freed from the hindrances of the categories of thought, it gains in 
pliancy, agility and versatility.
209
  
 
Freud sees imagination as crucial to the formulation of dreams, or as he calls it ‘dream-
imagination:’ imagination takes the memories from the day and structures them into 
dreams. As Freud points out, our dream-imagination is unfettered from reason and 
therefore prone to fantasy and delusion. However, he notes that without reason, 
imagination is far more flexible. Freud’s account of dream-imagination is strikingly 
similar to Kant’s account of imagination, in my opinion. As I have explained previously, 
in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, he notes that imagination is lawless and in the judgment 
of an aesthetic work, it is the lawlessness of imagination that allows our cognitive 
faculties to experience the reflective judgment. Freud is noticing the same lawlessness 
and like Kant sees this feature as not necessarily negative. Also, similar to Kant, Freud 
notes that imagination needs to be tempered by reason in order to maintain its connection 
to reality. Ultimately, Freud’s account of dream-imagination reveals that he sees a great 
strength in imagination: it is responsible for the transformation of our waking life into our 
dreams and creates our very dreams. As Freud places a great deal of importance in our 
dreams, he must then too place a great deal of importance in our imagination.  
 Two final points regarding Freud’s account of imagination that are important to 
note. The first, comes in a later part of The Interpretation of Dreams. Freud argues that, 
“the symbolizing activity of the imagination remains the central force in every dream.”210 
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Freud, here, explicitly states that imagination is crucial to dreams, in particular giving 
dreams their symbols, which for Freud is the very heart of his work on dreams. Further, 
the symbolizing of dreams connects Freud’s conception of imagination to Johnson’s. In 
order for one thing to be a symbol for another, one must extend a concept or idea on to 
another. For example, if I dream I am pregnant, such a dream may be a symbol for my 
philosophical work insofar as I am pregnant with ideas. In order for the physical 
pregnancy to be a symbol for the mental, I must extend the idea of pregnancy from 
physical to the mental; after all, being ‘pregnant with ideas’ is a metaphor. For Freud, 
then just as for Johnson, imagination is necessary for the extension of one idea on to 
another as we find in metaphors.  
 Second, in Freud’s discussion of Psychical (or Mental) Treatment he focuses on, 
as the title suggests, ways of treating physical or mental disorders. He argues: 
Laymen, who like to sum up mental influences of this kind under the name of 
‘imagination,’ are inclined to have little respect for pains that are due to the 
imagination as contrasted with those caused by injury, illness or inflammation. 
But this is clearly unjust. However pains may be caused–even by imagination—
they themselves are no less real and no less violent on that account.
211
  
 
Freud does draw a distinction between physical and mental, or here imaginary, pains but 
notes that imaginary pains ‘are no less real.’ This passage is important because it 
demonstrates that Freud sees a real power in imagination and in its ability to hold sway 
over our lives. Further, it complicates the picture that imagination is pure fantasy for 
Freud since he is here admitting that it can give real pain.  
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 Ultimately, I see no reason to say that Freud’s account of imagination, from 
which Adorno may be drawing, is in contrast to Johnson’s theory. Freud certainly does 
not have a very complete picture of imagination, and does place it more within the realm 
of fantasy than Johnson. However, Freud notes, more than once, the power that 
imagination has in our lives to determine and influence the world around us. This power 
is not just the creation of fantasy, but also the power of a flexible symbolizing. Johnson 
claims something similar in his discussion of metaphors and prototypes. Therefore, I do 
not think that Adorno’s influences, especially their work on imagination, prevent any 
strong claim against the joining of Adorno and moral imagination scholars.  
 Overall, Adorno does not have enough of a complete picture of imagination 
(particularly in comparison to the thinkers he critiques) to say for certain that he is in 
complete agreement with moral imagination’s account. However, what we can glean is 
that he does share many of the same qualities and characteristics of imagination that are 
discussed in moral imagination. Further, there are no indicators that Adorno’s theory 
opposes or is contradictory to moral imagination’s account of imagination. Finally, given 
the remarkable closeness of Adorno and moral imagination, which I have been detailing 
all chapter, and the ways in which moral imagination nearly completely fulfills the 
positive requirements for Adorno’s theory, I think it is clear that moral imagination and 
Adorno fit well together. 
 
 
Moral Imagination and Adorno Connected 
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 As I have been arguing throughout this chapter, Adorno’s work and the theory of 
moral imagination share a significant number of important and strong connections. From 
a general need to move away from reason-centric theories, to specific arguments 
concerning the pervasiveness of exchange metaphors in our moral language, the 
similarities between theories is remarkable. Along with these shared qualities comes 
mutually beneficial support. As it concerns Adorno’s work, a connection to moral 
imagination can offer Adorno a number of needed features. Connecting Adorno to moral 
imagination gives him a substantial response to one of the major criticisms made against 
his work: that he never offers a positive philosophy. He, as Cook points out, offers a 
number of criticisms regarding our current situation without any positive account of how 
we might overcome it. Adorno’s work, then, has been called entirely negative.212 By 
connecting Adorno to moral imagination, we begin to give a positive account to Adorno’s 
work. For instance, how do we overcome oppressively rigid and inflexible categories? 
We include imagination that allows us to be flexible and maintain a connection to 
particulars. How can we possibly move away from instrumental reason, but without the 
complete renunciation of rational thought? We can do so by incorporating a more 
imaginative rationality. Imagination, specifically, its addition, can assist Adorno in 
answering those who criticize him for being wholly negative. 
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 Yet, one may continue and say that the prescription ‘more imagination’ is too 
ambiguous to be helpful or practical. I would certainly agree with such a criticism, 
though I am not advocating for the addition of imagination at random or without 
direction. Rather, following Johnson, Werhane and Nussbaum’s work, and as I elucidated 
in Chapter One, a guided inclusion of imagination would be prescribed. Additionally, one 
could ask how we can trust that imagination has not been corrupted, for instance by the 
barter system, to the point that ‘more imagination’ just means more rigidity in thinking. I 
will address such a critique in my fourth chapter when I analyze Adorno’s “Education 
After Auschwitz.” There he speaks explicitly about ways to overcome rigid thinking per 
se, regardless of the metaphor at work, and his response will assist in answering our 
critique. Ultimately, I will spend my fourth chapter arguing for a specific method of 
imaginative education that closely follows Adorno’s work and that discussion will, I 
hope, answer any such critiques. 
 In addition to assisting Adorno in answering some of his critiques, the inclusion 
of moral imagination with Adorno’s work will also provide him with an explanatory 
support to his work. As we saw in the barter metaphor, the theory of moral imagination 
shows how the barter system works on a cognitive basis. This ‘how’ explanation offered 
by moral imagination is beneficial to Adorno’s theory because it lends further credence to 
Adorno’s work. 
 The relationship between Adorno and moral imagination is not only beneficial for 
Adorno, but also for moral imagination. In a similar manner to our previous discussion, 
Adorno’s work offers explanatory support to the theory of moral imagination. In 
particular, Adorno’s theory gives moral imagination a better ‘why’ explanation for many 
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of the qualities it describes. The imaginative extension of commodity terms to morality is 
a result of capitalism’s pervasiveness. We get better insight, then, into why certain 
metaphors or imaginative content are privileged over others by connecting Adorno to 
moral imagination. 
 Another beneficial component for moral imagination is that Adorno’s work can 
deepen and enrich Johnson’s work on moral imagination. For instance, while Johnson 
looks to explore the fact that morality is metaphorical, Adorno reveals how these 
metaphors can be oppressive or contribute to an oppressive system. Adorno’s insights, 
then, give us a better picture of just how complicated and deeply involved imagination is 
in our moral lives. In our discussion of constellations, Adorno’s insights helped us see 
that even Johnson’s stable core is open to revision and therefore not stable in the 
traditional sense of the term. Adorno’s work ultimately gives Johnson’s more depth by 
pushing his theories to be broader and more inclusive. 
 A final way in which Adorno’s work can be beneficial to Johnson’s moral 
imagination is that Adorno protects, or at least, responds to moral imagination’s greatest 
criticism. Critics of moral imagination do not necessarily contend that imagination is not 
present in moral thinking. Rather, they desire a greater clarity to its role, too much clarity 
I think. In order for imagination to be taken seriously in contemporary ethics, necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a definition of imagination as well as its exact role and 
purview are requested. Without this the response is, ‘What is meant by the phrase moral 
imagination?’ and, ‘What separates it from other cognitive faculties, such as memory and 
why?’ Certain inroads can be made to answer such questions by focusing on moral 
imagination’s role in specific moral examples or breaking apart moral imagination’s 
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work between moral perception, deliberation, etc. Despite these clarifications, the 
requirement for more will arise.
213
   
 Adorno can help answer these critiques in two major ways. First, Adorno’s work 
rebuffs the typical philosophical need for stringent clarity. Instead, as we have seen, he 
advocates for greater amounts of indeterminacy. Rather than demanding of moral 
imagination more delineation and greater lines of distinction, Adorno allows and 
encourages flexibility. Situated within Adorno’s theory, then, moral imagination needn’t 
respond to the criticism that without necessary and sufficient conditions, moral 
imagination as a theory doesn’t work or is incomprehensible. Of course ethicists who 
have for a long time clung to reason-centric theories would be suspicious of any theory 
that attempts to do away with their stronghold. Adorno, by calling into question their 
requirements, per se, allows imagination the flexibility it needs by not requiring it to 
become what it is not.  
 Second, Adorno’s work, when connected to moral imagination, encourages moral 
imagination to be true to itself. The theory of moral imagination advocates repeatedly for 
a number of characteristics that are and should be found in moral thinking: flexibility, 
creativity, and a movement away from universals. To require of the theory necessary and 
sufficient conditions or to think that such is possible does a disservice to the theory 
because such a requirement is antithetical to the spirit and the particulars of it. Although I 
think the idea that necessary and sufficient conditions are antithetical to the theory of 
moral imagination can be seen without Adorno, I do think that Adorno’s work can 
illuminates the idea. Adorno’s work very much follows its own tenants: Adorno claims 
that ideas and concepts are thought of in terms of constellations and writes, himself, in a 
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constellation-style; Adorno is critical of instrumental reason and therefore doesn’t write 
in an overly analytic style. Seeing how Adorno’s work, both the writing style and its 
focus, reflects the values set forth in his work only doubles the strength of his project. 
Similarly with moral imagination, the project and major tenents of the theory would fail 
before they ever go off the ground if it tried to be or satisfy the conditions required of the 
theory it is trying to critique and move away from. 
 In this chapter I have sketched out a number of the most central and important 
tenents of Adorno’s work. I have also demonstrated how the specific tenents tie very 
closely into a theory of moral imagination that was presented in Chapter One. My aim 
was not merely to point out similarities but also reveal a mutually beneficial relationship 
between the two theories. Adorno’s work offers moral imagination a deeper, more robust, 
and more complicated picture of imagination’s role in morality while also offering an 
explanation as to why certain imaginative content or activities are more prevalent. On the 
other hand, moral imagination gives Adorno’s work an explanation of how: both how to 
bring about some of Adorno’s ideas (like nonidentity thinking) and thereby respond to his 
critics, but also a how explanation regarding the cognitive working of many of the 
activities he describes. I have shown, then, in this chapter that the two theories can and 
should be combined. 
 From here, and in the next two chapters, I will focus the discussion of Adorno and 
moral imagination further. I will hone in on Adorno’s work on the Holocaust and 
examine in what ways the theory of moral imagination impacts Adorno’s work therein. 
At first, in the proceeding chapter, moral imagination will reveal some inconsistences, 
challenge some points, and deepen some of Adorno’s claims. In the final chapter I will 
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examine Adorno’s prescription regarding post-Auschwitz education and argue for an 
imaginative education to fulfill his requirements. Here, though, we have laid the 
groundwork for these and other discussions by thoroughly demonstrating the connection 
between moral imagination and Adorno. 
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ‘EDUCATION AFTER AUSCHWITZ’ 
 
 
 
As I have demonstrated in Chapter Two, moral imagination and Adorno’s work 
offer each other a number of complementary cross-sections. In an effort to deepen my 
explanation of the ways in which the two theories interact, I focus my analysis in this 
chapter. Specifically, I focus on Adorno’s work on the Holocaust, and the educative 
claims that fall out of that discussion. It is my goal to utilize the efficacy of an 
imaginative education that I discussed in Chapter One, in a post-Holocaust, Adornian 
education. In order to do that, I need to first get a firm grasp on the goals of such an 
education, specifically understanding the challenges it needs to overcome. In this chapter, 
I hope to do just that. 
Adorno opens “Education After Auschwitz” with the strong claim that drives the 
rest of the piece: “The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen 
again.”214 He argues, in this radio address, delivered on April 18, 1966, (and later turned 
into an article) that in order to prevent another genocide like the Holocaust, we must 
counteract the conditions that allowed it to occur in the first place.
215
 To discover these 
conditions, Adorno details the attitudes and behaviors of the persecutors. This chapter is 
dedicated to outlining and analyzing those attitudes and behaviors, including: collective 
identity, hardness, coldness, the veil of technology, the barbarization of the countryside, 
and avoidance. In my analysis, I explore Adorno’s claims and work at improving or 
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expanding on them, specifically by continuing my project from the first two chapters and 
integrating the theory of moral imagination within Adorno’s work. Ultimately, this 
chapter develops a firm theoretical foundation for Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education 
plan. In my final chapter, I take this theoretical foundation and use it to argue for concrete 
possibilities for an education specifically targeted at the Holocaust and post-conflict per 
se.  
 In order to establish and evaluate Adorno’s educational plan, we must begin by 
investigating to whom Adorno is speaking or to whom this education is addressed. Such a 
distinction is important for the creation of an educative plan because in order for the 
education to be the most effective, it must be correctly targeted. Though I begin the 
discussion for those involved here, it will continue throughout the chapter as I flesh out 
more of Adorno’s ideas.  
 Adorno is fairly explicit that the education he has in mind should target the 
persecutors of the Holocaust: “The roots [of why people commit genocide] must be 
sought in the persecutors, not in the victims, who are murdered under the paltriest of 
pretenses.”216 Adorno, then, draws a clear line between perpetrator and victim of the 
Holocaust. Such a distinction is maintained by most people who learn about the 
Holocaust with the Jews and other persecuted groups are the victims, and the Nazis are 
the perpetrators.  
 The persecutors, on the other hand, are for the most part members of the Nazi 
Party. He does name specific people, such as Eichmann and Höss, and also discusses the 
German military and government as guilty parties. However, the Nazis are not the only 
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group Adorno finds responsible for Auschwitz. He concludes “Education After 
Auschwitz” by recounting a conversation he had with Walter Benjamin:   
Walter Benjamin asked me once in Paris during his emigration, when I was still 
returning to Germany sporadically, whether there were really enough torturers 
back there to carry out the orders of the Nazis. There were enough. Nevertheless 
the question has its profound legitimacy. Benjamin sensed that the people who do 
it, as opposed to the bureaucratic desktop murders and ideologues, operate 
contrary to their own immediate interests, are murderers of themselves while they 
murder others. I fear that the measures of even such an elaborate education will 
hardly hinder the renewed growth of desktop murderers.
217
  
 
This quote is extremely telling, especially as it concerns Adorno’s account of the 
persecutors. Here we get a glimpse that the Nazis are not the only ones responsible for 
the Holocaust but that there are also “torturers” who carried out the orders of the Nazis 
and thereby seem to be different or distinct from the Nazis. Additionally, Adorno 
introduces us to category ‘desktop murderers.’ The phrase is not necessarily a popular 
one, that is, it is not one whose definition is clear within Holocaust literature. Rebecca 
Wittman, History Professor at University of Toronto, uses the phrase in her work: 
"[C]hanges to the law made it easier and easier for those who had the most power in the 
Nazi regime – the desktop murderers – to go free or escape trial, and in the end only the 
most sadistic – and exceptional – of Nazi criminals, usually camp guards, were tried and 
convicted of murder.”218 Wittmann’s use of the phrase is interesting because for her, the 
desktop murderers are those responsible for a great deal of the genocidal acts, but did not 
pull a trigger, instead giving the orders from the comfort of their office. 
 Adorno’s motivation for including “desktop murders” as persecutors is a noble 
one insofar as he wants to challenge the idea that the only people who were responsible, 
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or should be held responsible, are the ones who pulled the trigger. Rather, Adorno’s 
project in “Education After Auschwitz” is the revelation of the different ways society has 
led to the Holocaust. By including desktop murderers he is, in particular, pushing against 
Hitlerism, the idea that one person, Hitler, managed to, by himself, orchestrate the 
slaughter of 8 million people while everyone stood by innocent, unaware of what he was 
doing.
219
 Instead, Adorno wants to reveal that many more people were involved and 
responsible than perhaps they or we like to admit. While the SS guards of Auschwitz are 
responsible for murder, so too are the people filling out the paperwork to deport those 
victims. 
I agree with the spirit of Adorno’s work, specifically his broadening of those 
whom he considers to be responsible because without such broadening, we fall into false 
and dangerous narratives. For instance, the narrative of Hitlerism maintains Hitler as a 
charismatic monster who enticed so many people to do his bidding. Hitler then becomes, 
in this narrative, an evil genius, like those found only in comic books or Ian Fleming 
novels. This narrative is pervasive because it takes the common person off the hook and 
clearly gives us our guilty party/parties. The everyday German was either under Hitler’s 
spell or so afraid of this evil man to do anything; either way, no one had a choice. Adorno 
is trying to complicate this picture by arguing that the common person was not so 
helpless, but rather that actions besides literal trigger pulling caused the Holocaust. 
Adorno is quite certainly correct in critique of such a narrative; Hitler was, of course, 
voted into office but Hitler did not invent anti-Semitism, nor did he personally drop 
Zlycon B.  
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Not only is Adorno challenging our understanding of guilt with the discussion of 
desktop murders, he is also challenging a traditional philosophical dichotomy of the 
active participant and the disinterested observer. The disinterested observer has a long 
history in philosophy as the preferred position for practicing philosophy and is most 
ardently defended by those Adorno would consider Enlightenment thinkers. The idea 
behind disinterested observers is to remove all non-rational elements from our thought 
processes (e.g., no emotions, imagination, etc.) and by doing so, one will make the best 
judgment. Adorno wants to contest that position, especially in light of the suffering of 
others.  As Volker Heins states, “Adorno rejected the commonly held view that the roles 
of observers and participants are fundamentally different.”220 We see this rejection in 
Minima Moralia: “The detached observer is as much entangled as the active participant; 
the only advantage of the former is insight into his entanglement, and the infinitesimal 
freedom that lies in knowledge as such.”221 While Auschwitz guards are clearly active 
participants in the genocide at Auschwitz, most people want to maintain that the person 
who signed transfer papers was not, that she was merely an observer. By including those 
who might typically be labeled as an observer as a type of murder (e.g., desktop), Adorno 
is trying to call attention to the many ways in which people were responsible for 
Auschwitz. 
In order to see how Adorno pushes at this dichotomy of observer/participant, let 
us look at someone who might typically be considered a non-active observer, free from 
guilt during the Holocaust: a neighbor to a Jewish family. This neighbor observes the 
Jewish family being harassed, rounded up, and deported. The neighbor, true to her 
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position, stands by, inactive while all of this occurs. Her actions serve as the basis for her 
categorization as an observer: she is detached from the action, merely observing. 
However, I, and I think Adorno, suggest that if we contemplate her attitude to the 
deportation of her neighbors, we find her certainly not detached or disinterested and far 
less than a mere observer. As I imagine it, there are two likely attitudes the neighbor has 
in response to the Jewish family’s treatment: one, she buys into the Nazi propaganda and 
is gladdened by their abuse and ultimate deportation; or two, she buys into Nazi 
propaganda and wants to help but is too scared to do so; she worries she will be killed or 
deported if she does anything. It seems highly unlikely that anyone in a Nazi-occupied 
country was completely disinterested in response to the Nazis. It is also highly unlikely 
that anyone living next to a Jewish neighbor was entirely unaware of the Nazi 
propaganda about the Jewish people, or the situation of their neighbor (How does one 
ignore seeing neighbors deported? Further, if it was the case that the neighbor wasn’t 
aware, she could not be labeled a disinterested observer since she did not observe 
anything). The question, then, is whether in any given situation the neighbor truly is 
disinterested or detached? It is clear that they are not insofar as they all were interested in 
some capacity: either glad to see their neighbors go, worried for their own lives, or 
wanting to help. The idea, then, that anyone in Germany, Europe, or even the rest of the 
world, was disinterested in their observation is an untenable position and Adorno is 
absolutely correct in his desire to remove such a position as an option. 
Another category of people involved in the Holocaust are ‘those who resisted.’ He 
concludes “Education After Auschwitz” with the claim: “Concrete possibilities of 
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resistance nonetheless must be shown.”222 Adorno suggests that we look at those who 
refused to adhere to the Nazi doctrines and use their actions as a guide to help us create 
an educational system that tries to recreate the conditions of resistance. 
223
 I agree, in 
theory, with this step of the educational plan, though I am wary about how it might 
practically play out. For instance, as I will explain in greater detail shortly, Adorno 
criticizes the guilty for not critically reflecting; however, it is not necessarily the case that 
those who helped were critically reflecting. Some of those who helped, like the townsfolk 
of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, hid over 1,000 French Jews because, “God commanded 
them to save the Jews and they obeyed.” 224 The townsfolk are so steadfast in their claim 
that they were merely obeying God’s commands that they refused any memorials or 
museums in their honor until recently.  
A similar response of ‘just following orders’ is given by many whom Adorno 
wants to call guilty. Raised in a household or town in which Jews were blamed for all 
their problems, Auschwitz officer Oskar Gröning offers a similar answer to the question 
of why. Why did he participate in the Nazi party? Because that is what he was taught, 
because he knew it was right: “We were convinced by our worldview that we had been 
betrayed by the entire world and that there was a conspiracy of the Jews against us.”225 
Neither Le Chambon nor Gröning claim a great deal of critical reflection about their 
actions, both just felt that what they were doing was right. Both also seemed to appeal to 
rules already established for them about right and wrong. Looking at those who resisted 
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as a model might not necessarily produce fruitful results for how to promote resistance 
because they did not necessarily perform such actions (especially resistance understood 
as critical self-reflection which, as we will see, is fundamental to opposing the thinking of 
the Nazis).
226
 
Although I agree with Adorno’s desire to redefine the categories of those 
involved, I would like to go further. As I mentioned earlier, Adorno’s definition of 
murders seems to include the people responsible for the bureaucratic side of the 
Holocaust: those who organized everything so that such large-scale deportations, thefts, 
and executions could take place. He also, at the same time, wants to hold the Jewish 
people, and other groups, as victims. Such a distinction, however, is a false dichotomy 
because the two categories can overlap or bleed into one another. Adorno doesn’t 
necessarily spell out such a false dichotomy, however, and I want to add to his work here 
by suggesting that some of the people responsible for the activities associated with 
desktop murderers were Jewish people.
227
  
One of the best examples of this overlap between innocent and guilt is found in 
the Czech ghetto Terezin. Terezin was a 14
th
 century Czech fortress, turned into a town, 
then turned into a Ghetto for Jews. The Nazis expelled all of the villagers and started 
transporting Jews to the Ghetto in 1941. Besides serving as a ghetto, the main purpose of 
Terezin was propaganda: the Red Cross wanted to investigate claims regarding 
concentration camps and ghettos, so the Nazis created a model town for the Red Cross to 
tour. The story goes that when deported, all Jews would be going to their own cities 
where the children would be educated, there would be concerts, plays and musicals; they 
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  121         
could self-legislate, and live in peace. The Nazis went so far as to have the Jews write 
postcards to their friends and family back home encouraging them to come out to Terezin 
and live there. In truth, Terezin was just a stopover for the concentration and 
extermination camps farther East, like Auschwitz. While the Nazis were behind the idea 
of Terezin, they had the Jewish people who lived there do most of the legwork to make 
Terezin the propaganda machine that it was.
228
  
Two other striking examples come to light in the documentary Auschwitz: Inside 
the Nazi State. The first comes from the testimony of a survivor of Auschwitz, Ryszard 
Dacko. He reveals that there was in Auschwitz, what he calls, a brothel. It was set up so 
that the best workers could have a “reward” for their work. Dacko admits that the women 
did not have a choice in being part of the brothel but says that they got more food than 
others so everything was equal.
229
 Dacko’s testimony is stunning insofar as he is clearly 
unable to see that he is a rapist and victimized other prisoners. This example, in 
particular, reveals that we cannot maintain a clear and definitive line between victim and 
persecutor, but rather it must be admitted that some people who were victims, also 
persecuted others. The second example revealed in the documentary concerns the 
removal of corpses at Auschwitz. The Sonderkommando was a group of Jewish prisoners 
who were made to work in the crematoria on pain of their own immediate death. One 
member acknowledges, “They [the Nazis] didn’t kill us because there were 4,000 
cadavers that had to go into the ovens and we are the only ones that could do it and that is 
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why they saved us.” 230 The members of the group admit that the entire process of killing 
was done almost entirely by Jews, including those telling victims they should get in the 
shower. The Nazi officer was responsible, only, for dropping the Zlycon B into the 
chamber. The men, further, admit that without all of their work, and the work of their 
fellow prisoners, there is no way that the Nazis could have killed as many people as 
quickly as they did.  
From Terezin, to the brothel of Auschwitz, what I want to reveal with these 
examples is that there is not always a clear line between victim and persecutor, or even 
victim and desktop murderer. Noting this is important for a number of reasons: one, 
Adorno claims that his educational plan needn’t address victims, but only persecutors. If 
we understand that the two can be found in the same person, or that the two are not as 
distinct as we might like to think, then we need to make sure that our educational plan 
takes that into account. Two, Adorno’s account could use a bit of further explanation 
insofar as he doesn’t fully present the potentially overlapping categories of victim and 
persecutor dichotomy.  
I hope it goes without saying that I see a substantial distinction between people 
like Eichmann and those who suffered in concentration camps. I would never suggest that 
the two are guilty in the same way. Rather, what I want to suggest is that the distinction 
between guilty and victim is not necessarily a clear one but more of a spectrum with 
individuals on various ends and then a lot of middle positions in which such distinction is 
less clear. I think it is necessary to talk about this spectrum because painting the 
relationship as only extremes is just not true and perpetuates a false narrative. Also, it 
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leaves the door open for such events to happen again: no one thinks they could be 
Eichmann or Hitler and many people empathize with the victims, but few contemplate the 
experience of those in between. It is the in between position that I think is crucial to 
education following Auschwitz and is the biggest feature missing from not only Adorno’s 
work but also current education.  
In order to investigate the flexibility of the categories of those involved, we need 
to incorporate imagination.  For instance, the imaginative device of prototypes can be 
helpful in our categorizing of the different positions, such as coming up with a 
prototypical victim and then using that to imaginatively extend definitions or try out other 
cases to see if they fall within the prototype. Alternatively, the spectrum method of 
understanding victims and guilty that I suggested earlier also relies heavily on 
imagination: one must imaginatively try out and extend categories and definitions to 
certain examples. One must also perform some imaginative perspective taking in order to 
discover where certain people and actions may fall: if I was in that position, would it feel 
like I had any other choice in the matter? Ultimately, there are a variety of imaginative 
devices and exercises that would be required for my proposed way of understanding the 
different positions because my method requires flexibility and fluidity of categories. I 
will go into specifics regarding the ‘how’ in the next chapter, but for now I want to 
suggest that post-Auschwitz education would be better served if it encouraged 
imaginative exploration and flexibility in the thinking of those involved, specifically the 
categories of people and their relations to each other.  
Having gained greater insight into those to which Adorno is addressing both in his 
piece, we can now begin to examine the specific elements of his theory. Adorno separates 
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his education into two areas: “first, children’s education, especially in early childhood; 
then, general enlightenment, which provides an intellectual, cultural, and social climate in 
which a recurrence would no longer be possible, a climate, therefore, in which the 
motives that led to the horror would become relatively conscious.”231 While Adorno 
states that he cannot sketch out a plan for such education, he does note that he will 
“indicate some of its nerve centers.”232 It is these nerve centers that I will use to inspire a 
sketch of such an education. 
 
 
Collective Thinking 
 
 
 
 The most often discussed mechanism or condition for Auschwitz is a type of 
thinking which Adorno describes as “the blind identification with the collective.”233 
Adorno writes, “I think the most important way to confront the danger of a recurrence [of 
Auschwitz] is to work against the brute predominance of all collectives, to intensify the 
resistance to it by concentrating on the problem of collectivization.”234 Adorno describes 
it differently in another passage: “the very unwillingness to connive with power and to 
submit outwardly to what is stronger, under the guise of a norm, is the attitude of the 
tormentors that should not arise again.”235 This blind identification with the collective can 
be overcome in a number of ways, the most important, however, is autonomy: “the power 
of reflection, of self-determination, of not cooperating.”236 
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Though not explicit, I think Adorno’s identifying with the collective is a form of 
identity thinking. In identity thinking, we identify things or others as simple concepts, 
removing all of their particularity in favor of easy to understand universals, which you 
can then manipulate and use. In identifying with the collective, many of the same 
mechanisms are at work for others and also yourself. Adorno writes, “People who blindly 
slot themselves into the collective already make themselves into something like inert 
material, extinguish themselves as self-determined beings. With this comes the 
willingness to treat others as an amorphous mass.”237 Thinking with a collective, then, 
performs the same activities associated with identity thinking, especially the destructive 
ones. If I think of myself a member of a collective in the way described by Adorno, I lose 
what is particular about me. No longer am I a unique individual, I am a Democrat, NRA 
member, Nazi, and so forth. 
 Identifying with the collective also erases my 
particular interests or needs in favor of universal ones 
that I cling to dogmatically: if the party ascribes to 
something, and I am a member of the party, then I do 
too. If Adorno was around today, he might critique the 
ways in which people identify with political parties in 
the United States (and certainly elsewhere) as another 
form of identifying with the collective: if you are a 
Republican, you must be anti-abortion, pro-gun, anti-big government, etc. What these 
phrases actually mean might not be all that clear to you, but you know that because you 
are a Republican they are your ideals. Further, these ideals privilege universal rules over 
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particulars. Anti-abortion laws most often do not leave room for pregnancies that are 
caused by rape or incest; these particular situations certainly do not get discussed in the 
mainstream discussion of abortion debates. In a similar manner, being pro-gun seems to 
mean pro all guns, for anyone, without the need for background checks or databases; 
anything less than this is a fundamental infringement on one’s rights. Discussions about 
particulars, like assault weapons, accessibility by minors, and so forth do not enter into 
the debate because it is easier to stick to the universal and ignore the particulars. 
Identifying with the collective, then, not only extinguishes you as a particular in favor of 
the collective, it does the same with the ideals it espouses or condemns. 
Not only do you and your ideals become those of the collective, Adorno writes 
that thinking in terms of collectives also affects how you see other people. When you 
yourself already see in terms of collectives, it is easier to see others as “an amorphous 
mass.” Seeing others as an amorphous mass makes it that much easier to exterminate 
them, as the Nazi party demonstrated. Examining the rhetoric of the Nazis is a good way 
to see just how they viewed the Jews, and others, as an amorphous mass and much of this 
language is still maintained in our discussion of the Holocaust today. For instance, we 
talk about the extermination of the Jewish people, which is ultimately the Third Reich’s 
Final Solution. Talk of ‘extermination’ usually belongs only to the realm of bugs or 
insects.
238
 Even the most violent criminals are ‘executed’ by the state, not exterminated. 
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An exterminator is someone you hire to come to your house and rid it of bugs or vermin, 
both of which are ultimately not welcome in your home, hence the need for the 
exterminator. Similarly, the idea that Jews and other targeted groups were ‘rounded up’ is 
again a phrase most often associated with animals, and not humans.
239
 We round up cattle 
or other animals to take to the barn, to the field, or to the slaughterhouse, most often. The 
language of the Nazi’s Final Solution is certainly one in which the Jews were treated like 
an amorphous mass. Further, pictured in Figure 3, for example, is an issue of “Müncher 
Illustrietre Presse” from 1933 and currently on display at Dachau Concentration Camp 
Memorial Site. The cover is a group of Jewish men entering Dachau and the issue 
contained an extensive propaganda report on the Dachau concentration camp. Notice how 
the faces of each person are not very clear due in part to their looking down. Also, every 
man in the image has similar hair and clothes, rendering them once again not distinct 
individuals or particulars. Finally, the photograph is clearly of a large group of men, there 
are bodies spilling out of the edges. Such a depiction encourages the idea that the Jewish 
people are in such great numbers, like vermin.
240
  
 Identifying with a collective, seeing yourself as definitively belonging to one 
group, makes it very easy for you to see others as belonging to a different group, and also 
as that group being another collective. When you see an other as only the collective, 
regardless of how you frame that collective, you begin to erase particular individuals in 
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favor of universals. Instead of seeing the person in front of you as a unique individual, 
with particular wants, desires and interests, she becomes a Jew, one of many. If the 
narrative of the Jewish people is one that is blamed for the downfall of Germany, then 
being a Jew, identifying someone with that collective, means that person is just ‘part of 
the problem.’  
Even if the collective is considered a positive thing, such as a being a celebrity, 
blindly identifying someone in that collective, is, ultimately, going to be destructive to 
them. For instance, if I saw Joss Whedon on the street corner, because he is a celebrity, I 
would not necessarily treat him like a unique, particular person, but rather as someone 
belonging to the collective ‘celebrity.’ Because of that, I would treat him differently than 
other people, perhaps going up to him and asking him for his autograph or a photo, 
something I would not do to someone who didn’t belong to the collective of celebrity. 
While, hopefully, my interest would end there, someone who blindly identified with the 
collective might go further, following Whedon, taking photographs, and detailing his 
every movement. Such action is justified by the idea that he is a celebrity and this is what 
he gets for being a celebrity. Whedon, and others who are identified in the collective 
“celebrity,” have their individuality removed from them in favor of a universal that is 
easy to use and manipulate. 
One could say that it is an individual’s uniqueness or particularity that makes 
them a part of the collective, and therefore is not removed from them when they are 
identified with it. For instance, Whedon is a celebrity because of his unique and particular 
contributions to film and TV. While it might be the case that Whedon’s work has led him 
to be identified as “celebrity,” being identified in such a collective still removes from him 
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his particularity and much of what makes him an individual. His privacy, for instance, is 
easily invaded and such intrusion is brushed off because he is a celebrity. Similarly, being 
of Jewish descent or identifying as a Jew religiously may be central to an individual as a 
particular, or contribute to what makes them the unique person that they are. Even if the 
identification begins with something the particular person has, as long as it ends with 
collective identification, it will be harmful. 
 In order to overcome and ultimately, hopefully, prevent the blind identification 
with collectives, Adorno proposes that we seek out the causes of collective thinking as 
one way to counteract such destructive ways of thinking. He suggests that a thorough 
analysis, in the psychoanalytic tradition, of each perpetrator would be a way to 
understand what lead them think and act in the way they did. While such analysis was not 
completed, at least at the depth to which Adorno speaks, I think that, nevertheless, we can 
gain insights as to the mechanisms that allow or encourage collective thinking.
241
  
                                                     
241 Adorno explains the analysis he requires, thusly: “I would like to make a concrete proposal: to 
study the guilty of Auschwitz with all the methods available to science, in particular with long-
term psychoanalysis, in order, if possible to discover how such a person develops…This could be 
done only if they would want to collaboration in the investigation of their own genesis. Certainly 
it will be difficult to induce them to speak…Whether the attempt helps somewhat or not cannot 
be known before it is undertaken; I don’t want to overestimate it. One must remember that 
individuals cannot be explained automatically by such conditions” (Adorno, “Education After 
Auschwitz,” 28). While Adorno has such a desire, he notes, one: that such analysis might not 
work out; two: that it requires talking with the perpetrators directly; and three: that the 
persecutors must desire to look into themselves and learn. While I think that such a proposal 
could be fruitful, I am not exploring such an investigation because without access to the 
perpetrators, their willingness to be analyzed, and my lack of training in such analysis, my 
contribution would be superficial at best. A potential place for future research would be an 
attempt to actualize Adorno’s call using autobiographical information and testimony. For now, 
my project does speak to Adorno’s call to use “all the methods available to science” in the 
investigation, here that method being the work of moral imagination.  
 Additionally, I think it is possible to turn to a number of the mechanisms Adorno calls 
out as being foundational to the Holocaust and analyze them from a Freudian sense. I want to 
briefly take the time to explain why I won’t be doing such an analysis. I began to investigate the 
possible Freudian influences in a number of these characteristics, for instance, the parallels 
between Freud’s aggression and Adorno’s coldness or hardness. The trouble is, that Freud doesn’t 
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 In Chapter Two, when elucidating the connection between Adorno’s work and 
Johnson’s, I discussed Johnson’s Social Accounting Metaphor (where moral harm and 
help and are viewed in terms of debt or credit). I also made note of the argument that 
such a way of thinking can be harmful insofar as it can lead people to imagine that they 
have a limited amount of help, that it is a rare resource or commodity, and so they will be 
less likely to help people whom they do not identify as residing in their close circles of 
care. Metaphorical thinking, which is highly imaginative, then, does not necessarily 
produce positive results. I argued in Chapter Two, that in the combining of Adorno and 
Johnson, Adorno can bring such critical insights to Johnson’s work because of Adorno’s 
negative critiques of society.  
 I would like to suggest that a similar negative turn of imagination takes place in 
collective thinking. First, as I pointed out, Nazi propaganda, both visually and 
rhetorically, relies on metaphorical thinking: extending the language and imagery of pests 
to the Jewish population. Such propaganda relies heavily on projecting what is not 
present, and therefore on imagination. Additionally, the creation and maintenance of 
                                                                                                                                                              
have one consistent view on aggression. Rather, as my research revealed, aggression began as an 
innate personality characteristic (presented in the Oedipal complex), then altered to be part of 
self-preservation, then the death drive, and finally that the origins and nature of aggression were 
not yet understood. Attempting to compare Freud on aggression to Adorno is just outside of this 
project’s purview. Because I am not an expert on Freud, my contributions to the discussion would 
be superficial or cursory. And even my already cursory investigation into such influences 
revealed that the project would be immense in trying to detangle which period of Freud’s work 
Adorno is referencing and why, and then what connection was established. I would like to 
suggest that such a project could potentially be fruitful but isn’t within this project’s perimeters. 
Further, I think that we can get a great deal of depth out of Adorno’s work, in particular his 
characteristics of the Holocaust, without the Freudian background because, though Adorno 
himself calls for such an analysis, he says that it would be one of many he would support and 
further, that it might not even be successful. It is clear, then, that though Adorno is influenced by 
Freud, he doesn’t necessarily think that a Freudian way of understanding or viewing the 
Holocaust is sufficient. For now, we will exclude such a view, though note its importance for 
later development. 
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groups depends, foundationally on imagination. The division of collectives is almost 
entirely made up and maintained through ideas or mental projections. If, for instance, you 
saw two people on the street, you would not know from any actual particulars about that 
person whether they identified as a Republican or Democrat. You may notice their age, 
gender, infer their socio-economic status based on their clothes, and then imagine them as 
belonging to one or another collective. This sorting activity relies heavily on the 
imagination to use past information, pick out particulars, and infer. Separating into 
collectives, then, very much depends on imagination. 
 It is important to note imagination’s work in collective thinking because knowing 
the mechanisms that create collective thinking can help us overcome it, as Adorno 
suggests. If we understand how crucial imagination is to the formation and maintenance 
of collectives, we can perhaps utilize imagination to disrupt such formation and 
maintenance, or use imagination to form better, more flexible collectives. Yet, how do we 
overcome collective thinking? Adorno suggests that autonomy, understood as the “power 
of reflection, of self-determination, of not cooperating” must be engendered.242 The 
reflection to which Adorno speaks is, according to K. Daniel Cho, always “outwardly 
oriented.”243 Cho argues, “The practice in Adorno, never stops at the level of the 
individual or self; rather, it becomes an expansive form of thinking that maps the self 
within the conditions of society as a whole.”244 Self-reflection is, ultimately, not merely 
about the self. Rather, it is about society because Adorno “tends to attribute evil to the 
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social mechanisms which induce people to engage in heteronomous behavior.”245 
Overcoming collective thinking, then, requires us to be reflective about the society we are 
situated in and/or that promotes collective thinking. 
One could argue that we have a contradiction insofar as Adorno wants us to turn 
to others in order to break from our thinking with others. Yet, it is not in fact a 
contradiction for Adorno, though we are certainly walking a fine line. Adorno does not 
want us to merely fit in with the crowd and do what others are doing just because others 
are doing it. Rather, Adorno wants us to investigate the social context in which we find 
ourselves because, “Adorno suggests that it is wrong to assume that we always have a 
clear sense of who counts as one of us and that we have, or ought to have, a distinct 
preference for them.”246 We must, then, in order to overcome collective thinking, not 
automatically take up the thoughts and ideals of the group to which we have been told we 
belong or to which we find ourself in. Rather, with a critical eye, we must look at these 
ideals as well as the groups and investigate the reasons as to why the groups are divided 
as they are and why certain ideals are in place. 
 Overcoming collective thinking requires critical self-reflection but we need to go 
further and begin to gesture at actions that might bring about actual resistance to 
collective thinking. After all, Adorno’s plan for post-Auschwitz education is not merely a 
theory but one which he thinks needs to be put into place. Henry Giroux offers insights 
into how an education that promotes self-reflection would unfold, writing:  
Self-reflection, the ability to call things into question, and the willingness to resist 
the material and symbolic forces of domination were all central to an education 
that refused to repeat the horrors of the past and engaged the possibilities of the 
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future. Adorno urged educators to teach students how to be critical, to learn how 
to resist those ideologies, needs, social relations, and discourses that led back to a 
politics where authority was simply obeyed and the totally administered society 
reproduced itself through a mixture of state force and often orchestrated 
consensus.
247
  
 
Giroux is describing an education that I think is ultimately imaginative and therefore 
want to claim again that imagination is necessary to overcoming collective identity. 
 In order to be critical of one’s social context, one must first be aware of one’s 
social context. As I argued in Chapter One, imagination plays a crucial role in the 
perception of context, moral or otherwise. In the example of our sexist joke, we saw how 
imagination used past experience and information about the person to ‘see’ the joke as 
sexist (similar activities were required in Blum’s cab example, too). Insofar as 
imagination is a necessary part of moral perception, which I demonstrated in Chapter 
One, imagination is going to be necessary in order to become aware of the social context 
that is so crucial for Adorno’s critical self-reflection.  
After one is aware of her social context, in order to be critically self-reflective, 
one must call the context into question and resist the heteronomy of ideals with which she 
is presented.
248
 Again, these activities require imagination insofar as they require 
flexibility and creativity. As we saw in Chapter One, imagination is necessary for the 
ability to think of possibilities for action. We can contemplate past examples or 
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imaginary paradigms and compare them to the situation we are in in order to arrive at a 
possibility for action. If the ideologies are truly heteronomous, we will need flexibility 
and creativity to navigate out of them. Certainly, one wouldn’t use more instrumental 
reason and abstraction to get out of heteronomous ways of thinking since they are in large 
part responsible for collectivity thinking. 
I am not alone in my advocating for the inclusion of imagination as a method to 
counteract collective thinking. In Autonomy After Auschwitz, Martin Shuster calls for an 
inclusion of imagination following Auschwitz, arguing that, “not only are we turning 
ourselves into administered creatures but, even more alarmingly, we are becoming unable 
to even imagine or conceive a different world.”249 He continues, “This withering of 
imaginative capacities is…a serious problem for any discussion of freedom.”250 Insofar as 
collective thinking removes from us our autonomy, in favor of heteronomy, Shuster 
claims that our imaginative capacities are deformed; we cannot imagine a world in which 
we aren’t a part of the crowd. Yet, Shuster, in line with my claims, argues that “reigniting 
the spark of such imaginative capacities will also jump start possibilities for practical 
reason and thereby open new regions for action.”251 In the next chapter, I will offer a 
number of concrete possibilities for the stimulation of the imaginative capacities that both 
I and Shuster call for. For now, I want to set the foundation for my possibilities: in order 
to overcome collective thinking, we must be critically self-reflective and in order to be 
critically self-reflective, we must be imaginative. Therefore, imagination is necessary for 
the overcoming of collective thinking.  
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Hardness and Coldness 
 
 
 
In addition to collective thinking, Adorno explores two other mechanisms that 
contributed to the Holocaust: hardness and coldness. While the two terms are ultimately 
distinct, they are very much connected and relate very closely to collective thinking.  The 
“ideal of being hard” is, for Adorno, a mark of traditional education, and is defined as 
“absolute indifference toward pain as such.”252 He writes, “Whoever is hard with himself 
earns the right to be hard with others as well and avenges himself for the pain whose 
manifestations he was not allowed to show and had to repress.”253 Pretending that you are 
not hurt, or tolerating pain to the point that you make yourself (or at least pretend) 
indifferent to the pain, is the ideal of hardness. Adorno claims hardness is present in 
‘traditional education’ and is surely referencing traditional education for males in which 
repressing feelings is preferred to expressing them since the latter makes one weak and 
effeminate. Tyson Lewis explains: “Hardness as an educational virtue makes the subject 
resistant to pain and likewise resistant to the guilt of inflicting pain on others.”254 
 In hardness, as well as coldness, one’s relationship to the world is indifference. 
What isn’t necessarily clear in Adorno’s account of either is whether it is true 
indifference or feigned indifference. For instance, in the case of hardness, it seems 
extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to not actually feel pain. Rather, one would have 
to try to ignore the pain or experience it but not let it visibly affect you. In both instances, 
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you aren’t really indifferent to the pain, that is, it is not that you do not care about the 
pain. Rather, you seem to care that the pain exists so much that all of your mental 
capacity is dedicated to trying to repress a response to it. Hardness, then, doesn’t actually 
seem to be indifference in terms of not caring about pain, but caring so much about it that 
you try to control it.  
The problem that Adorno sees in hardness is not necessarily the indifference to 
one’s own pain, but rather that such indifference breeds more indifference: “In this [being 
hard] the distinction between one’s own pain and that of another is not so stringently 
maintained. Whoever is hard with himself earns the right to be hard with others as 
well.”255 Adorno’s real qualm with indifference, then, is how it affects our perceptions of 
others, in particular, that if I am hard, I expect others to be so as well. It is ok, then, for 
me to inflict pain on others because I am indifferent to pain and everyone else should be 
as well; I see the ideal that I hold as something that should apply to all. The conclusion 
for Adorno is that I can expect others to then submit to a great amount of pain because I 
can.  
 Ultimately, Adorno’s account of hardness is confusing because if the problem 
with hardness is that I no longer see a division between my own and an other’s pain, why 
is it that I then expect them to be indifferent to pain? Further, as I explored, the 
indifference as described by Adorno is not real indifference. Rather, the individual who is 
hard seems to be acutely aware of the pain she undergoes. If hardness leads us to harm 
other people, and expect that they can take it, again, then we are not actually indifferent 
to pain but acknowledging that it is present, harmful, and looking to inflict it on others. 
None of these are the activities of someone who is indifferent.  
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What is further unclear is to whom Adorno is speaking about when it comes to the 
problems of hardness. Is Adorno accusing Nazis of being hard on other Nazis or were the 
Nazis hard on the victims of Auschwitz? In the first instance, hardness needs to be 
overcome and addressed because Nazi on Nazi hardness allowed the persecutors to push 
others to do things they might not have done before. It allowed the people giving the 
orders to influence the actual trigger pullers. By teaching the German people, the Nazi 
Youth, and so forth to be hard, the Nazi officers were preparing a generation of people to 
follow orders: we are hard and put up with all this pain, and now you do the same.  
Another way of reading Adorno’s critique of hardness is that the teaching of it led 
the Nazis to be indifferent to the pain of those they tortured and killed at Auschwitz and 
other concentration camps. Training young Nazi troops and officers to not care about 
pain makes it easier for them to not care about the pain they inflict on the Jewish people. 
I find this second reading a bit more difficult to accept, particularly in light of Adorno’s 
discussions of the other mechanisms of the Holocaust, as well as the rhetoric of the Nazi 
party. The first condition or mechanism that Adorno addresses in this article is the blind 
identification with the collective. Doing so, he argues and, as I explained, allows one to 
view others as an amorphous mass, stripped of everything that makes someone a unique 
and particular individual. If it is the case that the Nazis viewed the Jews as an amorphous 
mass, and this certainly seems to be what Adorno suggests, as well as what their rhetoric 
and propaganda suggests, then it seems difficult to believe that they were also hard in the 
way Adorno describes. It seems unlikely that the Nazis struggled with distinguishing 
their pain from the pain of Jewish victims, if they do not, in the first place, see Jewish 
people as individuals capable of experiencing pain.   
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Further, Adorno says that a major concern with hardness is that it encourages 
someone who is indifferent to pain to expect others to be indifferent to pain just as they 
were. Maintaining this attitude, expecting another to be like you, again, seems difficult 
given the rhetoric of the Nazi party, and Adorno’s discussion of collective identity. The 
Nazis tried, and some would say succeeded, in differentiating Jews from the rest of the 
German population. Their propaganda was focused on the idea that the Jews were a 
clearly distinct, subset group of people. It is inconsistent, then, that the Nazis, proud 
members of the elite Aryan Race, and proud of their hardness, would expect the same of 
the inferior Jewish people. The whole point of identifying with a collective is identifying 
those who do not belong in that collective and one important way that is done is through 
ideals; we have different ideals than others. If the Nazis maintained hardness as an ideal 
that marks their collective, it seems odd that they would expect it of a different, 
ultimately inferior collective.  
Finally, this second reading seems difficult to maintain if you take seriously 
Adorno’s use of the word ‘indifferent.’ If in hardness, one really is indifferent to their 
own pain and the pain of others, it seems odd that the Nazi party would try so hard to 
inflict so many different types of pain on the Jewish people. Perhaps, we are supposed to 
read Adorno as suggesting that the Nazis turned a blind eye to the suffering of the Jews 
and in that way they were indifferent. Again, this seems false: the Nazis seemed to care 
very much about the suffering of the Jewish people. They created entire cities, rail lines, 
and systems to inflict suffering on the Jewish people.  
Given the inconsistences with which Adorno uses the term ‘indifference’ and the 
ways in which he discusses collective identity and given the rhetoric of the Nazi party, it 
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seems difficult to maintain that hardness is between the Nazis and their victims. Rather, it 
seems that the hardness that can be addressed in post-Auschwitz education would be 
between fellow Nazis, or those who are disposed to such a way of thinking. Moving 
forward, then, the education after Auschwitz has to overcome hardness and the attitudes 
and activities associated in it within groups or collectives rather than between them. 
Coldness is related to hardness insofar as it too concerns indifference. Adorno 
describes coldness as “the inability to identify with others” and argues that it is 
“unquestionably the most important psychological condition for the fact that something 
like Auschwitz could have occurred in the midst of a more or less civilized and innocent 
people.”256 He continues, “[I]f people were not profoundly indifferent toward whatever 
happens to everyone else except for a few to whom they are closely and, possibly, by 
tangible interests bound, then Auschwitz would not have been possible, people would not 
have accepted it.”257  
Adorno did not create his conception of coldness whole cloth in “Education After 
Auschwitz.” As Simon Mussell points out, the rhetoric of coldness is present in Marx and 
Engel’s discussion of the ‘icy water of egotistical calculation’ and Weber’s ‘iron cage.’258 
Additionally, as Bernstein notes, Adorno used coldness previously in order to describe 
“the mood…of identity thinking in its exploded bourgeois form.”259 Bernstein talks about 
Adornian coldness as a way of being in the world; he talks about how a “cold gaze” is a 
“constitutive feature of…rationalized reason.”260 This cold gaze appears to be the way in 
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which people, the bourgeois in particular, view other humans as objects or things. The 
cold gaze is marked by “silencing compassion” and an “obsessive concern for 
efficiency.”261 Bernstein also reiterates the indifference of coldness found directly in 
Adorno’s writing, “Coldness is the material inscription of logical indifference” and, 
“coldness...is the condition of abstraction from particularity that is necessary in order to 
carry on acting methodically and consistently in the midst of revolting carnage.”262  
Adorno claims that in coldness people are ‘profoundly indifferent’ toward others 
and what happens to them. Similar to our previous discussion of disinterestedness 
(notably, in reference to hardness), a true lack of interest does not seem to be actually 
present. Let us break down the indifference to different relationships in order to gain 
greater clarity about what Adorno may mean here: when the Nazis rounded up Jews to 
deport them to ghettos and concentration camps, many of their neighbors did nothing, or 
rather, did not do anything to stop the deportations. Perhaps this inactivity is the 
indifference Adorno is describing. If we mean by indifference that the neighbors did not 
care for their Jewish counterparts, this seems difficult to maintain. First, because some 
neighbors did try to hide their Jewish friends. Others offered to safe guard their 
possessions when they were gone or take care of their house. There were also some who 
were glad to see Jews leave. Those who bought into the Nazi narrative about the Jews 
wanted them gone and many ended up ransacking their homes and taking their property 
once they were deported. It seems that none of these neighbors were indifferent to the 
deportation of the Jews. The former actively tried to help their Jewish friends while the 
latter reveled in their departure. Others were most certainly too scared to do anything. 
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Seeing entire families and neighborhoods rounded up by gunpoint and escorted into cars, 
some shot along the way, was enough to scare non-Jews into inactivity. They might have 
cared deeply for their Jewish friends, or they might have been scared they were next; 
neither are marks of indifference. In all of these instances, it is not that an individual 
cannot, as Adorno puts it, identify with another. It seems, in fact that many are doing just 
that. If I was in your position, I would want someone to help me, or if I do help I could be 
rounded up, just like you. Perhaps the only one who is not putting themselves in the 
position of someone else is the non-Jewish neighbor who rejoices at the departure of the 
Jewish citizens. The issue there, though, seems to be not so much with coldness per se, 
but with the inability to see Jewish people as part of your collective, as similar to you. If 
you do not even think that the Jewish people are of the same group, and are in fact 
inferior to you, then you wouldn’t even venture to identify with them. This attitude, then, 
is more a result of identifying with a collective than coldness. 
Perhaps we can gain greater insight into the indifference of coldness, or at least 
coldness itself, in our examination of secondary texts. Mussell in his aptly named article 
“Pervaded by Chill,” argues that Adorno’s comments on coldness come in direct 
response to Kant:  
For Adorno, fulfilling the duties of such a formalized morality requires a 
disinterested subject, such that individual situations, actions and consequences are 
rendered indifferent…The moral subject abstracts away from the unique concrete 
object, and instead adopts a purely contemplative stance, at a distance, that allows 
for rules to be dutifully followed.
263
  
 
Mussell’s suggestion, that Adorno’s description of coldness is a direct response to Kant, 
may give us a new avenue to interpret the indifference of coldness.  
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Kant discusses disinterested observers in both this moral and aesthetic theory. In 
the former, the moral judge must not be concerned with particulars, but rather with 
universal and abstract laws (e.g., do not kill), in the latter the judge of the beautiful 
cannot take an interest, understood as interest in the existence of the thing or in the way 
the object might be used. Perhaps, then, the indifference that Adorno speaks of is 
synonymous with Kant’s disinterestedness.  
The problem with such a reading is that Kant’s account of disinterest is unrealistic 
and unattainable. In Kant’s aesthetic theory, found in his Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, he explicitly calls for a disinterested spectator or judge. He claims that in order 
to have a pure judgment of the beautiful, the individual viewing the art must maintain, 
along with a number of other cognitive capabilities, a disinterested position. Such a 
stance is not unique to Kant but found in a number of aesthetic theories such as Dewey, 
Plato and Dufrenne.
264
 The reason for the disinterested spectator, at least for Kant, is that 
one cannot and should not want to own or use the object judged as beautiful. If the 
spectator wanted to do these things to it then it could not be a pure judgment of the 
beautiful but would probably be a judgment of the good or pleasurable.
265
 These two 
other judgments arise when an object is judged as useful (e.g., a hammer for building a 
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desk), or as sensually pleasing (e.g., wallpaper as pleasing for decoration). When I 
viewed the Mona Lisa, if I thought “Oh, this would make a lovely gift,” or, “I love the 
colors so much,” then both of these responses take interest in the existence of a thing 
because of a use, or a pleasure the viewer gets out of it. Pure judgments of the beautiful 
should not have any of these features.
266
  
 I think it is important to note and really take stock of Kant’s account of a 
disinterested judge. It is too easy to just accept the idea that the judge must be 
‘disinterested’ and move on applying the phrase without looking into just how Kant uses 
the term and how he sees the ‘disinterest’ playing out. I fear the same has happened with 
Adorno’s use of the phrase indifference, and it seems that Mussell might have done the 
same here. If Adorno identifies coldness as Kantian indifference, and if Kantian 
indifference is understood as not caring about the existence of a thing in terms of its use 
or the pleasure it brings us, then I think we have a hard time seeing how this indifference 
was the mark of the mood of Auschwitz. It seems very clear that the Nazi Party did care a 
great deal about the existence of the Jewish people; so much so that they wanted to make 
sure that existence was no more. Further, the Nazis did use Jews for both ‘good’ and 
‘pleasure,’ creating work camps, as well as concentration camps, where the Jewish 
people provided free labor for the Nazi war machine. Disinterest in the Kantian sense, 
then, does not help us make sense of Adorno’s indifference. 
Kant’s moral theory also appears to establish a disinterested judge. In deciding 
what rule can become a universalizable maxim, one must consider whether everyone else 
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Figure 4. Documentation Center Nazi 
Rally Party Grounds. Photo by 
author, 2014. 
could follow such a rule.
267
 In doing so, one is abstracting from particular people and 
their interests and instead favoring a universal ideal: rational being. In this way, the 
Kantian moral judge must be disinterested because she cannot care about the particulars 
of people or events. This abstraction also appears in 
Bernstein’s discussion of Adorno’s coldness, in particular in 
his enunciation of the cold gaze. He describes the gaze as 
one of abstraction, in which people are seen as things. I 
want to suggest that it is this abstraction that is really at the 
heart of coldness and is its defining feature.   
Let us return to our neighbor relationships in order 
to see this abstraction at work. While indifference didn’t 
seem to capture the relationship between the Jewish people and the Nazi officers, 
abstraction from particulars does seem to get closer to the truth. If the first step in the 
Nazi party’s method was collective identity, so that the Jewish people and other groups 
were seen as other, the second step would be to then look at these others in a certain way: 
with coldness. This coldness means that the Nazis did not perceive the Jewish population 
as individuals with unique interests, desires, or attributes. Rather, by perceiving them 
with coldness, all that is unique about a person was ignored in favor of an abstract 
universal. There is clear evidence of such methods of perception in Nazi propaganda, 
such as the issue of “Muncher Illustrietre Presse” mentioned earlier. Another potent 
example of this propaganda is found in Figure 4 at the Documentation Center, a museum 
within Nuremburg’s Nazi Rally Party grounds and dedicated to the propaganda and 
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general rise of the Nazi party. We see a young German boy reviewing the basic features 
of a Jewish person, specifically pointing to his nose. This image is a prime example of the 
type of abstraction which I think typifies coldness. Rather than seeing a Jewish person as 
a fellow German, or even as a fellow human being, students were being trained to 
abstract away from the person and focus on features of their Jewishness.  
The propaganda of the Nazi Party resonates with the idea that coldness as 
abstraction was a key to their way of viewing the Jewish people and I think that 
abstracting from particulars identifies the relationship that the people of Germany, and 
other Nazi occupied countries, had toward victims of the Nazis. Those who rejoiced in 
the deportation of their Jewish neighbors seem to have bought into the narrative of the 
Nazi’s propaganda: Jews are not individual human beings like you or me, they are a 
plague to be eradicated, and they are the cause of all our woes. Rather than seeing the 
Jewish shopkeeper as a person, the neighbor now sees him as an obstacle perhaps to him 
getting his own business, or to happiness for the German people. It becomes easy to 
smash the windows of Jewish owned companies on Kristallnacht when you perceive the 
owners not as people but as mere things in your way.  
 The neighbors who did not directly act either way when their Jewish neighbors 
were rounded up, that is they did not rejoice and help the Nazis nor did they hide or help 
the Jews, also perform a similar abstraction practice. If the attitude was: “If I do 
something then I will be killed or taken away too” it may seem that the individual is not 
abstracting from particulars and rather truly putting themselves in their Jewish neighbors’ 
shoes: I see that terrible thing happening and I don’t want it to happen to me. Herein lies 
the rub: putting yourself in another’s shoes does not necessarily translate to helping or 
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caring for that neighbor because you are putting yourself in place of another and making 
a judgment from there. I wouldn’t want to be rounded up so I won’t do anything that 
might encourage such behavior, particularly aiding my Jewish neighbors. These 
‘inactive’ neighbors are committing the activity of abstraction because they are not 
focusing on the particulars of their neighbors but abstracting from the situation and 
placing themselves in it. Their concern, then is not focused or located on the particular 
other, but removes them from the picture so that the inactive neighbor can put herself in 
the center of the situation. Because she is removing the particular person from the 
situation and focusing instead on a more abstract picture, she is as well viewing her 
neighbor and the situation with our new understanding of coldness.  
 Adorno’s coldness then needs to be understood as not merely indifference 
(particularly in terms of not caring), but rather as abstracting from particulars. Further, I 
believe that Bernstein is correct in his discussion of coldness as a type of gaze; coldness 
seems to primarily concern a way of seeing or perceiving. Rather than perceiving Jewish 
people as unique individuals, non-Jews perceived them as things: either as obstacles to 
one’s success or as examples of what one does not want to have happen to them. In both 
instances, the neighbor is not looked at as a unique person. Coldness remains different 
than, though closely connected to, collective identity insofar as coldness is the way one 
perceives those who are not within your collective.  
Coldness, understood as a way of perceiving through abstraction, will be directly 
reproached through imagination, as I will argue in the next chapter. As I identified in 
Chapter One, imagination is a necessary component of moral perception and, further, is a 
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key tool in perceiving particulars. Imagination’s work of focusing on salient particulars in 
perception will, therefore, directly combat the abstract seeing of coldness. 
 I further see imagination involved in our discussion of coldness insofar as 
imagination played a role in the false narrative of indifference that we have been 
discussing. Johnson, as I explained in Chapter One, discusses the role of narratives in our 
everyday lives: we use them to make sense of our decisions and our life. We can also add 
to or edit out events or choices in favor of a cohesive or understandable narrative. I think 
something similar is going on here with the discussion of indifference. How do we 
explain who so many did so little to stop the deportations? How do we explain why so 
many were killed so quickly and constantly? One way to make sense of these questions 
and perhaps arrive at an answer is to conclude that we are indifferent to each other; that 
society, modernity, and technology have made us not care about each other like we used 
to; that the real moral failing is that we turn a blind eye to the suffering of others. This 
narrative, though obviously not positive, seems easy to understand and even adhere to. As 
a contemporary German person, it may be easier to understand your grandmother as an 
indifferent observer rather than an active participant or as more concerned with her own 
particulars than another’s during WWII. Such a narrative is certainly easier than the idea 
that everyone very much knew what was going on and cared in some capacity; that they 
actively went along with the Nazi propaganda and narrative that the Jewish people were 
to be viewed not as unique individuals but as objects. Understanding coldness not as 
indifference but as abstraction makes many more people active participants in the 
Holocaust: citizens actively perceived their Jewish neighbors in ways that were 
destructive to their personhood. Further, my reading of not only coldness as abstraction, 
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but also that people prefer the narrative of indifference over the narrative of abstraction, 
would be, I think, supported by Adorno because he views many people as active 
participants in Auschwitz. 
 Insofar as imagination is crucial to the creation and use of narrative, as Johnson 
argues, then it would be present here in this narrative. Further, because this is a false 
narrative I want to suggest that imagination might be even more present than normal. 
Imagination has long been credited, often as a way to diminish it, with fantasy or falsity. 
It seems that imagination is helping to do just that here. I bring this up only to show the 
power of imagination. This false idea and story has so permeated thinking of the 
Holocaust that it has, in a sense, taken over and replaced the actual narrative. Imagination 
is a powerful cognitive tool and just as it can play an integral role in a false narrative, it 
can do similar work in a true narrative. It is for this reason, and many others that we have 
been discussing, that I think imagination will be central to an Adornian post-Auschwitz 
education: because it can be a tool harnessed for bad education, like false narratives about 
what happened, it must be directed in clear and direct ways.  
Ultimately, it is important to investigate coldness and hardness per se as Adorno 
finds them to be fundamental to the mechanisms of Auschwitz. If we are going to create 
an educational system inspired by Adorno’s insights, then we must have a firm 
foundation to build from. If, as he claims, he wants to counteract the indifference found 
in coldness and hardness, it is important to know what he means by indifference and 
where he thinks it shows up. Also, it is going to be necessary to gain insight into the 
cause of this indifference in order to develop possibilities for targeting the cause, as well 
as its symptoms. In the next chapter, when I offer a positive account of a type of 
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education that meets Adorno’s requirements for post-Auschwitz education, it will be 
important to have a firm grasp on coldness, in order to offer an education that counteracts 
it. 
 
 
The Veil of Technology 
 
 
 
Another factor that Adorno finds troubling is the prevalent role of technology in 
modern society and, in particular, the way it is used. He claims that the relationship 
between people and technology produces different personalities, specifically 
“technological people, who are attuned to technology.”268 While such attunement can be 
a good thing, Adorno warns, “there is something exaggerated, irrational, pathogenic in 
the present-day relationship to technology.”269 It is here that Adorno introduces what he 
calls a “veil of technology,” understood as the ways in which technology can manipulate 
our understanding and interaction with the world. Adorno writes: 
People are inclined to take technology to be the thing itself, as an end in itself, a 
force of its own, and they forget that it is an extension of human dexterity. The 
means—and technology is the epitome of the means of self-preservation of the 
human species—are fetishized, because the ends—a life of human dignity—are 
concealed and removed from the consciousness of people.
270
  
 
Adorno’s claim can be best understood by means of an example of modern technology: 
smartphones. Smartphones are, under Adorno’s critique, supposed to serve as a 
continuation of human skill and as a means to an end. For instance, my smartphone is 
supposed to serve as a tool for keeping in contact with my mother or calling for roadside 
assistance. Perhaps it is also supposed to keep track of my calendar and to-do lists. In this 
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way, it is a means to other things in my life: a means to maintaining my relationships and 
my work. What happens instead, under the veil of technology, is that the smartphone is 
no longer a means to an end but an end itself. Companies like Apple have done a great 
job of making this move with their customers who camp out for days just to purchase 
their phone. The goal for the individual is the phone, it is owning the phone, and not what 
the phone does for the user. If the iPhone was treated as merely a means to an end, new 
editions wouldn’t be so sought after since, ultimately, there is little in “extension of 
human dexterity” available in each new feature.  
Additionally, under the veil of technology Adorno is concerned about the 
fetishizing of technology. As Robert Witkin explains, Adorno draws his discussion here 
from Marx, specifically Marx’s account of the alienation of labor. Marx claims that 
laborers are alienated from their labor because the commodities they make (where 
commodities are understood as “goods made purely for sale in a mass market”271) are not 
their product but rather belong to the company. The commodity becomes, in this 
scenario, a fetish-object when “it seems not to be the outcome of real relations among 
human beings but to belong to an autochthonous world of things.”272 Again, the iPhone 
example gives us clarity: we do not, when we buy or use the iPhone, think of it in terms 
of who made it and what conditions they had to work in to produce the phone. We do not 
think about the person that sells it and whether their job allows them a living wage or 
health insurance, rather we think of the iPhone as just always being there and existing. 
We do not think of what went into making it, we just use it. Because we do not think of it 
as a thing produced by other humans, but as a thing just merely present, and we fetishize 
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it. Ultimately, it is problematic to detach a commodity from the labor that went into it 
because it allows us to mistreat those who make it.  
Adorno is also concerned that “the individual’s relationship to the commodity 
becomes one of authoritarian submission.”273 This subservient relationship certainly 
seems to describe anyone who would sleep outside to possess a piece of plastic, glass, 
and metal. The phone or whatever piece of technology, then, is no longer a tool useful for 
my daily tasks and work, but is now my master; without it I do not know what to do and 
will do anything to keep it and use it. This fetishization of technology is troubling 
because it deforms our relationship to things, as well as our relationships to other human 
beings. Because we obsess over things, we don’t care about the suffering of those who 
got us these things. It is this attitude that Adorno is particularly worried about 
counteracting in his post-Holocaust education.  
 This veil of technology is not inevitable; one can, it seems, have a healthy, or 
what he calls “rational,” relationship with technology. What Adorno is concerned about is 
“the overvaluation that finally leads to the point where one who cleverly devises a train 
system that brings the victims to Auschwitz as quickly and smoothly as possible forgets 
about what happens to them there.”274 Additionally, he writes, “With this type, who tends 
to fetishize technology, we are concerned—badly put, with people who cannot 
love…Those people are thoroughly cold…And whatever of the ability to love somehow 
survives in them they must expend on devices.”275 Adorno’s concern regarding 
technology seems two-fold: one, that our relationship with technology allows us to avoid 
contemplating the effects of our technology (e.g., such as the railroad or iPhone 
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examples), and two, that there are certain people so obsessed with technology that they 
are incapable of love.  
 Adorno’s first major concern about technology seems to center on the idea that 
we focus on the technology per se and ignore all of its possible implications. His example 
of the train tracks, though simple and quick, is a poignant and loaded example, because it 
gives us some insight into the division of people Adorno discusses as involved in the 
Holocaust. Though not explicit, it does seem that Adorno finds the people who devised, 
and perhaps even built, the railroad tracks to Auschwitz to be perpetrators. It seems, then, 
that those who devised the track system are just the personalities we now need to 
discourage. 
 Additionally, Adorno’s discussion of the train engineers offers us insight into the 
question of Adorno’s audience. Adorno seems to be putting his finger on the many 
people who helped orchestrate the Final Solution but might not feel guilty because “all 
they did” was come up with some plans or a system. They might want to maintain that 
there is a big difference between designing the gas chambers and dumping in the Zylcon 
B, or between planning the tracks to the concentration camps and actually rounding up 
prisoners and transporting them; buying an iPhone is not the same as being responsible 
for the suicides of the people who build the phones. What we need to do, then, moving 
forward, is find a way to connect these personalities to the effects of their technological 
advancements. That connection seems to be what is missing for Adorno and what is 
necessary to tear down the veil of technology. 
 The second major concern regarding the technology type, as I mentioned, was that 
those who tend to fetishize technology are incapable of love, according to Adorno. This 
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claim is more difficult to understand and certainly to prove. What I think is the greatest 
difficulty with Adorno’s account here is the question of which came first: the obsession 
with technology or the inability to love? If someone is born with an inability to love, and 
therefore turns to technology to fill this hole, such a problem is far more difficult to 
overcome. This situation seems unlikely given that Adorno is concerned primarily with 
how education can change what society and culture has undone. It is much more likely, 
then, that Adorno thinks that either the obsession with technology gives rise to an 
inability to love, or somehow culture has deformed an individual so that they cannot love 
and then they turn to technology. Adorno connects these people to coldness calling them 
“thoroughly cold” and “cold in a specific way.”276  
One additional note that I want to make regarding Adorno’s discussion of 
technology is that aside from the veil, which we discussed here, the other major way in 
which Adorno discusses technology is in reference to the efficiency of the Nazis. We can 
first see such a discussion implicitly in his above train example. Adorno notes that the 
train system is clever and that it “quickly and smoothly” delivers victims to Auschwitz; 
the system then appears to be efficient in its actions. He also discusses the character of 
the Nazis as being marked by “a cult of action, activity, of so-called efficiency.”277  
Efficiency is often a characteristic attributed to Germans and certainly to the Nazi 
party. In particular, people discuss the ways in which the Nazis systematically and 
efficiently killed the Jewish people. While the Nazis did seem to have a system by which 
they killed the Jews (e.g., concentration camps), it is not entirely clear that efficiency was 
their primary concern. I had often heard the narrative of efficiency in the killings of the 
                                                     
276 Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” 30. 
277 Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” 27. 
  154         
Holocaust but it wasn’t until my research visit to Auschwitz that I gained greater insight 
into this narrative and began to think that perhaps it is false.
 278
 On my tour of Auschwitz, 
far to the rear of the camp I saw a small building with a new exhibit. The building offers 
an introduction and explanation as to the arrival process for victims of Auschwitz. In one 
particularly striking panel, it reveals that victims sometimes waited outside for days, 
naked, to get their prison uniforms.
279
 This example, and others like it, made me question 
to what extent the murders at Auschwitz were really efficient, and to connect this back to 
Adorno, technologically advanced.  
Adorno’s seems to equate efficiency with technological advancement. Yet, many 
millions of people were killed in very inefficient and “low tech” ways. Countless victims 
died of exposure, hunger, and disease. It was actually, very often, the removal of 
technology that killed so many. Removing beds with proper linens, proper bathrooms 
with drainage systems, proper food storage and sanitation, resulted in a large number of 
deaths. While the tracks might have been cleverly constructed, people’s deaths on the 
journey were due to dehydration, certainly not a high tech or efficient method of death.  
What I want to push at here is: one, that technological advancements and 
efficiency are not necessarily related. So while the Nazis may have had an obsession with 
technology, it was not always utilized in their mass murder; two, that the narrative of the 
Nazis being efficient needs to be questioned since many of their methods were not 
necessarily efficient. Both points are important because they reveal a number of nuances 
that are not necessarily present in Adorno’s work or in the dominate narrative of the 
Holocaust. Further, as I will discuss at greater length in Chapter Four, some of the 
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stereotypes of the Nazis, including cleanliness and efficiency, have lead current German 
youths to see Nazis as having some features worth emulating.
280
 It is important, then, to 
disprove any myth that gives the Nazis something to idealize.  
In summary, Adorno is concerned about those who idealize technology to such an 
extent that they block out the effects of their technology, especially when those affects 
are harmful to others. While Adorno is highly critical of these personalities and wants us 
to ward against them, he does not dismiss technology entirely, after all “Education After 
Auschwitz” was first presented as a radio address (he even suggests “television programs 
be planned” to counteract the conditions I’m detailing here281).  As I will suggest in 
Chapter Four, we should try to harness the positive aspects of technology, especially the 
way in which it is involved in the media, in our positive educational plan while working 
to combat the fetishization of technology.  
 
 
Barbarization of the Countryside 
 
 
 
Yet another mechanism to overcome post Auschwitz is the debarbarization of the 
countryside. Adorno writes, “I will go so far as to claim that one of the most important 
goals of education is the debarbarization of the countryside.”282 Adorno’s 
‘debarbarization’ discussion is inspired by the Marxist dichotomy ‘Socialism or 
Barbarism.’ Barbarism refers to a technologically advanced society that is exploitive and 
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oppressive, and in which as the technology advances, so does the exploitation.
283
 The 
countryside is especially susceptible to this barbarization because it promotes the 
instrumental reasoning that treats objects as practically useful and allows exploitation. 
For example, the activities involved in animal husbandry require an attitude of coldness 
associated with barbarization: treating animals like objects and systematically and 
efficiently slaughtering them without a second thought. Further, the countryside is prone 
to this barbarization because it is isolated from the city and the large institutions therein. 
This isolation promotes further barbarization because it does not foster critical reflection 
or radical change, but rather a clinging to tradition that contributes to destructive ways of 
relating to the world.
284
   
Adorno specifically addresses the countryside because it possesses a unique 
problem, namely location. Barbarization, as a combination of coldness and instrumental 
reasoning, can be addressed by mechanisms that address its roots. However, the 
barbarization of the countryside is a unique issue because the educational system present 
in the city would not work in rural settings due to the diffusion of the population. Adorno, 
then, gives possibilities for reaching out to the countryside: “I could imagine that 
something like mobile educational groups and convoys of volunteers could be formed, 
who would drive into the countryside and in discussions, courses, and supplementary 
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instruction attempt to fill the most menacing gaps.”285 The importance of the 
barbarization of the countryside, for Adorno, is more about location than anything else, or 
rather, location is what makes the countryside’s barbarization of particular importance. It 
does not seem to be the case that the city isn’t barbarized; Adorno opens his essay by 
saying that Auschwitz was a relapse into barbarism.
286
 If it is the case that everyone 
relapsed into barbarism during the Holocaust, then barbarism is not solely an issue for the 
countryside. Rather, what is an issue specifically for the countryside is its remoteness, 
and this remoteness fosters a greater deal of unreflectiveness. Because people in the 
countryside are not challenged by new ideas, people or customs, it is more difficult for 
them to be critical of their own position. In the next chapter, I will include in my 
educational plan ways to address the remoteness of the countryside. Insofar as my 
educational plan will address coldness and collective identity thinking, which constitute 
barbarism, my educational plan will address barbarism per se. 
 
 
Avoidance 
 
 
 
 In order to explain another of Adorno’s concerns regarding the mechanisms of 
Auschwitz, he offers a personal experience wherein he was reading a review of Sartre’s 
play Morts sans sépulchre. In it, apparently, many “terrifying things” occur to the point 
that the critic felt uneasy. Adorno writes, “[The critic] did not explain this discontent as 
being caused by the horror of the subject matter, which is the horror of our world…the 
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critic wanted to avoid confronting the horror.”287 Adorno uses this critic to make a larger 
point about the tendency to avoid horror and, ultimately, the problem he sees with such 
avoidance: “Herein lies, not least of all, the danger that the horror might recur, that 
people refuse to let it draw near and indeed even rebuke anyone who merely speaks of 
it.”288 Adorno is concerned with the possibility that if we avoid the horror of the 
Holocaust we are more likely to repeat it. Heins explains: 
A recurring motif in Adorno’s writings is the educational ideal of making the 
young generation willing and able to face the horrors of the recent past without 
taking recourse to metaphysical consolations.. He wanted students to grow 
emotionally and intellectually sensitive, not only to be able to appreciate works of 
art, but even more so to be able to take in, absorb and communicate the traumatic 
rendering of the barbarous crimes of Nazi Germany.
289
  
 
Heins’ comment helps us answer, or at least sheds insight onto, our primary question 
regarding to whom Adorno speaks. Heins suggests that Adorno’s educational plan, here 
regarding avoidance, is targeted to the young generation who was not directly involved or 
alive for the Holocaust. Because there is no further clarification, it seems that the 
avoidance is a concern for all, whether your ancestor was a Nazi or a Jew. Not avoiding 
the horror would, depending on your relationship to the Holocaust takes different forms. 
For someone related to a Nazi, the concern might be to not avoid the horror that your 
ancestor did; for a Jew, it might be to not avoid the horror of what happened to your 
ancestor and what the Germans did to them. It is unclear how much these distinctions 
matter for Adorno and this is a potential problem. I might, if I was a relative of a German 
solider, say that I know that what happened was terrible but I didn’t do it, and my uncle 
was forced into service anyways. He didn’t pull the trigger or work at Auschwitz. Such 
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an attitude seems to be a form of avoidance insofar as it isn’t fully facing the horror but 
looking for ways to maneuver around it. Avoidance for a Jewish descendent could 
include, not recognizing the role that Jews played in the torture and murder of their own, 
as mentioned earlier, or not acknowledging the non-Jews systematically persecuted. 
 Part of the reason I inquire as to whom Adorno speaks is to get a better sense of 
what he means by avoidance. His example of the theatre critic offers us a bit of help: 
avoidance for Adorno isn’t total avoidance; the critic after all, saw the play and did not 
walk out at the parts that made him uneasy. Rather, it seems that Adorno finds the 
avoidance in the critic’s reflection; the critic didn’t explain his discontent as stemming 
from the correct source. This lack of explanation is what Adorno calls the critic’s 
avoidance. Avoidance, then, seems to be another form of lack of reflection. I may learn 
about the Holocaust and hear the number dead but then think, that is just too many 
people, the numbers must be wrong or, as some do, and as we will discuss, think that the 
Jews must be responsible themselves for what occurred. In these instances I am avoiding 
facing the true horror of what occurred and dealing with it in parts, the numbers dead, 
where does blame fall, etc. Ultimately, then, Adorno is concerned with individuals 
avoiding what occurred in the Holocaust by not fully reflecting on it.  
 Our talk of avoidance will be helpful in Chapter Four when we discuss a positive 
form of Adorno’s education, in particular, this new form of education needs to be 
unavoidable, both literally and metaphorically. In theory, the education should be one 
that one cannot avoid in a literal sense. If one can avoid the education (e.g., not attend the 
class, the museum, or the monument), then those who need the education the most might 
not attend or know that it is there for attendance. Additionally, the education should not 
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allow one to avoid the horror, like the critic did. In Chapter Four I will go into further 
detail regarding what this type of education will look like, I will use examples of 
education that seems to perpetuate avoidance, as well as examples of education that push 
people to engage and face the horror.   
 Adorno’s “Education After Auschwitz” is powerful and poignant from its very 
opening lines. Adorno, in no uncertain terms, calls for direct and real action to be taken in 
our education system that addresses the horrors of the Holocaust. Some of his claims, as I 
have outlined here, are more thorough and supported than others. In summary, Adorno’s 
educational plan post-Auschwitz is addressed to everyone, including specifically 
perpetrators, bystanders, and victims of the Holocaust both actual and potential. The 
education must be accessible and targeted at different perspectives or people with the 
clear understanding that the categories of those involved are flexible and porous. The 
content of the education should promote critical self-reflection and should dissuade the 
viewing of people abstractly and avoidance of the issues.  
Adorno does not think that his educational agenda is merely theoretical, and 
neither do I. That is why, in the next chapter, I will take the foundation that I have laid 
here and develop concrete possibilities for fulfilling Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education.  
Here I have done the work of laying a firm theoretical base from which I can deliver a 
concrete Adornian educational plan. Ultimately, I will argue, as I have in all three 
chapters thus far, that an introduction of imagination into Adorno’s work will yield the 
most positive results for making sense of and actualizing his work.  
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IMAGINING ADORNO’S ‘EDUCATION AFTER AUSCHWITZ’  
 
 
 
In his radio address, Education After Auschwitz, Adorno calls for education to 
focus on combating the conditions that led to and supported the Holocaust. In Chapter 
Three, I analyzed and explored these conditions and in this chapter, I will draw from this 
analysis and present an educative plan that meets Adorno’s criteria for post-Auschwitz 
education. In this chapter I also further wed the theory of moral imagination that I have 
been discussing to Adorno’s work, arguing that a highly imaginative education actualizes 
Adorno’s plan. 
I begin the chapter by briefly reviewing the prescriptive account of moral 
imagination that I outlined in Chapter One, and then show how such a prescription can be 
applicable to Adorno’s post-Auschwitz initiative. I highlight a number of features found 
in an imaginative education and usually only discussed in terms of novels. I argue that 
such features can also appear in a variety of media including memorials, monuments, and 
museums. I offer three such monuments and use them to show the possible efficacy of a 
highly imaginative education. I then review the major contributing factors, as outlined in 
Chapter Four (i.e., collective thinking, coldness, hardness, and barbarization), and 
demonstrate how these memorials counteract them. Although the purpose of this chapter 
is to give concrete examples of the type of education that Adorno argues can overcome 
Auschwitz, I also suggest, by way of two studies on the efficacy of current Holocaust 
education and two studies on the mechanisms of prejudice, that such an education can be 
potentially transformative. Ultimately, this chapter will give concrete examples of a type 
of education that I think actualizes both Adorno and moral imagination’s prescription for 
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improving people’s ability to keenly perceive and understand the world, as well as serve 
as a powerful tool for overcoming conditions that lead to genocide.  
 
 
An Imaginative Education 
 
 
 
In Chapter One, I outlined the major tenents of a theory of moral imagination and 
concluded that the major moral imagination scholars argue that we should train our moral 
imaginations. Martha Nussbaum, as I discussed, offers the most robust account of this 
imaginative education, claiming that the reading of fiction can prepare a reader for future 
moral activity.
290
 Ian Ravenscroft, a cognitive science, took Nussbaum's thesis further 
and argued that empirical data and our understanding of mirror neurons further supports 
Nussbaum claims.
291
 The major educative factors for Nussbaum and Ravenscroft come in 
the form of moral perception and deliberation: reading novels allows us to practice the 
activities involved in moral perception and deliberation, and also can give us a paradigm 
with which we can model our own behavior. I return to this discussion because I want to 
demonstrate the ways in which such a prescription can add to our discussion of Adorno.  
Moral perception and moral deliberation are both important for Adorno, 
especially in his discussions of Auschwitz, though he does not necessarily refer to each 
by the same name. For instance, in Adorno's discussion of collective identity thinking, he 
places a great deal of importance on an individual seeing herself as a member of a 
collective, or seeing an other as a member of a different collective because doing so 
makes it easier for individuals to treat others as an amorphous mass. Collective identity 
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thinking, though the title may suggest it has to do with thinking alone, is actually very 
much concerned with perception. The Jewish people were not actually vermin or pests, 
but the propaganda, both visual and written, attempted to influence the way Germans 
perceived the Jews. An education, then, that specifically targets the way one perceives an 
other would be particularly useful for Adorno's educative purposes.  
Similar themes regarding perception appear in Adorno's discussions of coldness, 
hardness, and barbarization. In coldness one sees an other not as a robust human being 
with unique wants and needs, but rather as a manipulable object. In hardness, one views 
herself as impermeable to harm and views others similarly. Finally, in barbarization, one 
views the world in ways that privileges efficiency and detachment. Ultimately, the 
majority of issues Adorno attributes to the Holocaust center around perceptions, 
specifically ones that are pernicious, false, and dangerous.  
Moral deliberation is also a factor in Adorno's assessment of the improvements 
necessary after Auschwitz. Moral deliberation, as adopted from Blum and discussed in 
Chapter One, includes contemplating possibilities for actions that perhaps one has never 
tried before, or never tried in a particular circumstance.
292
 Improving one's ability to 
morally deliberate, perhaps by giving one more options for action, or improving one’s 
skills for abstracting from one situation to another, would, it seems, have a positive 
impact in preventing the conditions of Auschwitz from recurring. For instance, an SS 
solider may claim that he had no choice and he was just following orders. He may even 
actually hold this as true in his own mind. Helping him understand that he has 
possibilities for action or deliberation may help to reveal that he was not as 'choiceless' as 
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he might have thought. This kind of revelation could be a crucial step in counteracting the 
conditions that led to Auschwitz. 
Nussbaum, Ravenscroft, and others, who share their enthusiasm for imaginative 
education, almost exclusively advocate for the use of fictional novels as the medium by 
which the education should be delivered. The reasoning is that novels often present the 
reader with access to the inner thoughts of a character, and those thoughts are necessary 
for the reader to understand the process of imaginative exploration that is required in 
moral deliberation.
293
 Further, novels, as a medium, encourage us to let down our guard 
and be more receptive to the new perspectives and ideas presented within. We usually 
read novels, Nussbaum claims, with an open mind and heart. This attitude allows us to be 
open to and receptive of the kind of education that novels provide.
294
  
While novels can certainly be a powerful tool for moral education, they are not 
always the best tools for training, especially when it comes to cases like the Holocaust. 
Novels, for instance, are often given from one perspective, a characteristic Nussbaum 
praises.
295
 However, when it comes to more complicated circumstances, multiple 
perspectives are necessary in order to understand with greater clarity what occurred, why 
it occurred, and what one might possibly do to stop such events from occurring again. 
Fictional novels often do not employ multiple narratives or give equal weight to multiple 
perspectives and are, therefore, less than ideal for situations of a certain level of 
complexity. Further, there is no de facto reason why a fictional narrative would be 
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preferable to non-fiction when it comes to the teaching of something like the Holocaust. 
Indeed, removing the event from non-fiction, and blurring it with the invented could 
cause people to take a distorted view of the events. Non-fictional narratives, such as Elie 
Wiesel's Night, would perhaps be a better candidate for a book that might fulfill 
Nussbaum's criteria. Again, though, my concern is that a single perspective may not 
provide the most holistic education necessary for counteracting all of Adorno's concerns 
regarding the Holocaust. 
Though I am critical of novels as the only, or the most reliable source for moral 
imagination, it may be the case, however, that no single form of education can ever be 
sufficient to counteract the conditions that led to the Holocaust. Though one form of 
education alone may not yield the desired results, I do want to suggest a form of 
education that is not often discussed, yet potentially effective: memorials, monuments, 
and museums. Memorials and museums often share a number of imaginative features 
comparable to novels, including the telling of a narrative, engaging with the individual, 
and requiring perspective taking. Memorials also have the added bonus of being public 
and possibly incorporating multiple perspectives, thereby moving away from the private 
experience of reading a novel. It is because of the similarities to novels, as well as some 
features unique to the medium, that I find memorials to be an effective, though often 
undiscussed, form of education. 
I am not working with a strict definition of memorial, museum, or monument; if it 
self-identifies as such, or is called such, then for my purposes it is. Debating the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of a memorial or attempting to separate the 
differences between a monument and a memorial is not within my scope here. Rather, 
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what I am looking for and interested in with these structures are the ways in which they 
promote an imaginative education that fits Adorno’s educative plan. I am also not 
claiming that all memorials, museums, and monuments are imaginative or even educative 
just because they exist; there are certain features that make these structures educationally 
potent. In order to explain these features I will utilize a number of spaces that I see as 
exemplars of this imaginative education, as well as noting spaces that do not ultimately 
fulfill the imaginative education requirement, and the failings that result from that lack. 
My hope is that through the use of examples, greater clarity will be shed on what 
constitutes an imaginative memorial, rather than offering strict conditions or guidelines 
for memorials. As with much of this project, imaginative exploration of categories will be 
required to test out examples and explore possibilities.  
In order to get greater clarity regarding what types of memorials might be 
considered imaginative, I want to return to Nussbaum’s and Ravenscroft’s requirements 
for imaginative novels and suggest that what works for the latter can apply to the former.  
For the most part, Nussbaum (and Ravenscroft, insofar as he adopts Nussbaum’s thesis), 
suggests that there are three crucial elements necessary for a novel to qualify for 
containing an imaginative education: first, the novel must help people pick out and focus 
on particulars. As we saw in Chapter One, this may take the form of watching a character 
do the very activity (i.e., Maggie seeing her friend as something particular, perhaps as 
someone in need, or someone who has been hurt), or encouraging the reader to undergo 
that very activity (i.e., providing content that assists the reader in seeing Maggie as a 
daughter and then over time as something else, like a wife). Second, the novel must allow 
the reader to put herself in the shoes of another. This is most often done by giving the 
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reader information about the narrator (e.g., Maggie, and her inner thoughts and 
deliberations). The reader, then, gets to see the process of another’s decision making as 
well as test out how that process might match up with her own. Third, the novel gives the 
reader space to practice or see new possibilities for action. Reading about Maggie’s 
choice to treat her friend in a certain way, gives us an example of what one might do 
there, as well as the opportunity for us to test out our own response: would we do as she 
does? 
These features are at the heart of Nussbaum’s requirements for an imaginative 
novel, and I claim that we can find the same features in public memorials, museums, and 
monuments. Indeed, I think we can find these features in greater quantity and with greater 
complexity in these public educative spaces.  If it is the case that museums, memorials, 
and monuments can give the visitor the imaginative experience that Nussbaum and 
Ravenscroft see as necessary for receiving moral training via novels, then I think we can 
extend their thesis to this form of education: memorials, insofar as they are imaginative, 
can prepare visitors for future moral perception and deliberation.  
 
 
Exemplars 
 
 
 
 As I have mentioned, I will be discussing three memorials in particular because I 
see these memorials as being exemplar. By exemplar, I think they do two thinks 
exceptionally well: one, they are highly imaginative and two, they fulfill many of 
Adorno’s requirements for post-Auschwitz education. By highly imaginative, I mean that 
the memorials and museums utilize or encourage a number of the imaginative activities I 
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discussed in Chapter One. For example, the memorials I discuss all incorporate narratives 
into their educative experience, which is an important imaginative device that we all use 
to see and understand ourselves and others. Narratives that encourage us to take up the 
perspective of others are particularly effective forms of education because they allow us 
to practice for similar future activities, for instance. Insofar as these memorials utilize 
narratives and perspective taking (along with metaphors, thinking through particulars, 
extension of categories, and so forth), they are considered highly imaginative and one 
part of what makes an exemplar memorial.  
 The second criteria for an exemplar memorial is that it aligns with Adorno’s 
educative principles. In particular, the memorials I discuss contain features that combat 
the conditions that Adorno claims contribute to the Holocaust, such as coldness and 
identity thinking. As I outlined in Chapter Three, coldness, for instance, is a way of 
seeing others, namely through abstraction. The exemplar memorial, then, would 
encourage visitors to focus on particulars, rather than abstract. The exemplar memorial 
also wouldn’t fetishize technology, encourage or allow avoidance, or any of the other 
features Adorno has outlined as contributing to an attitude that allowed the Holocaust to 
happen. 
 In order to demonstrate that these memorials and museums are exemplar, I will 
first describe their features in general terms and then argue as to how and why those 
features are imaginative and/or Adornian.
296
 The point of this chapter is not necessarily to 
give a final, definitive educative plan to stop all genocides or that will unequivocally get 
at and prevent the roots of prejudice. Rather, I see this chapter as a natural conclusion to a 
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 As I have been arguing throughout this entire project, the two are very much related. 
Therefore, when I speak of a memorial favoring particulars over abstraction, I hope it is clear that 
such a move is both imaginative and Adornian.  
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project that has set about intending to show the compatibility and necessary integration of 
two theories. Specifically, both theories offer us ways of explaining how we see, 
understand, and operate in the world. Both theories also offer us ways of improving that 
perception, understanding, and operation. This chapter attempts to concretize those 
suggestions for improvement by calling out specific modes of education that align with 
both theories. While I hope that such education can be effective in overcoming prejudice, 
for example, this chapter is much more concerned with actualizing an imaginative and 
Adornian education.
297
  
The monuments, museums, and memorials I discuss were ones I was fortunate 
enough to visit and experience thanks to Marquette University’s Smith Family 
Fellowship. As an honored recipient of the fellowship, I was able to travel to Poland and 
Germany visiting a number of Holocaust memorials. It is from this research that I draw 
my exemplars, and from my experience of them that I offer many of my arguments for 
their advantages and disadvantages. I understand that going to these sites with the thought 
of an imaginative education in mind already skews my results in favor, or out of favor, 
with such an education. I did my best to remain impartial and unbiased when entering the 
different museums that I speak of.  
 
 
Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory 
 
 
                                                     
297 Though it should be noted, and I will discuss later, both theories do suggest that if we follow 
their prescription, we can improve and perhaps root out some of the causes of prejudice. For 
example, if we are more imaginative (e.g., if we take other’s perspectives more frequently and 
with greater depth), we would be less likely to harm other’s, especially given imagination’s 
ability to allow us to rehearse certain moral activities. Similar with Adorno: the opening of his 
educative plan has in mind that Auschwitz never happen again. In that way, he certainly does 
want to stop the type of behavior, including prejudicial behavior that lead to the Holocaust.  
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Figure 5. Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory.  Expedia, 2015.  
 
The first exemplar memorial of post-Auschwitz education is located in Krakow, 
Poland in Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory. The format of the museum is narrative and, 
using documentary photographs, eyewitness accounts, film documentaries and more, to 
tell the chronological story of everyday life in Nazi-occupied Krakow.
298
 The permanent 
exhibit, “Krakow Under Nazi Occupation 1935-1945,” is particularly striking because it 
uses a number of methods and techniques that “go beyond the framework of traditional 
museum exhibitions” by recreating wartime Krakow complete with cobbled streets, 
shops, trams, and even a Ghetto.
299
  At one point in the museum, you round a corner and 
are assaulted by a row of giant swastika flags that you must walk between (see Figure 5). 
As you walk, you notice the floor is tiled with small swastikas, bright lights nearly blind 
you, and loud Wagner music plays. 
The experience is extremely 
uncomfortable and is the start of the 
section on the Nazi occupation. As a 
visitor, you get a feel for the 
magnitude of the Nazi occupation in 
its ability to be overwhelming and 
imposing on everyday life. Another equally unsettling experience is your walk through 
the labyrinthine Ghetto (see Figure 6). The walls in this part of the museum are very high 
and the ceilings are very low. The light is dim and as you walk through and read the 
firsthand accounts of life in the ghetto, the noise of aggressive dogs bark at all sides.  
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 Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory. Kraków under Nazi Occupation 1939–1945. (2013, June 
18). Retrieved October 4, 2015. 
299 Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, Kraków under Nazi Occupation, 2013. 
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The designers and creators of the museum had a very personal experience in mind 
when they constructed the museum and its exhibits. For instance, they wanted the visitor 
to have a specific and unique experience: as being a spectator “voyeuristically” 
wandering through the city. They also include what they call “memory machines,” 
stamps which you can press on paper and take with you.
300
 They claim that, “By using 
the "memory machines" visitors can produce their own, tangible “time documents” which 
they can take home with them.”301 They describe the overall experience thusly: 
The 45 exhibition rooms have been used to present Krakow’s history in an almost 
tangible way, enabling visitors to get a personal experience of the past, and to feel 
the dramatic emotions shared by the city’s wartime residents…The motto of this 
permanent exhibition and of the entire new branch of the Historical Museum of 
the City of Krakow is “the factory of memory.” The space of remembrance 
created at the former Enamel Factory offers the visitors an opportunity to confront 
the past in a personal way.
302
 
 
Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory is a highly 
imaginative form of education because, like the novels 
praised by Nussbaum and Ravenscroft, it engages the visitor 
in similar, imaginative ways. First, the experience of the 
museum encourages visitors to pick out and focus on 
particulars. In the Ghetto portion of the museum, placards, 
photos and various media pick out and focus on specific 
families and individual victims of the ghetto. Offering 
stories of specific people, including first person 
testimonies, encourages the visitors to see the victims as specific people with unique 
wants, needs, and desires. This focusing helps combat the ‘mass vermin’ propaganda by 
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 Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, Kraków under Nazi Occupation, 2013. 
301 Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, Kraków under Nazi Occupation, 2013. 
302 Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, Kraków under Nazi Occupation, 2013. 
Figure 6. Ghetto Ceiling and Wall 
in Oskar Schindler’s Enamel 
Factory. Photo by author, 2014. 
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giving the visitor the necessary information to see the individual as an individual, rather 
than an indistinct member of the many.  
Yet, the museum does not focus on victims alone. As I argued in Chapter Three, a 
better understanding of ‘those involved’ is necessary in education moving forward; 
focusing solely on victims or perpetrators, and not seeing those positions as flexible, 
reinforces a false and static narrative. One particularly powerful example of this 
flexibility in the understanding of those 
involves comes in the discussion of the man for 
whom the factory is named, Oskar Schindler. 
While many might be familiar with the person, 
and the story by way of the Oscar award 
winning, Schindler’s List, the movie is not 
necessarily true to history insofar as it paints 
Schindler as a fully redeemable character. The museum, on the other hand, gives a great 
deal more of Schindler’s complexity, including his failure as a business man and the fact 
that he only ever succeeded when he was able to employ slave labor via the Jews. While 
Schindler was interested in saving his workers, it was not necessarily because he felt the 
need to preserve human life, but rather his workforce. Schindler is a great example of the 
ways in which people were complicit or even active in the persecution of the Jews but are 
not necessarily demonized for doing so. He is a prime example of someone who doesn’t 
seem to be merely following orders, but actively took advantage of the Final Solution. He 
Figure 7. Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory. 
Expedia. 2015. 
  173         
profited from the forced labor of his workers and freely participated in their 
exploitation.
303
  
The museum doesn’t shy away from this side of the man and presents this less 
known, and less pleasant side of Oskar Schindler. In fact, I thought this was quite a 
powerful part of the museum experience in general. I was not, at first, looking forward to 
visiting the museum. The name suggested that it would be focused on the man, Oskar 
Schindler. As I have seen the movie, I did not think an entire museum dedicated to a 
person who didn’t seem all that noble, nor all that evil, would be interesting or really full 
of relevant information. Yet, once inside, there is actually very little dedicated to the man 
himself; one room, his old office, is really the only focal point on him. It seemed, then, 
that people who might have really loved the movie, would be drawn to the museum to 
learn more about the man, only to experience something even more interesting and 
informative; an education on the occupation of Krakow. The room dedicated to Schindler 
did mention his saving of Jewish workers, but also discussed his failures as a 
businessman and his involvement with the Nazi party. Presenting the ‘hero,’ and perhaps 
the motivation for one’s visit to the museum, in a complicated and more factually 
accurate way, requires the visitor to be flexible in her perceiving of others: they do not 
necessarily and easily fall into one category or universal. 
A third component in the museum’s work in education through imagination is that 
it requires or encourages the reader to step into the shoes of another person. The example 
                                                     
303 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. (August 18, 2015). “ Oskar Schindler.” 
Holocaust Encyclopedia. Retrieved January 10, 2016, from 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005787 & Yad Vashem. Oskar and 
Emilie Schindler (n.d.) “The Righteous Among The Nations.” Yad Vashem. Retrieved 
http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/schindler.asp. 
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of the Ghetto section of the exhibition not only helps visitors focus on particulars, but 
also with this second educational step. Having access to information on specific people or 
families is at least helpful and possibly necessary for the very activity of perspective 
taking. Without any information about the person, when I imagine what it might be like 
to be them, I might project on the person wants, needs, or interests that are not present or 
actual for that person. Such projection could be potentially dangerous; I may not think 
that things were that bad, as I imagine it, or that they deserved it in some way. Supplying 
visitors with first-person accounts, however, gives the visitor as accurate information as 
possible for her imaginative projection.
304
 By reading the testimony, watching videos or 
listening to recordings, I am, as a visitor, better able to have an accurate imaginative 
experience for perspective taking. Further, effects, like the lowered ghetto ceilings, 
darkness, and dogs barking, contribute to the feeling and overwhelming atmosphere that 
adds to the potency and efficacy of the perspective taking. Just reading placards, 
something typical of any museum, does not necessarily elicit an imaginative experience 
of perspective taking. However, reading about the cramped spaces, while in a cramped 
space can aid in one’s willingness and ability to imagine the situation they are reading 
about.
305
 
                                                     
304 First person testimony has been criticized as not being factually accurate because people in 
extreme distress do not remember things, or even experience things, as factually accurate. The 
discussion of to what extent someone who lives through the Holocaust and reports her experience 
is factually accurate is not within the purview of my discussion. Since I am concerned with the 
ability of an other to imaginatively step into the shoes of a victim, persecutor, etc., I am only 
interested in the ability to do so in a way that matches up with the truthfulness of the reported 
experience.  
305 Museum experiences that are highly imaginative would still, generally, include literary 
activities, such as the reading of placards. While there are certainly powerful, purely abstract or 
artistic memorials (such as, the Field of Stelae in the Memorial the Murdered Jews of Europe), I 
don’t think that such memorials are the only, or even the best method of education. As I have 
been arguing throughout this project, the ideal experience would have a number of different 
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In addition to the Ghetto section of the museum, the introduction to the 
“Occupation of Krakow” portion of the exhibition does a remarkable job of encouraging 
the visitor to imagine in the shoes of another. Further, I think this part of the museum is 
potent because it encourages the visitor to take up the perspective of a bystander, a 
perspective not often discussed (as I mentioned in Chapter Three), in Holocaust 
narratives. As I mentioned, the section on the occupation of Krakow, comes as a bit of 
surprise; one rounds the corner and straight into a very bright, very loud hallway draped 
with giant flags that one must walk between. This experience is supposed to mimic that 
of the occupation: sudden and all encompassing. This part of the exhibit does an excellent 
job of introducing visitors to the experience of the occupation as citizens experienced it. 
Again, the placards, videos and other media gives information from a variety of specific 
people, including shopkeepers, school teachers, and parents, about the experience of the 
occupation thereby giving the visitor the cognitive information needed to take up 
another’s perspective. The setup of the museum, then, encourages and, in a way, forces 
(i.e., you have to walk in between the swastika flags and listen to the music) the visitor 
imaginatively experience some of the components of the occupation.  
Every detail of this museum has been thoroughly planned in order to elicit a 
striking experience for the visitor. For instance, Marta Smietana, a spokeswoman for the 
museum, comments about the controversial floor, “We used the swastika symbol because 
it says so much about the occupation…At first you think how banal it is, then you start to 
understand how dangerous it is."
306
 This room, then, is significant because it doesn’t 
                                                                                                                                                              
components, including the reading of facts. However, such an experience needs to be 
accompanied by other imaginative features, too. 
306 McCracken, P. (June 9, 2010). “Exhibit at Schindler factory site recalls Nazi-era Krakow.” 
Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Retrieved October 4, 2015, from 
  176         
Figure 8. Two books, one says "Righteous" in Polish 
and the other "Traitorous" in the Hall of Choices. 
Photo by author, 2014. 
specifically focus on the experience of the victim, but rather offers the visitor a bit of 
insight into the perspective of the bystander by giving a glimpse into the life of an 
everyday citizen of Krakow at the beginning of the Nazi occupation. Receiving 
information on the bystander’s perspective is a crucial component to understanding with 
greater clarity and depth the experience of the Holocaust, and Oskar Schindler’s Enamel 
Factory has a number of components that provoke the visitor to take up such 
perspectives.  
The final major component of an imaginative education is that it offers the reader, 
or here visitor, the opportunity to practice and envision possibilities for action. The 
Museum ends with an exhibit called the Hall of Choices, which is described as depicting, 
“The moral dilemmas and personal choices made by Krakow’s residents: the righteous 
and the traitorous.”307 The Hall of Choices also features large columns that spin, as the 
visitor moves them, with a number of firsthand ethical dilemmas and responses in a 
variety of languages. One excerpt reads, 
“Star of David on her right arm. I looked 
away. I pretended I did not see her.” The 
Hall of Choices encourages visitors to 
practice and envision possibilities for 
actions by providing them with actions that 
were taken, and not merely actions of 
victims and SS officers, but people from all walks of life. The Hall of Choices, as the 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.jta.org/2010/06/09/news-opinion/world/exhibit-at-schindler-factory-site-recalls-nazi-
era-krakow. 
307 Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, Kraków under Nazi Occupation, 2013. 
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concluding exhibit, encourages visitors to contemplate activities and actions, including 
those taken and in doing so, is again, highly imaginative.  
Despite encouraging the envisioning of possibilities, The Hall of Choices is not, 
however, without issue. Dividing actions into righteous and traitorous presents actions as 
a strict dichotomy, which we have already seen can be problematic. It is not always the 
case that an action or a person is so clearly one or another. Further, presenting actions as 
if they fall into those categories alone can be problematic; one may think she wouldn’t 
join the SS or help at a concentration camp and therefore that she is righteous. There are 
so many other ways, however, that actions could contribute to the Holocaust, actions that 
might not be considered on the face of it traitorous.  
Overall, Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory is a space of imaginative education 
because it encourages visitors to undertake the imaginative activities that Nussbaum and 
Ravenscroft count as necessary for novels 
to have imaginative potency. Insofar as the 
museum incorporates the same features, 
and I think does so in a better way (e.g., 
through the inclusion of multiple 
perspectives), it is an exemplar of an 
imaginative memorial. Further, the visitor 
should leave the museum not only with a more robust education on the Holocaust, for 
instance the specific history of the Nazi occupation of Krakow, but also an education that 
should prepare one for future moral activity. The museum allows visitors to practice the 
Figure 9. Oskar Schindler’s Factory Photo: Hall of 
Choices. Tripadvisor, 2014. 
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imaginative activities required for future moral activity, and as Ravenscroft argues, 
practice makes perfect.
308
  
While it is clear that Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory is an exemplar in terms of 
imaginative education. It is also, in large part because of its imaginative experience, a 
possible form of Adornian post-Auschwitz education. In Chapter Three, I discussed the 
key features that Adorno argued contributed to Auschwitz, as well as the possible 
avenues for counteracting those conditions, though Adorno’s focus is more firmly on the 
former than the latter. The first component he discusses, and as I argued the one he sees 
to be the greatest contributing factor, is collective identity thinking. Very briefly, 
collective identity thinking is the unreflective slotting of oneself and/or others into 
collectives, often in an attempt to justify harming those outside one’s collective.309 
Adorno claims that responding to collective identity thinking takes a number of forms, 
though ultimately they are all synonymous: autonomy, critical self-reflection, and non-
cooperation. As I discussed, critical self-reflection is primarily a focus on others, or 
specifically on the context in which one finds herself and others in. It is always outwardly 
oriented, challenging the assumptions we have about who fits into our collective and calls 
context into question. Shuster, as I pointed out, thinks that ‘reigniting’ imagination is a 
viable path to realizing critical self-reflection.
310
 I also argued that imagination would be 
crucial to the activities involved in combating collective identity thinking because 
imagination is so crucial to the activity of picking out particulars, which is necessary 
when it comes to seeing people as unique, rather than part of an amorphous mass. 
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 Ravenscroft, “Fiction, Imagination and Ethics,” 80. 
309 Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” 26. 
310 Shuster,  Autonomy after Auschwitz, 105.  
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Further, imagination is required for the exploration of who does and does not belong to 
your collective, as well as why they do/don’t belong, and in what ways that matters.  
As I have argued, imagination is necessary in counteracting the effects of 
collective identity thinking and I would like to further suggest that the imaginative 
education present in Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory is capable of just that. The 
museum encourages the visitor to experience moments of the occupation of Krakow in a 
way that it is much more immersive than merely reading facts on a placard. The museum, 
by recreating scenes from Krakow, encourages visitors to put themselves in the place of a 
number of different people within the Holocaust: victims, bystanders and even, to an 
extent, perpetrators. All of this perspective taking can awaken critical self-reflection 
because one is forced into a number of different social contexts to which she must 
respond.  
Adorno also argues that post-Auschwitz education must also combat hardness and 
coldness. As I argued in Chapter Three, the key feature of both is indifference, 
specifically indifference as a way of seeing characterized by abstracting from particulars 
in favor of universals. Seeing someone not as a unique person, but as a rodent or part of 
the reason why Germany is failing, is exactly the method of abstraction that is performed 
in coldness and hardness. Again, counteracting hardness and coldness requires one to 
focus on particulars, rather than abstractions. Adorno, as I mentioned, does not require us 
to love our neighbor as a way to counteract indifference, but rather to understand or see 
our neighbor as someone that is loved by others, or capable of love. Again, Oskar 
Schindler’s Enamel Factory, in its imaginative education, promotes the activities of 
particularizing that counteract hardness and coldness. For instance, the museum 
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encourages visitors to participate on the individual level and to see those involved as 
particular, unique people. The museum tells the story of individuals, of families, and in 
doing so attempts to move away from the talk of the “extermination of the Jews,” a 
phrase often used but which maintains many of the problems of Nazi thinking: seeing 
Jews as an amorphous mass of pests. Individualizing Auschwitz helps to move away 
from the erasure of the particular by making a particular person’s life and story heard and 
felt. 
The Veil of Technology is another concern Adorno has for post-Auschwitz 
education because it involves individuals fetishizing technology by treating it as an end 
rather than a means. This fetishization of technology allows or encourages people to do 
the same activity with humans; seeing them as objects or means to an end, rather than 
ends in themselves.
311
 Though, to be clear, Adorno is not against technology; quite the 
opposite, as his discussion here is in fact being broadcast across the radio. Rather, he 
wants to ensure that we have a healthy relationship to technology, one in which 
technology is used as a means to communication, connection, or whatever its service is, 
rather than valued in itself.  
Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory is a great example of not fetishizing the 
technology therein. Video clips, music, sounds of dogs barking, touch screens, and so 
forth are all used in service of the larger goal: the immersive experience of the visitor. 
Though technology is used, and sometimes unavoidable (i.e., the sounds of barking), its 
use isn’t overwhelming or required (like the use of cell phones to scan in codes for 
reading placards). Much of the technology that is utilized is relatively ‘low tech.’ For 
instance, the recreation of streets or the mock entrance to a camp, uses some lighting 
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features and music/sound effects, but mostly relies on a sort of realism of re-creation. The 
overall low tech features of the museum, especially compared to other museums, are 
particularly striking, but also gives an example of a proper and healthy relationship 
between technology and the visitor. The museum, rather than relying on the latest 
technology to convey its education, relies more heavily on imagination and immersion, 
and in doing so provides a more Adornian education.  
Avoidance is another concern for Adorno in his post-Auschwitz educational 
initiative. This avoidance is not, as discussed, ignoring something or moving out of one’s 
way to not experience something. Rather, as Adorno elucidated with the critic example, 
avoidance is lack of reflection: one avoids something by not fully engaging with it and 
reflecting on it.
312
 This feature is certainly hard to test for or ensure that visitors 
experience because you cannot guarantee that visitors are going through the imaginative 
activity of perspective taking while in the museum. A visitor might be too distracted by 
watching their kids, or concerned about a sick relative back home and not fully engage 
with the museum, and in that way fail to critically reflect. One can also enter the museum 
with an attitude of defiance; I refuse to engage with the material here and am going to 
just shut down all information that I am given. Again, this person will be difficult to 
reach, and it is not possible to guarantee that the museum gets these visitors to critically 
reflect. I want to suggest, however, that the museum, and the ways in which it is set up, 
certainly makes it difficult for people to avoid the Holocaust and the imaginative 
activities required of the visitor.  
The path through the museum, as I mentioned, is made up in such a way that one 
cannot avoid certain experiences. For instance, one must walk between giant swastika 
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flags and over a tiled swastika floor. At a different part of the museum, a city block of 
Krakow is reconstructed, as are the ghetto walls. All of these reconstructions mean that 
while people may be able to avoid reading and reflecting on particular placards or the 
information placed therein, they cannot avoid the very physical experiences recreated by 
the museum. Because they cannot avoid some aspects of the experience, it seems unlikely 
that they can completely avoid the imaginative activities stimulated by the museum, such 
as perspective taking.  
Further, being in the cramped, dark space of the ghetto makes it difficult to avoid 
the feelings that are provoked by that experience. The visitor may fail to reflect further on 
the situation of the Jews living in that ghetto, or even refuse to do so. However, this isn’t 
necessarily a fault with the museum itself. Insofar as it is impossible to guarantee that 
everyone has the same educative experience, and further that everyone has the same 
imaginative education, Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory and every other educational 
tool could be considered a failure. However, the Museum does a remarkable job forcing 
or strongly encouraging engagement in its visitors by making certain experiences 
impossible to avoid, turn away from, or miss. The hope is that if one has to experience 
the museum, and the museum is set up in such a way that the visitor is engaged in a 
variety of ways and through a variety of media all at once, it becomes difficult to avoid 
the content and to fail to critically reflect on it. 
The final major concern for Adorno in post-Auschwitz education is barbarization. 
As I discussed in Chapter Three, barbarization shares many features of Adorno’s other 
symptoms insofar as it too centers on treating others as manipuable objects rather than 
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unique subjects.
313
 The unique feature of barbarization for Adorno is the problem of 
location: he is concerned with barbarization of the countryside. The countryside provides 
unique problems insofar as it is removed from the city where new ideas and new people 
are found. The countryside, then, just gets the same traditions and ideas reinforced 
generation after generation without much reflection. In order to counteract this location 
issue, Adorno suggests some form of “mobile educational groups and convoys” that go 
around teaching the countryside.
314
  
The countryside, and the location issue, is going to be the hardest feature to 
overcome. The problem is if someone is sent from the city out to the countryside to teach, 
the city person may be seen as too much of an outsider; you don’t have to listen to what 
the city person says because she belongs to a different collective and couldn’t possibly 
understand our way of life. Alternatively, if you force people from the countryside to 
come into the city and experience the museums therein, you might get a similar 
resistance: these are issues for the city and not for us. Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, 
then, as a static building located in the city does not solve the problem of location in the 
barbarization of the countryside.  
While I do see the static location of the museum as potentially problematic, I do 
think there is something important and perhaps potent about the fact that the museum is 
located in the old enamel factory. As I mentioned before, the museum’s name is different 
than its overall message or focus; very little is about the man, most is about the 
occupation. People then, even from the countryside, might be intrigued to see the 
museum because they saw the movie. Who wouldn’t want to visit the factory from the 
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movie? Once there, however, the education that one receives is surprising and engaging. 
Visitors, then, may be more open to the educative experience because they enter the 
museum with the excitement of the movie and the legendary man, rather than the idea 
that they will be confronted with a new, imaginative experience.  
Overall, Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory is an exemplar of a memorial that is 
imaginative at its core. Its educational material requires the visitor to undergo many of 
the same imaginative activities that Nussbaum and Ravenscroft argue are crucial for 
proper and effective education. Further, those same features that guarantee an impactful 
imaginative education are also crucial to Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education.  
 
 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe 
 
 
 
 Museums needn’t recreate literal streets in order to engage visitors imaginatively. 
A different kind of memorial museum in Berlin stimulates imagination and fulfills 
Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education, though in different ways than its Polish counterpart. 
The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and Information Center is easily 
identified by its Field of Stelae: 2711 concrete blocks. The blocks are grey in color and 
begin short on the perimeter, resembling caskets, and growing taller as they move inward. 
Once inside, the concrete blocks tower over 
the visitor and create a maze like pattern. 
 The memorial itself has an interesting 
history. The museum site was dedicated to the 
memorial purpose over 10 years before the 
Figure 10. Field of Stelae of the Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe. Photo by author, 2014. 
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project was completed. Issues with building arose, which delayed the project a number of 
times. For instance, after the site was chosen and construction began, excavation 
underneath the memorial site was started with the intention of placing a museum or 
information center. When the construction began, the workers unearthed Goebbels’ 
bunker. Such a discovery is not totally unexpected as Hitler’s own bunker is located just 
down the block from the memorial’s site. This discovery delayed the construction as new 
plans had to be drawn up for the placement of the information center.
315
  
Further, the memorial at first was 
specifically to the murdered Jews of Europe, a 
group certainly at the center of the Holocaust, 
but not the only victims. People were concerned 
with the limited focus, concerned that it 
continued the erasure of other victim groups. 
Since the memorial’s inception, the memorial is 
now also responsible for the Memorial to the 
Homosexuals Persecuted under the National 
Socialist Regime and the Memorial to the 
Murdered Sinti and Roma of Europe.
316
 Finally, 
                                                     
315 Chin, Sharon, Franke, Fabian, & Halpem, Sheri. (2011). "A Self-Serving Admission of Guilt: 
An Examination of the Intentions and Effects of Germany's Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe."  Reflections on the Holocaust . Ed. Julia Zarankin, New York: Humanity in Action, 
13-21. 
316
 History of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2015. 
http://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/en/memorials/the-memorial-to-the-murdered-jews-of-
europe/history.html. 
Figure 11.  Inside the Field of Stelae of the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. 
Photo by author, 2014. 
  186         
one of the elements of the construction required that a chemical be sprayed on the 
concrete in order to prevent graffiti. The company that manufactured the chemical is the 
same company that produced the Zyklon B during WWII.
 317
   
Though the memorial is often criticized for its unique history, it is also, I think 
one of the reasons why it is so powerful: in trying to move forward in history and 
memorialize what happened, the events and people continued to resurface and reveal 
their connections to the present. The memorial doesn’t shy away from its constructional 
difficulties and in embracing them, shows the ways in which attempts to move forward in 
history or progress can be complicated; moving forward often means dredging up the past 
and dealing with it in new and unexpected ways.  
 The Information Center, which rests underneath the Field of Stelae is small in 
size, especially compared to the rest of the museums in Berlin. The Center is broken up 
into various rooms which each have their own focus. The Room of Dimensions, for 
instance, displays diary entries, 
letters, and last notes that were 
written during the Holocaust. The 
Room of Families highlights 15 
families’ experience of life before, 
during and after the Holocaust. The 
Room of Names plays a recording of names and brief biographies of murdered and 
missing Jews from Europe. To listen to the whole recording would take six years, seven 
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months and 27 days.
318
 The Center concludes with a video archive consisting of “Voices 
of Survival,” interviews with Holocaust survivors as well as a terminal dedicated to the 
debates regarding the very memorial itself.   
The Memorial and Center are very different in style and content than Oskar 
Schindler’s Enamel Factory, which is precisely why I want to highlight it as an exemplar 
in order to reveal the different ways in which an imaginative Adornian education can be 
realized. For instance, the Room of Families, Room of Dimensions, and Room of Names 
all offer visitors the opportunities to focus on particulars, including particular victims, 
families, stories, and names. This picking out and focusing on particulars assists the 
visitor in practicing the imaginative activity required by Nussbaum, as well as the very 
Adornian activity of moving away from seeing others as an abstract mass, and instead as 
unique people. The Room of Dimensions, for instance, highlights letters and postcards 
people sent right before they were deported to a camp. In the letters the visitor is able to 
experience the confusion, hope, or defiance of an individual. Some wrote to their friends 
or their children saying goodbye or encouraging them to flee. The visitor, then, sees the 
individual as someone, a mother, a friend, a sister, and as having specific fears, wants, 
hopes and needs in the changing landscape of Germany in WWII.  
Additionally, Peter Eisenman, the architect of the memorial, describes the design 
in a way that echoes many Adornian ideas. For instance, he discusses the concept of the 
memorial as one that attempts to find a balance between the mass graves that are a result 
of the Holocaust and the individualizing work tombs often participate in. He writes: 
Today an individual can no longer be certain to die an individual death, and 
architecture can no longer remember life as it once did. The makers that were 
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formerly symbols of individual life and death must be changed, and this has a 
profound effect on the idea of memory and the monument. The enormity and 
horror of the Holocaust are such that any attempt to represent it by traditional 
means is inevitably inadequate.
319
 
 
 The Memorial and Information Center also encourage perspective taking, though 
in a more abstract way than the re-creation style of Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory. At 
the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, the experience of walking through the 
Field of Stelae encourages the visitor to have an experience akin to that of a victim: 
increasingly disorienting. Eisenman discusses the layout of the monument as purposively 
evoking similar feelings to those affected by the Holocaust, writing, “In this monument 
there is no goal, no end, no working one’s way in or out. The duration of an individual’s 
experience of it grants no further understanding, since understanding is 
impossible…there is no memory of the past, only the living memory of the individual 
experience. Here, we can only know the past through its manifestation in the present.”320 
He also describes the walk through the Field as ‘agitating,’ creating a ‘slippage’ and 
‘indeterminacy’ with its seeming ‘instability.’ The experience of the visitor walking 
through the stelae mimics many of the feelings of the victims: everything that seemed 
familiar, or ever became familiar, was immediately disjointed or made indeterminate. 
This mimicry assists the visitor in taking up the perspective of the victim, something 
crucial for an imaginative education. 
 This perspective taking activity can be continued in the Information Center below. 
The layout of the Room of Families, for instance, mimics that of the concrete blocks up 
above. Information is projected on the slabs and in doing so the activity on the outside is 
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brought in, but with specific people and information about them. The perspective taking 
activity, then, has more of an anchor in the Center in the form of actual victims and 
people.  
 In terms of practicing for future activity, the memorial does not give the visitor 
explicit direction to do so. However, the memorial certainly offers a number of 
possibilities for action by giving examples of what people had or had not done. Since the 
focus is on the victims in this memorial, most of the actions concern them as well.  
 Not only does the museum fulfill the imaginative requirements for education, it 
also as I have begun to demonstrate, fulfills Adorno’s requirements. As I mentioned, 
many of the activities and focal points of the memorial focus on particularizing the 
victims of the Holocaust. By giving each victim’s name and biography, each person is 
specifically remembered. This individuating activity, and the others like it, can be helpful 
in counteracting collective identity thinking, as well as coldness and hardness.  
Further, similar to Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, the Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe does employ technology, but does not fetishize it. The Room 
of Names, for instance, is mostly dark with just the names being read and a projector with 
the names and biographies in different languages so that if the visitor did not understand 
the language in which the information was read, she might still be able to follow along. 
The technology, then, is limited, and used only in service of the message, rather than 
being the thing to experience itself. The memorial also doesn’t rely heavily on technology 
insofar as it is merely concrete slabs. Yet, it is their placement that gives them such a 
high level of impact on visitors. 
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 Additionally, the experience of the Field of Stelae makes it difficult for the 
visitor to experience ‘avoidance.’ The memorial begins in a very inviting and non-
intimidating manner but as one ventures farther in one feels overwhelmed and a bit 
trapped. Further, one must walk through at least part of the field to enter the Center, so 
the experience cannot be avoided there either. I think that the physical aspect of the 
memorial, the disorienting nature of it, makes it difficult to avoid reflection. That doesn’t 
mean that people do; for instance a recent Crossfit expert visited the memorial and posted 
a photo of himself exercising on the memorials.
321
 It is clear that people can fail to reflect 
on their experience. However, as I argued before, a memorial does not fail to be 
educative simply because a few people fail to reflect. While of course these are just the 
people Adorno would be worried about, as am I, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe, gets close to a form of education that pushes people to reflect critically because 
of its layout, content, and imaginative exercises. Similar to Oskar Schindler’s Enamel 
Factory, we run into the problem of bringing the education to the countryside. The 
Memorial is in a static location in the heart of Berlin. Yet, the central location can 
actually work in its favor: it is down the block from the Brandenburg Gate and the 
Reichstag. Visitors to Berlin would find the memorial hard to miss, and in that way, 
perhaps people visiting from the countryside would be drawn to the memorial.
322
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Figure 13. Stumbling Blocks. Berlin. Photo by author, 2014.  
 
 
Stopersten/Stumbling Block 
 
 
 
 The last memorial I want to discuss briefly is the Stopersten, or Stumbling Block. 
This monument is 
created by artist 
Gunter Demnig and 
commemorates victims of 
Nazi oppression. The 
Stumbling Blocks are just that, small cobblestone-sized plaques with individuals names 
engraved on them.
323
 The stones commemorate a number of victims: those who died, 
survived, were sent to concentration or extermination camps, euthanasia facilities, 
sterilization clinics, and those who were forced to flee/emigrate or committed suicide due 
to persecution. The Stumbling Blocks are located in 18 European countries (including 
Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic) outside home or shops of the victims.
324
 
Along with their names, the blocks contain dates of deportation, if available, and place 
and date of death. The stones are grouped together, as in Figure 13, if they were members 
                                                                                                                                                              
tools that we overcome the other, similar mindsets. That being said, I don’t think that the 
countryside is purely a mindset for Adorno. After all, and as I discussed in Chapter Three, 
Adorno offers very specific advice for overcoming the problems with the countryside and 
specifically spells out sending people to the countryside to educate the people there. Adorno, 
then, does seem to see the countryside as being unique because of its very real isolation. With the 
countryside as a very literal problem, the central theme of which is its isolation, the root problem 
(e.g., a perverse way of seeing) remains to be solved. 
323 STOLPERSTEINE GELSENKIRCHEN. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2015. 
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Figure 14. Stumbling block. Berlin. Photo by author, 
2014. 
of a family. Figure 14 shows a number of families from the same building who were all 
deported. Some, it is clear, died at certain camps, like Auschwitz and Cherlmno, while 
others are unknown. These bricks are placed in accordance with city officials permission 
(Munich has banned them, for instance) and often in collaboration with local schools. 
Children are assigned particular families or names of the Stumbling Block and do the 
research as a class or a group, or raise money for the installation of the blocks. These 
blocks, like most memorials, are not without their own controversy. Some people claim 
that these memorials are highly disrespectful; they are placed in the ground and people 
walk over them. Rather than have the 
memorials in a place of respect or silent 
reflection, they are on the ground, 
underneath citizens’ and visitors’ feet.  
 These memorials are certainly the 
smallest I encountered in Europe, but are 
truly my favorite because I think they are 
remarkably powerful and in very simple 
ways. One thing that is so important about the memorials is that they are ‘stumbled’ upon 
during people’s everyday lives: outside shops, homes, on small and big streets, etc. In this 
way, they reveal just how ubiquitous the persecution was. Further, they cannot be 
avoided. One does not have to plan a day trip to a museum or a monument to experience 
these, they are everywhere, regardless of one’s desire to see them or experience them. 
While some claim they are easily ignored and people just walk on them, in my view that 
is part of the genius of these memorials. As they get walked on they get brighter and 
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shinier. The more that they are ignored, the more polished they become and the more 
they stick out. Further, these monuments might be just the thing to combat the location of 
the countryside issue that Adorno addresses. Because they are placed everywhere where 
persecution occurred, and because persecution of course occurred in the countryside, 
placing them there would be bringing the memorial to them. Further, if the children from 
the countryside underwent the research required for the placement, they would receive a 
more specialized, more countryside specific education to which they might be more 
receptive.  
 Additionally, I think that these memorials can fulfill, in a way, many of Adorno’s 
and Nussbaum’s requirements for education. By placing them in doorways and on the 
street where people were deported or fled, it encourages people to stop their everyday 
lives and think about the particular people or family who could still live there if their 
ancestors hadn’t been forced out. They name every person and are broad in their 
conception of victim, they also group people together in families so that you can see the 
number of people affected. In some places it is only one block, in others it is large 
groups. Seeing the numbers individuated, yet grouped, is a powerful exercise in 
individuating the victims. Further, these blocks do an excellent job forcing perspective 
taking because as one walks around doing one’s chores or visiting houses, you are struck 
that such activities were exactly what other people were doing; that someone used to live 
here or shop here and do not any more. It makes the experience of the Holocaust much 
more personal. It is not in a silent place of reflection that we remember the victims; we 
remember them in the street, in the place where they lost their home. Thanks to these 
memorials, you can be struck at any moment with the idea that you are right in front of a 
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house where a family of Jews were pulled out and forced on a train to a concentration 
camp.  
 The three memorials discussed, Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, the Memorial 
to the Murdered Jews of Europe, and the Stumbling Blocks, are all very different kinds of 
memorials: from a more traditional museum that focuses on reproduction, to a more 
artistic and abstract art installation paired with a focused information center, to small 
bronze stones placed in the street with minimal information. Despite the different media, 
styles, content and concentrations, all three are exemplar of memorials that can be 
imaginative and also fulfill many, if not all, of Adorno’s requirements for post-Auschwitz 
education. It may seem, because of the varied memorials that I have discussed, that all 
memorials are imaginative and Adornian, but this is not the case. It is important to 
discuss non-ideal memorials in order to get a better picture of an imaginative Adornian 
monument. I am not, nor will I, advocate for necessary and sufficient conditions that are 
required for a memorial to be imaginative or Adornian. Rather, I can give, as in all of our 
previous discussions, general guidelines that need to be extended and reflected upon. In 
order to further distinguish an exemplar memorial, I will address a non-exemplar 
memorial in the form of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum. 
Auschwitz-Birkenau and other similar concentration camps are preserved by the 
nations in which they are located as state museums. Though millions of people visit these 
camps, the sites do not contain a great deal of explicit, or specifically-focused, 
educational content. That is, most of the sites’ resources are focused on preserving the 
past and making sure that people do not forget, as opposed to educating people about the 
conditions that allow for genocide and preparing visitors to recognize, or stand up against 
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them in the future. The space doesn’t have interactive features or large pieces of abstract 
artworks. Auschwitz, the smaller of the two sites, has the most buildings still intact and a 
few of the buildings have been turned into exhibition rooms. The most powerful of these 
rooms feature glass cases full of the possessions of its inmates: shoes, glasses, suitcases, 
hair, etc. There are few informational placards around the camp, and a brief informational 
brochure. For the most part, the educational experience itself is the walking around and 
taking in the sites. 
Birkenau is even more devoid of additional education material. Most of its 
buildings were burned by the Nazis on their retreat. There are a few barracks still intact 
with recreated bunkbeds so visitors can see as close as possible recreation of the victims’ 
living situations. The train tracks are still there, and you can walk down them and into the 
camp. The lack of buildings, of people, and of educational placards and information, 
gives you the time and space to contemplate, mourn, and remember. The sites are not 
particularly imaginative in that they don’t have the features described in the other 
memorials. That doesn’t mean they can’t be imaginative, but that there is nothing 
additional in the museum trying to provoke an imaginative experience.  
Both sites seem to prioritize quiet reflection and contemplation and serve more as 
places for honoring and remembering victims than anything else. According to the 
museum’s director, Piotr Cywinski, educating visitors has not been the museum’s focus, 
though he wants it to be, acknowledging that the site needs to “explain itself better.”325 
For example, the site is looking to add more explanatory exhibitions including “how the 
camp worked as a German Nazi bureaucratic institution” because the experience of the 
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Nazis at Auschwitz has been purposely downplayed.
 326
 Since the camp was established 
and funded by survivors and survivor groups, “they wished to erase the memory of their 
tormentors, as the Nazis had tried to erase them, so they said as little as possible in their 
exhibition about the Germans who had conceived and run the camp.”327 By not focusing 
on the Nazis, an incomplete picture develops of not only Auschwitz but also the 
Holocaust. Without any information, visitors might begin to supply their own:  perhaps 
either perpetuating the Hitlerism narrative, or rather one in which all Nazis are seen as 
radically evil, another untenable narrative.  
Having the survivors alone establish the purpose and focus of Auschwitz has also 
led to other stories being silenced. For example, “They focused on mass victimhood but 
didn’t highlight individual stories or testimonials of the sort that have been commonplace 
at memorial museums as devices to translate incomprehensible numbers of dead into real 
people, giving visitors personal stories and characters they can relate to.”328 At the time 
the camp was established as a museum, many people all over the world didn’t understand 
or comprehend the massiveness of the Holocaust, or denied it all together. Displaying the 
large number of eyeglasses, for instance, was a necessary tool to overcome this denial. 
Marek Zajac, the secretary for the International Auschwitz council explains, “People who 
visited after the war already knew what war was, firsthand. They had lived through it. So 
the story of a single death did not necessarily move them, because they had seen so much 
death, in their families and in the streets, whereas the scale of death at Auschwitz was 
shocking.”329 Zajac and the other camp leaders acknowledge that the motivation for 
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establishing and preserving the camp is not wholly present in modern times. Previously 
the major concern was to preserve the camp so as to respond to skeptics and critics. Now, 
the Holocaust as a historical event hasn’t been forgotten and sceptics are few and far 
between. The camp is, then, looking to change; to move from memorialization to 
education. 
Moving forward, new exhibits will, for example, work to “describe the process of 
extermination leading visitors step by step through what victims experienced, and end 
with a section on camp life, meaning “the daily dehumanization and attempts to keep 
one’s humanity.””330 Included in some of these activities may be offering visitors the 
choice of whether a mother should give a child to a grandmother or take the child with 
her through the selection process. The camp wants to show the impossible choices that 
individuals were faced with on a daily basis and show that there isn’t always an easy 
solution to avoid what happened.  
Cywinski and others also recognizes that moving forward they do not want to rely 
too heavily on technology, stating: “the more we use special effects…the more we draw 
attention from the authenticity of this place, which is unlike any other.”331 In a move that 
almost echoes Adorno, videos and touchscreens will be kept at a minimum in order not to 
overshadow the site. By allowing the space to be the central focus, rather than 
technology, the Auschwitz-Birkenau site can continue to avoid fetishization of 
technology.  
Another important aspect of the Auschwitz-Birkenau site is the way in which it 
reaches the countryside. It is, in fact, located very much within the country, as are many 
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concentration camps. Part of the reason the camps were located in the country was that 
there was more space than in the city, and there were often already train lines nearby.
332
 
Some may argue that the countryside location of the camps is due to the locals ‘barbaric’ 
nature, those in the countryside would easily accept the horrors of the camps without 
saying anything, unlike the people in the city. I’m not sure that such a statement is true. 
Before Jews were deported to camps in the countryside, many were first rounded up and 
deposed from their city homes, where their many neighbors witnessed such removal. 
Many, too, were put first in ghettos in parts of the city. It is highly unlikely that residents 
of Krakow didn’t realize or notice that a portion of their citizens were all moved to one 
area of the city, and that area was walled off. The attitude of turning away from atrocities 
isn’t unique to the countryside, though the distance does make it more difficult to bring 
new ideas or education plans to the countryside. Creating a museum is easier in a large 
city with more resources and attendees. Keeping the camps where they are, and 
potentially updating their messages or foci, is important because the camps are already 
located in the countryside. They are already, in principle, performing the difficult work of 
reaching that audience.  
I bring up the example of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp not only because it 
doesn’t incorporate a great deal of imaginative education experiences, but also because it 
is looking to change, and officials know it needs to: “The exhibition at Auschwitz no 
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longer fulfills its role, as it used to,” 333 states Cywinski, “More or less eight to 10 million 
people go to such exhibitions around the world today, they cry, they ask why people 
didn’t react more at the time, why there were so few righteous, then they go home, see 
genocide on television and don’t move a finger. They don’t ask why they are not 
righteous themselves.”334 Cywinski and others that work with the memorial, recognize 
that while they have done a good job of ‘remembering’ or at least ‘memorializing’ the 
atrocities, the larger goal of transforming people’s lives so that such an event doesn’t 
again occur hasn’t really happened. There is a reason that such a reaction hasn’t 
necessarily emerged: it wasn’t the goal of the camp. The camp, and others like it, were 
preserved by survivors so that Germans couldn’t deny what had happened. The land and 
camps were preserved so that people could know how many died, and if the camps stood, 
the events could not be denied or erased from history. For the most part, the camp has 
succeeded in that mission: schools both in Germany, and throughout the world, teach the 
Holocaust every year. Cities all over the world have Holocaust museums and memorials, 
including cities in the US, Israel, and across Europe. Cywinski and his peers seem to 
realize that the role of Auschwitz must change, as the title of the New York Times article 
states: ‘from memorializing to teaching.’335 
With this shift in focus, I think it is important to look at ways in which we can 
improve the educational aspects of Auschwitz and other camps like it. As I mentioned, 
these camps already have two powerful features: they don’t fetishize technology, and 
they are already located in the countryside. I think it is important to keep both these 
features as they are: to not inundate the camp with technology, nor move the camp, or 
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large parts of it to easily accessible locations. What the camp can do, however, is include 
more of the imaginative and Adornian features I have been describing. For example, the 
camp has a number of moving exhibits, in particular, the large collection of shoes, 
glasses, and briefcases. These exhibits help to demonstrate the magnitude of lives lost. 
However, within that magnitude, specificity and particularity needs to be drawn out. 
Focusing on one suitcase, for example, and giving the story of that family or that person 
could help give people a specific narrative to provoke imagination, which could be a 
powerful tool for that visitor’s educational experience.  
Another ‘exemplar’ feature I would encourage Auschwitz to consider is to 
complicate the story of Auschwitz by offering more narratives from different 
perspectives. I want to be clear that I am in no way advocating for all perspectives to be 
incorporated. For instance, I do not think that Holocaust deniers should receive a voice in 
the new educational plan.
336
 Rather, I think it is important to incorporate more narratives 
of people who lived and worked there, beyond just victims. As I mentioned before, the 
fact that Auschwitz had an involuntary brothel should be highlighted and discussed. I also 
think it is important to discuss in greater detail some of the guards who lived and worked 
there. It would also be important that, if it was the case, the guards weren’t presented as 
evil, supernatural monsters, nor should they be perceived as entirely innocent and blind to 
the situation. Rather, incorporating first person narratives from the guards’ perspectives 
could be helpful for visitors to understand the thoughts and justifications for the people 
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who worked at Auschwitz. Further, the neighboring village should be brought into focus 
in the new education plan. Discussing the role of people in the village who helped and 
who didn’t can again be important for visitors to see with greater detail the varying roles 
of those involved in Auschwitz. By including other perspectives, I do not mean to take 
away from the victim’s place at Auschwitz. I think you can maintain that the victims are 
important and central, while still expanding the narrative to include more perspectives. In 
fact, as I will discuss, getting perspectives from more than just victims can actually be 
helpful in seeing victims in a more positive and holistic light.  
Finally, it can be helpful to include more context for the visitor. Including more 
narratives, and from a wider variety of people and perspectives, can help accomplish this. 
It can help the visitor see Auschwitz in its day-to-day activities as a real place with real 
operations, rather than as some supernatural place of horror. Also, context can be added 
by discussing recent or ongoing genocides that are similar to Auschwitz. If Cywinski and 
others like him, want to make sure that visitors connect the events of the Holocaust to 
other genocides, they should do just that in a more explicit way. For instance, showing 
suitcases of current Syrian refuges alongside the suitcases at Auschwitz could help people 
connect, in a real way, the two events. The suitcase, as I am suggesting here, can be a 
good way of helping visitors practice a type of seeing or understanding that is not abstract 
but particular. Rather than viewing the current refugee crises in a way that treats the 
people like an amorphous mass (e.g., as is done in coldness or identity thinking), taking 
particular suitcases, highlighting the stories behind each, and juxtaposing the two can 
help the visitor see a Syrian refugee as a unique subject and therefore in a more Adornian 
way, and also as one who is undergoing something similar to the victims of Auschwitz.  
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Incorporating more imaginative education into sites like Auschwitz could also be 
an important step in the movement from an education where the main focus is 
remembering, to one where the main focus is changing the people who visit. As much as 
we might like to think that seeing the gas chambers is enough to change every person’s 
heart and mind, this just isn’t the case. I think people don’t connect, for example, those 
ovens, with the current refugee crisis. We feel that if we remember, or say ‘never again,’ 
we have done all the work necessary. However, what Cywinski, and others like him, 
rightly note is that mere remembering isn’t enough to change people. What I will show 
next, is that merely knowing or learning about facts in terms of Holocaust education 
doesn’t change people, at least not for the good, so there is further reason to think that an 
imaginative education is important. 
 
 
A Necessary Change in Education 
 
 
 
 While it might be interesting to discuss changes in education, especially around 
the Holocaust, and while I may have made interesting connections between an 
imaginative education and an Adornian education, one may ask why any of this matters. 
Besides a possibly interesting philosophical discussion, do we really need to keep talking 
about education post Auschwitz? It is rare to find someone in the West who has never 
heard of the Holocaust; it is taught in schools, portrayed in movies, TV shows, and video 
games. Further, who cares if the education is more fact based, or reason-focused, as 
opposed to imaginative, narrative, and particular? As long as people know what happens 
and how many were killed, surely that is enough.  
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 While I do think that this conversation is philosophically relevant and interesting, 
hence this project, I also think that my suggestion of an imaginative Holocaust education 
is important and necessary for Holocaust education moving forward because, as I 
mentioned, institutions like the Auschwitz-Birkenau group are looking to adjust and 
change as time, technology, and visitors change. Looking forward, then, I think we need 
to re-examine the educational techniques being used and incorporate new ones. Further, I 
think an imaginative education is a necessary change in post-Auschwitz education 
because, if we examine the trends and effects of Holocaust education now, we find that 
they often do not decrease feelings of anti-Semitism, or help students become the kind of 
people that might prevent another Holocaust. Rather, the education currently being used 
has been shown to encourage such behavior. In order to demonstrate this, I will focus on 
two major articles and discuss the empirical data conducted on Holocaust education and 
the anti-Semitic attitudes that persist despite, or perhaps even because of, such 
educational plans. I think that once we better understand the findings, the need for a new, 
more imaginative education, will be seen with greater clarity. 
“Education after and about Auschwitz in Germany: Towards a theory of 
remembrance in the European context” explores the history of education about the 
Holocaust in Europe, and Germany in particular, and utilizes data on teachers’ and 
students’ engagement with those educational materials. Reinhold Boschki, Bettina 
Reichman, and Wilhelm Schwendemann also highlight Adorno’s role in the educational 
development in the wake of Adorno’s radio lecture, “Education After Auschwitz.” In 
particular, teachers began requesting textbooks that portrayed the Jewish population not 
as objects of history and victims, “but instead identify them as an independent section of 
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society with its own culture and identity that was persecuted by the majority of the 
populace.”337 However, as Boschki et al. discuss, despite these changes, textbooks, and 
education in general, didn’t address the roots of anti-Semitism, and therefore didn’t really 
get at the heart of the matter. At the same time, more information about Hitler himself 
emerged, as well his concepts of racism. According to Boschki et al., “This encouraged a 
view of history from the perspective of the perpetrators, while the role of the victims 
remained underrepresented.”338 
According to Boschki et al., “In Germany today, the frame of education about and 
after Auschwitz includes a wide range of methods and approaches: classes in schools, 
memorial days, education programmes for adults, education about and after Auschwitz as 
part of religious education, and finally, films, the Internet and teaching media.”339 
Boschki et al. discuss each type of education, though I will focus on a few for the sake of 
brevity. In Germany, teaching about the National Socialist Party and the Holocaust is an 
obligatory part of a school’s curriculum.340 However, Boschki et al. are critical of such a 
practice given that it occurs only in History classes, and only for 15-16 year old students. 
They argue that “family ties” and “the media” have already made crucial influences on 
students and that any teaching at this time is unlikely to have a great impact.
341
 While 
there may be a variety of methods for educating about the Holocaust, Boschki et al. find 
that, for the most part, the education is not very effective: 
Quantitative studies assess the awareness and knowledge of Germans, especially 
the current youth, with regard to National Socialism and the Holocaust. One of 
the most famous—and much discussed—of these studies is titled “Auschwitz—I 
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have never heard of it” (Sibermann and Stoffers 2000). This is a prime example of 
a whole host of studies that identified a worrying lack of knowledge amongst the 
interviewed young Germans and pointed out the “increasing lack of awareness of 
Nazi Barbarism” (Siberman and Stoffers, p. 194, our translation). Such studies, 
however, have attracted strong criticisms: they treated those killed by the Nazis as 
little more than figures (in terms of question: “How many Jews were murdered in 
the Holocaust?”) and do not address any of the reasoning behind the answers 
given.
342
  
 
Further, according to the authors, the current education sometimes has the opposite 
outcome to its intention with some aspects of the Nazi party are seen as positive, 
including “order, security, and cleanliness.”343  
 What is going on with the Holocaust education? Why is it the case that students 
aren’t hearing about, or apparently not hearing the right things about the Holocaust? The 
authors attempt to explain: “While National Socialism remains one of the most studied 
phenomena of our history, there are virtually no attempts to design teaching about this 
period in such a way that it does not merely convey information and cognitions, but also 
sensitizes students against wrongdoing.”344 They continue: 
A further observation was the general level of ignorance regarding Judaism. Jews 
were seen as “victims” and “those who were gassed,” and identified as 
“foreigners…” At the end of the teaching block, which was very much geared 
towards cognitive content, the group visited the concentration camp of Natzweiler 
in Alsasce, in France. This visit clearly left emotional traces: in the interviews 
students mentioned sadness, shock, dismay, shame, feelings of sickness, 
depression, loss…and many other feelings.345  
 
Ultimately, the authors argue that “remembrance learning often fails” because the 
psychology behind the Nazi ideology isn’t adequately explored.346 Rather, education post 
Auschwitz focuses mainly on Hitler, the person and leader, and the large scale nature of 
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the event, in terms of murders, and deportations. Such a focus doesn’t seem to present an 
education that stays with people, or changes them because without a full exploration of a 
the Nazi ideology it becomes too easy to separate yourself from the people involved. 
Instead, you may think of those who followed along as either stupid or brainwashed. 
Most people don’t see themselves as being susceptible to either fault. Without a clear 
connection, most people don’t seem to make it themselves and therefore are unlikely to 
be moved or change.  
In order to overcome the poor educational standards currently in place, the 
authors argue that three elements are essential to an improved education: “sensitive 
language, human rights education, and a culture of remembrance.”347 As I will 
demonstrate, these three elements are very much in line with the imaginative, Adornian 
education I have put forward. The first feature that education post Auschwitz should look 
to is a focus on language: 
After the Holocaust language proved itself to be insufficient to transmit what 
happened. Most of the survivors stated clearly that words cannot express their 
experiences of mass murder and death. For this reason education after and about 
Auschwitz is always in danger of failing because it is based on narratives. 
Nevertheless, the narratives of the victims are very important since they are the 
main source of history.
348
 
 
This discussion is particularly telling for a number of reasons. First, it speaks to the 
insufficient nature of language to transmit what happened. I think this is why so much 
emphasis for so long was placed on the grand scale of the Holocaust. It is impossible for 
people to conceptualize so many people being treated in such a way, and so many people 
doing nothing. The large scale wasn’t seen before, and survivors, and other interested 
parties, wanted to make sure the immensity was prominent in memorializing. While size 
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is important, it can also be a way for viewers to escape. When overwhelmed by so much, 
people’s first reaction may be to retreat or avoid. So much suffering becomes almost 
supernatural, or thought of as a one-time thing that could never happen again. If we focus 
on individual stories, perhaps this will give people the story in more easy to digest pieces.  
For example, I have been to Auschwitz before my most recent trip, when I was an 
undergraduate. I found the entire experience to be fascinating. When I went back for my 
most recent research trip, I reentered the room with the large collection of shoes. As far 
as I could tell, nothing had really changed in the room since I had been there a few years 
prior. On the way out, however, I noticed one pair of baby shoes. They were 
approximately the same size and style as a pair of shoes my nephew had worn the last 
time I saw him. All of a sudden I was struck in a new way, when thinking about my little 
nephew, and thought about him, specifically, going through the events. I got choked up. 
Now some may criticize such an event, worrying that the only way I was able to really be 
influenced was when I put myself or my loved one in the shoes of another; that I required 
myself to be at the center of the experience to feel any real empathy to others. I do not 
share such a criticism, especially, since an issue seems to be that many do not think they 
would be in those shoes. Those were others, of another time, and that would never 
happen to me. But when I focused on an individual “story,” in the form of shoes, and 
connected it to a similar individual story in my life, a profound memory was created. This 
occurs, I think, because, as I discussed in my first chapter, we think and understand 
ourselves most clearly through narratives. If we’re able to put ourselves into another’s 
narratives we are more likely to see, understand, and connect to it.  
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 I don’t think that my experience is unique, nor do I think that it will work for 
everyone because I don’t want to take one personal experience and suggest that because it 
worked for me, it works for all. After all, in writing this project, I think I have become 
more attuned to the role of imagination and narratives in my life and in the lives of 
others. I am, therefore, perhaps primed for such an experience to have an effect on me in 
ways that others are not. However, I think it is a good example of what happens when, in 
the midst of a large, seemingly infinite collection, particularity is found and noted. A 
story is heard or seen in a way that allows individuals to identify and understand, a way 
that is not found on the larger scale. I think these narratives, both in the non-traditional 
sense, like in shoes, and in the traditional sense, need to be brought into clearer focus. We 
need to incorporate more variety of narratives, as well as more particularity. 
 The second feature that Boschki et al. discuss for education reform is human 
rights education. This takes the form of “clarify[ing] the connection between the 
Holocaust in the past and humanity in the present.”349  As I mentioned previously in my 
discussion of what Auschwitz-Birkenau could do better, connecting past genocide to 
current ones, or the Holocaust to current anti-Semitic attacks, could serve to strengthen 
human rights education overall. Boschki et al. describe it thusly, “The creation of historic 
sensitivities is a first step towards an intensive discourse that can lead to the creation of a 
moral and historic identity…Through confrontation with historic topics, learners not only 
acquire an understanding about past situations, but also about the present and—more 
importantly—their very selves.”350 What I find particularly striking about their 
description here is the idea of ‘confronting’ historic topics. I think that this is correct, 
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though it may be a criticism that some level against my suggestions for post-Auschwitz 
education insofar as what I am suggesting might be traumatic to visitors (e.g., forcing 
people to confront genocide) and transforms the space from a place for quite reflection, 
into one that involves constant confrontation.  
Many of the features I suggest may require visitors to be put in an uncomfortable 
position. Auschwitz, and other places like it are thought of as places of memorialization, 
quiet reflection, like that of a holy site or graveyard. They are places of respect, not 
places to make people uncomfortable, they shouldn’t encourage imaginative recreations 
or push people into uncomfortable positions. While I am sympathetic to such a position, 
I, ultimately, don’t think it is tenable. Again, as the director of Auschwitz acknowledges, 
while the place is currently one of respectful memorialization, it doesn’t seem to have an 
impact on others beyond a bit of reverence while one is on the grounds (even that is 
tenuous
351
). If educating about Auschwitz is important, and not just to learn about the 
numbers of dead, but rather to help mold people to be those who wouldn’t participate, 
and might even intervene, in such situations, then the mood of Auschwitz, and other 
places like it needs to change. This doesn’t mean that Auschwitz becomes an interactive 
free for all. There are still ways to incorporate and encourage silent reflection (if that is 
what is needed), but more importantly it must include places for discourse and 
engagement. We need to take steps to ensure that, similar to the theatre critic, people 
cannot easily avoid or ignore the horror, but we need to do what we can to require 
engagement, to confront the visitor. This doesn’t mean we re-traumatize people, of 
course. That is why I think engagement on an individual level in a way that stimulates 
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one’s imagination is the best course: individuals go who will struggle to avoid the 
imaginative experience, but without being forced into a traumatic, real life experience.  
The third and final element of Boschki et al.’s educational reform is fostering a 
community of remembrance. For such a community, they suggest that social psychologist 
Harald Welzer’s work is best for understanding and developing a culture of 
remembrance. In particular, Welzer argues that integrating emotions with memories help 
determine which memories are interpreted as important or significant.
352
 Boschki et al. 
argue, “Thus it is clear: the effectiveness of education after Auschwitz cannot simply be 
measured using historical facts. Increasingly important are the students’ emotional 
approaches to the historical event.”353  
The emotional aspect of significant memories certainly seems to be one that is 
missing from the majority of educational curriculum currently. Of course, including notes 
that encouraged teachers to make their students cry, or engage with them on an emotional 
level would most certainly make the educational experience feel disingenuous and fail. 
However, as Boschki et al. report, bringing students to the site often helped create such 
an emotional connection: seeing where it happened may help students imagine, or 
mentally envision the events with greater detail.
354
 The trip can give students context that 
they didn’t have before, which allows them to create a more emotional response. 
Ultimately, memorizing numbers in a history class is not going to produce the emotional 
response that is necessary for significant memories to be formed. Rather, the education, 
as it is set up, treats the Holocaust like any other event that should be memorized, but 
relegated to the annals of history; something that occurred but won’t again. An education 
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that can counteract such response needs to be different, needs to be particular and 
imaginative.  
Boschki et al. aren’t the only researchers studying the effects of teaching students 
about the Holocaust. Roland Imhoff and Rainer Banse have studied the idea that ongoing 
suffering evokes an increase in prejudice of the victims, rather than the opposite, and 
focuses on the Jewish population in the study.
355
  Imhoff and Banse asked 63 first year 
psychology students from the University of Bonn to participate in the study. They 
attempted to assess anti-Semitism using twenty-nine questions containing “modern” anti-
Semitic statements, such as, “Jews have too much influence on public opinion.”356 
 In the beginning of the study, “The presence or absence of ongoing consequences 
for the Jews was manipulated…when participants read a text describing atrocities 
committed against Jews in the Auschwitz concentration camp.” Two different groups, 
then, received different endings to what they read. The first, called the “no-ongoing-
consequences condition” read a paragraph in which the suffering of victims has no direct 
implications for Jews today. The second, called the “on going-consequences condition,” 
read a paragraph in which even today, Jews suffer because of “secondary 
traumatization.”357 Three months after they read their assigned text, participants were 
presented with a text “about German atrocities inflicted on Jews at Auschwitz, which 
included the manipulation of ongoing consequences…At the end of the experiment, 
participants were asked to remember whether the text contained any information about 
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ongoing suffering of victims” in order to test for forgetting.358 Their results determined 
that “the acknowledgment of ongoing out-group suffering from past in-group atrocities 
can increase prejudice against the out-group. As expected, participants adopted a more 
negative attitude toward Jews to cope with the Jews’ ongoing suffering.”359  
Most interestingly was that this result only came about when participants thought 
they were undergoing a lie detector test and that any false information would be found 
out. When participants weren’t put under the lie detector test, they reported the opposite 
idea. Imhoff and Banse claim, “This decrease of prejudice conforms to the strong social 
norm that the suffering of innocent people should be met with empathy, sympathy, and 
care.”360 Yet, what also needs to be noted, as they do, is that a large proportion 40% of 
the participants “did not recall the specific information given about the ongoing 
suffering.”361 
 Imhoff and Banse’s article is interesting for a number of reasons: one, it shows 
that people know they should be empathetic to groups who are suffering but when people 
think they have to tell the truth, most aren’t. This first point is particularly disconcerting 
in terms of trying to create an educational system that can help people connect with 
greater empathy to others with greater efficacy. As I will discuss in my critique section 
shortly, one possible issue with my efforts is that there is no real way to test whether we 
succeed. Imhoff’s and Banse’s report only further deepen such a concern: people know 
what they should do or say, that is they are empathic, but they don’t actually feel that 
way. How, then, will we ever create an education that actually changes people to be more 
                                                     
358 Imhoff & Banse, “Ongoing Victim Suffering,” 1445. 
359
 Imhoff & Banse, “Ongoing Victim Suffering,” 1446. 
360 Imhoff & Banse, “Ongoing Victim Suffering,”1446. 
361 Imhoff & Banse, “Ongoing Victim Suffering,”1446. 
  213         
empathic if they aren’t even honest about whether they are? I will save this discussion for 
the critique, but it is worth noting here.   
 I do want to draw attention to the fact that 40% of participants forgot about any 
specific information about suffering. 40% seems like a very large number, especially for 
forgetting about suffering, which is precisely what the test is trying to examine. I want to 
suggest that the method of conveying the information is at fault. Reading a story about 
what happened that ends with arguments about why the suffering of the Jewish people 
now connects to the past is not the kind of text that is likely to spark any real impact. As 
we saw, bringing emotions into the mix helps to create significant memories. Rather, 
what Imhoff and Banse seem to have done is bring college students in and have them 
read another text, in a long line of texts, and then quiz them about it. Such an education is 
precisely the kind that I and others are suggesting is ineffective in really influencing 
people. If anything, Imhoff’s and Banse’s analysis supports my claim that a reason-based 
education isn’t effective. In this case, they couldn’t even inspire people to remember 
about suffering they read about three months prior.  
 While Imhoff’s and Banse’s report is interesting, I am unconvinced as to its 
ultimate conclusions, because it begins with the same type of education that we see time 
and again failing to inspire or change students.  Rather, I am much more in support and in 
line with Boschki et al.’s analysis and conclusions. I do think that Imhoff’s and Banse’s 
work is important insofar as it lends further credence to the idea that the memorization of 
cognitive facts doesn’t produce wholly different people and that the current simplistic 
narrative of the Holocaust is not merely incorrect but also damaging. Ultimately, then, 
my call for a new form of education that is more particular, context focused, and 
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imaginative, is not merely one that fits within Adorno’s framework, or is philosophically 
interesting, but also I think needed. As these studies indicate, education as it is now is 
ineffective and potentially damaging.  
 
 
Mechanisms of Prejudice 
 
 
 
 Although the main focus of this chapter is the discussion of exemplar memorials 
(e.g., highly imaginative and Adornian), as I have been suggesting, such exemplars do 
seem to be needed and have the real possibility of offering an effective education. To that 
end, I want to briefly demonstrate how studies on the mechanisms of prejudice also 
support my project. Because I will be brief, I will only focus on two such studies, though 
there are many others that support my work and, ultimately, such a connection can be 
explored in greater detail following this project. I’ve chosen to highlight these two not 
because they are the most ardent supporters of my theory, but rather because they are 
different in kind and focus. The first, Eliot Smith’s “Social Identity and Social Emotions: 
Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice” argues for a new way of understanding 
prejudice and how it grows. The other, “Mimicry reduces racial prejudice” is an 
experiment aimed at addressing and overcoming prejudice.  
 Smith begins his essay by outlining the traditional view of prejudice as an 
attitude: “Stereotypes of an outgroup are conceptualized as the perceiver's beliefs about 
the group’s attributes: for example, they may be seen as dirty, clannish, musical, or 
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shrewd.”362 In the traditional view, the overall model of prejudice and related constructs 
is as follows:  
Negative stereotype: Members of group A are dirty, hostile, lazy… 
leads to 
Prejudiced attitude: I don’t like As 
leads to 
Discrimination: I prefer to avoid As, exclude them from good jobs…363 
 
In this traditional model, the mechanisms of prejudice are very much focused on the 
perceiver’s beliefs about a group’s attitude, and that in turn leads to discrimination.  
 Smith argues for an alternative view of prejudice as being centered on emotion, 
rather than beliefs. He argues that the beginning point for his alternative theory of 
prejudice is self-categorization understood as: “a view of oneself as a member of a social 
defined group or category.”364 In order to begin with the negative stereotype about group 
A, you must first identify yourself as not being a member of group A, or as being a 
member of group B. But how is such a distinction made? According to Smith’s theory:  
The salience of a particular social identity is a function of many factors including 
(1) the presence (real or imagined) of outgroup members as a focus of social 
comparison, (2) the perception that significant attributes covary with group 
membership, and (3) competition or conflict between groups.
365
  
 
What is unique about Smith’s view is that rather than begin with the other, he sees 
prejudice as beginning with the self. In a specific example he explains: “my taxes are 
burdensome; I work hard to earn a living; nobody gives me any handouts.”366 In order to 
see group A as lazy, which is the first step in the traditional model, you must begin to see 
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yourself as hardworking and others like you as the same. This perception can be false, but 
it is the self and one’s ingroup, rather than the other, that is the starting point of prejudice.  
 Smith’s theory about the mechanisms of prejudice maps on to the discussions I 
have been having throughout this project, both as it pertains to moral imagination and 
Adorno. For instance, in Chapter One, I outlined Johnson’s theory of prototypes in which 
we take prototypical examples of concepts or objects and imaginatively extend to see if 
others like it fit within that category.
367
 As Smith notes here, prejudice seems to have 
similar features: an individual begins with their context, their struggles and situation and 
from that begin to draw lines between groups. Adorno’s discussion of collective identity 
thinking also parallel’s Smith’s discussion of prejudice. Adorno writes, “People who 
blindly slot themselves into the collective already make themselves into something like 
inert material, extinguish themselves as self-determined beings. With this comes the 
willingness to treat others as an amorphous mass.”368 Adorno’s discussion of collective 
identity thinking, just like Smith’s  discussion of prejudice, begins with the individual 
and extends outward. In particular, if I think of myself as part of the group of hard 
workers, it is easier for me to begin to see group B as inferior.  
 The theory of moral imagination and Adorno’s work both align with Smith’s 
work on prejudice insofar as all three share similar themes about the importance of the 
self in terms of the formation of groups, and the subsequent exclusion of others based on 
those groups. What is of further interest, especially for this chapter, is the ways in which 
an exemplar memorial can potentially overcome these mechanisms of prejudice. Insofar 
as Smith notes that thinking of oneself within groups is the first step in the mechanisms 
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of prejudice, and that such a process of thinking involves perception of oneself and one’s 
situation in a larger context, I think any of the memorials we discussed would be very 
helpful in speaking to the mechanisms of prejudice outlined by Smith. Insofar as the 
museums and memorials all push people to perceive a multitude of contexts and 
perspectives in new ways and in doing so give visitors a better understanding of their 
own relation to others, I think that such a push would be helpful to overcoming the 
mechanisms of prejudice outlined by Smith. 
 A second piece on the mechanisms of prejudice investigates even more so the 
ways in which we can overcome them. In particular, Michael Inzlicht, Jennifer Gutsell, 
and Lisa Legualt investigate to what extent mimicry can reduce racial prejudice. They 
open their article with a claim that has been central to my project: “Humans are empathic 
animals. Basic research in neuroscience has established that we readily connect with 
others. We automatically match other people’s motor and autonomic responses, thereby 
allowing us to get “under the skin,” and understand their emotions and needs.”369 If it is 
the case, as I have been arguing, and as Inzlicht et al. claim, that perspective taking is 
important to experiencing with others, why is it that prejudice exists? Wouldn’t it just be 
the case that I should imagine I am an other and in doing so, I’d never be tempted to harm 
anyone? What Inzlicht et al. point out is that despite our tendency to be empathetic, such 
a capacity is constrained by social factors, most notably attitudes and group 
memberships.
370
 They mention specific studies in which white people, for example, are 
                                                     
369
 Inzlicht, Michael, Gutsell, Jennifer, & Legault, Lisa. (2012). “Mimicry reduces racial 
prejudice.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 48(1): 361-365, 361 
370 Inzlicht et al., “Mimicry,” 361.  
  218         
less likely to mentally resonate with black people.
371
 Further, they cite a number of 
neuroscience studies that show that we less readily resonate with people who belong to an 
outgroup, despite our automatic tendency to do so.
372
  
Inzlicht et al.’s project, then, is to see if mimicry can help overcome some of our 
resistance for our natural empathic conditions. They ran their own experiment in which 
they had non-black participants watch a number of videos that had people performing 
generic motor tasks. The experiment group viewed a video with black actors and were 
instructed to mimic the actions of the actors and then completed two measures of anti-
black prejudice, one implicit and one explicit.
373
 Their results demonstrated that 
mimicking outgroup members reduces implicit bias against that group.
374
 
Inzlicht et al. offer a few possibilities as to why mimicry is helpful for 
overcoming prejudice, most central being that it increases what they call the “self-other 
overlap” defined as “the overlap between mental representations of the self and mental 
representations of another person or group.”375 They explain: 
Mimicry kick-starts the brain system that underlies motor resonance. And it is 
precisely this motor resistance that is lacking for outgroups and for those we are 
biased against (Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2010).
376
 By having people artificially 
resonate with outgroup members-by having them mimic outgroup others-we are 
in effect priming the kind of perception-action-coupling that is normally absent 
for the outgroup but present for the ingroup and so important for empathy and 
liking.
377
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So, how exactly does one go about overcoming this reaction to not associate with the 
outgroup? That is, how specifically can we encourage people to perform such mimicry? 
According to Inzlicht et al:  
Perspective-taking, or putting oneself in the shoes of another, can reduce 
stereotyping and prejudice, and does so by increasing self-other overlap (Galinsky 
and Moskoqitz, 2000 and Vescio et al, 2003).
378
 Training people to approach the 
outgroup can similarly reduce prejudice on response latency as well as 
neurophysiological measures and does so by increasing the association between 
the self and the outgroup (Phills, Kawkami, Tabi, Nadolny, and INslischt 
2011).
379
  
 
 The connection between Inzlicht et al.’s work and my project is twofold: first, in 
their opening they seem to suggest that a possible cause for prejudice, or at the very least 
a cause for the continued presence of prejudice is a lack of imaginative perspective taking 
of another. As I explained, they note that we are empathic animals, but that we fail to do 
so with certain others. This inability to imagine as an other is a result, or potentially a 
cause of prejudice. My project has been discussing the importance of such imaginative 
extension, and I think that Inzlicht et al. begin to demonstrate the importance of a lack of 
such imaginative extension.  
The second place I see my project connecting is in their work on how to 
overcome the lack of imagination. In particular, Inzlicht et al. suggest that we train 
individuals to practice this perspective taking through activities like the mimicry of their 
experiment. My project, especially in this chapter, has suggested that encouraging others 
to take up the perspectives of others, especially perspectives to which they don’t often 
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have access to, can be extremely important to overcoming the conditions that contributed 
to the Holocaust. Here, Inzlicht et al. suggest that similar mimicry can be important to 
overcoming the mechanisms of prejudice. Further, as I have been discussing in this 
project, the work of improving oneself begins with the self, and in particular the self 
perceiving her surroundings and context in new, unique ways. For both Adorno and the 
theory of moral imagination, seeing the world without rigid, predefined perspectives is 
important to overcoming the challenges of reason. As it pertains to the Holocaust, seeing 
yourself as more than your group, an others as unique individuals, is important for both 
Adorno and a theory of moral imagination in overcoming the conditions that caused it. 
Inzlicht et al. lend further credence to the idea behind my project and the exemplar 
museums I mention insofar as the latter require visitors to take up another’s perspective, 
go through, and in some ways mimic, the experience of others.  
 
 
Potential Criticisms 
 
 
 
 Incorporating an education that focuses on imaginative activities can be a way to 
counteract many of the conditions that led to the Holocaust, as well as the harmful 
educational programs currently underway. In response to these claims, I anticipate two 
major criticisms, which I will address. First, throughout this chapter and the entire 
project, I have called for a refocusing on particulars, as opposed to abstractions or general 
categories. One could argue that by focusing on particulars, I am merely replacing one 
extreme with another. Second, one could argue that the educational system I am 
advocating for has no real method of measurement; we’ll never know how well someone 
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is imagining, since it takes place entirely in their head, or to what extent their imaginative 
activities will impact their future decision making. Leaving such an important educative 
initiative entirely in the mind of students makes it too difficult to measure.  
 The first potential critique of my project is that I favor the particular too much and 
in doing so merely trade one extreme for another. This favoring is dangerous on two 
levels: one, as it pertains to the Holocaust, focusing on one person or family loses sight of 
the large number of people killed. One of the most important aspects of the Holocaust, 
and one of the most horrible things about it, is the number of dead. By focusing on 
particulars, we lose sight of the mass level of annihilation and in doing so do a disservice 
to what occurred. The second potential danger in focusing on particulars is that it has the 
opposite, but just as harmful, effect on people’s view of those involved. For example, 
Hitlerism could be construed as a form of particularity over the abstract or universal. By 
lumping all the blame on Hitler and analyzing his particular actions, upbringing, and 
motivation, he becomes a supernatural being, one who hypnotized an entire nation into 
performing these evil acts, or who was so clever and crafty he was able to pull of this 
mass extinction without alerting the people. Focusing on Hitler gives us a particular 
villain, and in doing so, in not incorporating the larger view, we create a false and 
negative narrative. 
 Focusing too much on the particular can also have a negative effect on the ways 
in which victims are portrayed. For instance, by looking at a particular family or 
individual, and seeing their movement from deportation, to ghetto, to concentration 
camp, one could begin to give excuses for behavior. If only they hadn’t gone along with 
the deportation, if they’d only hidden in the countryside, if they hadn’t trusted their 
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friends that everything would be ok, if they hadn’t gone to that temple at that time, if only 
they hadn’t gone to the back of the cattle car, if only they hadn’t insisted on staying with 
their kids, etc. In hindsight, we may have better ideas for what to do in such situations, as 
we read more and more narratives about what occurred. However, what can be missing, 
especially when focusing on particulars, is how out of the victim’s control so many 
events and circumstances were. While for some insisting to stay with their children meant 
the children lived, for others it meant both died—it depended on the guard, the time of 
day, and ultimately, luck. When we focus on particular narratives, especially when we try 
and put ourselves in their shoes, we begin to come up with things we would have done 
differently, we see their mistakes, or we see their banal actions as mistakes. Yet, this way 
of viewing the situation is potentially harmful because it shifts the blame of what 
occurred to the victim and offers a rationale for doing so, while also ascribing much more 
control then any one victim had. 
 I agree that focusing too much on particulars can lead to false and potentially 
harmful narratives and that is something I want to actively work against and avoid. That 
being said, I don’t think my proposal necessarily falls into the trap of trading one extreme 
for another. While I have called for a focus on particulars, I do so because Adorno makes 
a similar demand. As I detailed previously, instrumental thinking often focuses on 
abstract qualities and in doing so negates the particularities of a thing, making it easy to 
use. For this reason, Adorno wants to bring the focus back to particulars. Bringing the 
focus back to something, doesn’t mean negating its previous focus. In my tree example 
from Chapter Two, I noted that in instrumental thinking we treat a specific tree as a 
resource, focusing on the tree in its uniqueness, such as a home for squirrels, a living 
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thing, and so forth. Thinking of a tree in this way doesn’t mean that we forget that it is 
also a resource for humans. If anything, Adorno calls for us to constantly try and keep all 
of these in mind, forever shifting our focus along different axes.
380
 We, then, aren’t 
trading one static viewpoint for another, but rather trading a general static viewpoint for a 
dynamic, ever-changing viewpoint of particulars. 
 The same can be said about imagination and particulars: most moral imagination 
scholars, as I discussed, argue that we need to focus on particulars in terms of moral 
perception, rather than begin with abstract universals. This does not mean that the 
abstract universals do not play a role in the act of moral deliberation, nor does it mean 
that we ignore them altogether. Rather, it means that we constantly test those abstracts via 
particulars, as we did with our example of “lie.” Both of my inspirations for focusing on 
particulars do not advocate for their total replacement of universals, and both, it should be 
noted, want more particulars to play a role in creating, testing, or determining universals. 
 Similarly, I do not think that my education initiative necessarily leads to the 
extreme of focusing too much on particulars. For example, as I argued, a number of 
different perspectives and narratives need to go into the creation of a more robust 
education. I do not think that we should focus on one particular narrative, in fact I have 
been arguing against such an idea for this entire chapter. Focusing too much on one 
narrative, even if that is the narrative of the victim, gives us a false and potentially 
dangerous picture of what happened. What is dangerous is when the particular experience 
becomes the universal. Rather, as I have claimed, we need to create an education that 
does focus more on particulars than universals, but includes a wider range of particulars.  
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Further, though I have advocated for the particular because it is easier to imagine 
with a unique story or perspective, I do not think we should lose sight of the mass number 
of people murdered. Rather, I think that focusing on the particular can give us greater 
insight into the large scale of what happened. Because it is so immense, it feels almost 
impossible, or certainly hard to wrap our minds around. By focusing on particulars, like I 
did with the baby shoes, I was given a window into what seems like the infinite, and in 
that way I was more deeply affected.  My view would also then certainly challenge the 
dominate narrative of Hitlerism, which tends to favor extremes (e.g., Hitler was an evil 
genius who brainwashed all of Germany into following his command). Ultimately, 
though I too worry about the over focusing on particulars, I do not think that my strategy 
necessarily encourages that to happen. Because I want multiple particulars, and am 
advocating for a view of the universal that is forever shaped by the particulars, I think I 
strike a happy medium between the two extremes. 
 The second major critique of my educative proposal is that it isn’t measurable. 
Since it relies on engaging people’s imagination, we won’t be able to test to what extent 
individuals are engaging their imagination, whether they are imagining the “right” thing, 
and whether those imaginings will produce the desired outcome. While I agree that these 
three things are difficult to measure, I don’t think that such difficulties render my 
proposal impossible. No educational plan is easy to measure insofar as education takes 
place, for the most part, in students’ heads. However, we can try to assess the extent of 
learning, or the impact certain education plans or initiatives through tests such as the ones 
Inzlicht et al. perform. 
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 Insofar as I am advocating for a specific type of education, one that is 
imaginative, it certainly is difficult to ensure that people are imagining the “right” things. 
For instance, someone could walk through Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory, a museum 
which I have argued is a paradigm for imaginative education, and either not imagine 
anything, perhaps because they are distracted, or maybe imagine the wrong things (i.e., 
they don’t empathize with the victims, they connect in some way with the Nazis instead). 
In the first instance, in which the visitor doesn’t imagine at all, I find such a visitor 
unlikely, especially in a place like Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory. Entering the room 
on the Nazi occupation, as I described, includes very loud music, bright lights, and the 
need to navigate around flags—to completely ignore or avoid such an experience would 
be difficult. Insofar as museums utilize a number of different media that are difficult to 
avoid (e.g., as I mentioned in the chapter, loud music, recreated scenes, tiled floors, flags 
and structures you have to move around and between), they do their best to ward off the 
ability to ignore, or be too distracted. I think it would be difficult, perhaps even 
impossible, to create an education plan that achieved total engagement and involvement 
with all students. I do think, though, that the type of immersive experience I am 
describing does a better job at engaging with the student and requiring them to imagine.  
 It is possible that someone who already has certain pro-Nazi feelings goes to 
Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory and rather than imagining with the victims, feels pride 
in what occurred, and in that sense imagines the “wrong” thing. I do think that this 
imaginative education might be able to reach people whose minds are in a sense already 
set in a certain direction. For instance, I have long thought that the Holocaust was a 
terrible event. While this may sound obvious, I want to make the point that my mind was 
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set in a certain way. However, before my experiences at these memorials, and as I have 
read more about the Holocaust, have developed and challenged my ideas on the matter. 
For instance, hearing about the brothels in Auschwitz, and the ways in which the 
prisoners referred to the women there, forced me to reconsider previous narratives about 
the Holocaust, namely that everyone there was wholly innocent. My point is that these 
educative experiences can still challenge our thought or deepen our understanding, even 
if we think we have the whole story or know everything there is to know. Perhaps a Nazi 
sympathizer who visits the museum (this itself might be unlikely), thinks that the events 
were over exaggerated. However, going through the ghetto section, with the recreated 
walls, sounds, and photographs, could give her a better sense of what occurred and begin 
to challenge her views. Again, I think this kind of education is more likely to do this 
activity than facts written on placards. Ultimately this criticism, as well as others like it, 
does not diminish the potential efficacy and potency of an imaginative education.  
 In this chapter I have advocated for a certain imaginative type of education in 
response to the Holocaust. An imaginative education has a number of key features, 
including: a focus on picking out particulars, especially in contrast to abstract or general 
terms, an emphasis on context, and the incorporation of imaginative activities such as 
perspective taking, and mental rehearsals. I don’t think that this is necessarily an 
exhaustive list of features of an imaginative education, nor do I think that this education 
relies exclusively on imagination.  
 An imaginative education should be emphasized in education post Auschwitz for 
a number of reasons. One, because as I first argued, an education that emphasizes 
imaginative activities fulfills many of the key features of Adorno’s education post-
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Auschwitz. As I argued, for instance, an education that focuses on helping students 
understand the context of a situation can help people break free from their myopic cold 
stare, or having students mentally rehearse events can be a way to limit avoidance in 
observers. Second, as I demonstrated in Chapter One, performing imaginative activities, 
especially those involved in education (e.g., imagining to fly a plane, playing the flute, 
winning a race, etc.), can have a marked impact on the educational outcomes, so 
imaginative activities need to be included in more arenas. If the mirror neurons that fire 
while we imagine events occurring in our mind help us actually perform such actions in 
our real life, then perhaps the inclusion of imaginative activities in other forms of 
education can have a real impact on how people react to certain situations. Third, and 
finally, as I discussed in this chapter, it seems that the current system for Holocaust 
education is very much focused on treating the event in terms of historical facts (e.g., 
numbers dead, years of camp opening and liberation, etc.). This reason-based style of 
education isn’t necessarily producing the desired impact on visitors. I think that the 
educational standard, then, needs to be changed and a more imaginative one would belie 
many of the concerns of today’s education by helping to sensitize students and forming 
more significant memories.  
 Though I think that an imaginative education is a necessary tool in a more robust 
post-Auschwitz education, I also want to suggest that it needn’t stop there. In fact, I think 
such an education could extend to genocide education per se. Insofar as Adorno’s 
analysis of the conditions that led to the Holocaust are found in other genocides, similar 
educational techniques would be needed to overcome the conditions. There is certainly 
good reason to believe that Adorno’s account is correct insofar as genocides have in 
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common the division of collectives and indifference towards those not found in our own 
collective. Breaking down these divides and seeing others no longer as radically other or 
as manipuable objects, is a key step in moving forward not only after Auschwitz but also 
post-conflict. Therefore, Adorno’s work on education, and my developing of it through 
the work of imagination, can be extended beyond and after Auschwitz. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Overall, my project has demonstrated the integral role of imagination in our moral 
lives, specifically within the realms of moral perception and deliberation. Utilized in a 
number of different ways, such as perspective taking, projection of possibilities, and so 
on, imagination and its activities, is necessary, though not sufficient, for many, if not all 
of our moral activities.  
My project has also demonstrated the potentiality of moral imagination by 
showing the ways in which it can help to counteract both Enlightenment thinking, as well 
as the conditions that led to the Holocaust. In the former instance, by integrating moral 
imagination in with Theodor Adorno’s anti-Enlightenment critique, I developed both a 
deeper understanding of Adorno’s critique, as well as possible avenues for combating or 
moving out of it. Further, Adorno’s work contributes to moral imagination by bolstering 
it against critics who may demand a certain level of rigidity or clarity from the theory, 
which isn’t possible. In the latter instance, incorporating an imaginative education or 
imaginative activities can be a potentially powerful tool in counteracting the conditions 
that led to the Holocaust. By incorporating Adorno’s insights therein, as well as 
examining the current educational system, I’ve demonstrated the need for a more 
imaginative education after Auschwitz. 
 There are three major conclusions that I have drawn from my research: one is that 
imagination is integral, even necessary, for our moral activities of deliberations and 
perception. Many of the imaginative activities that we use on a daily basis have not 
necessarily been attributed to imagination, though most certainly must rely on it. Further, 
the more I research imagination, the less clear I become as to its purview and its limits. 
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This has led me to leave behind the archaic view of the mind as something with distinct 
cognitive faculties and rather embrace greater fluidity in my thinking of imagination.  
 Second, my research has concluded that Adorno’s Critical Theory work is 
compatible with a contemporary understanding of moral imagination. In particular, that 
some of the ways in which Adorno describes methods for thinking of concepts or object 
can be explained by or supported by current understandings of concepts (e.g., prototypes) 
and that such current understandings are underpinned by imaginative activities. I did not 
necessarily go into the project with the understanding that the two would combine or 
support each other so well, but my research has, I think, concluded that the two are highly 
compatible theories that offer mutual support and depth. 
 Third, I’ve concluded from my research, that certain styles of post-Auschwitz 
education have been privileged, and have not been successful and sometimes even 
damaging to their audiences. While I went into my project hoping to advocate for an 
imaginative education, I didn’t anticipate the extent to which such a need was present.  
 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 
 
 
 My research is important because it gives a practical educational initiative 
following Auschwitz. By highlighting specific memorials, museums, and the ways in 
which they are uniquely (and imaginatively) tackling Holocaust education, I have begun 
to outline education initiatives that are meeting some of the challenges facing the 
community today. Further, I have provided general guidelines for what others can do, 
insofar as they should incorporate or encourage visitors to undergo imaginative activities 
  231         
in their museum experience. Further, they should reconsider the ways in which narratives 
are presented and the way those involved are discussed.  
 My research also contributes and engages with the secondary work on Adorno 
and therefore is of import. My project attempts to match Adorno with a theory not 
previously discussed within his literature. Further, my project attempts to deepen a 
number of his discussions by challenging some of his conclusions (e.g., the ways in 
which he talks about those involved), and offering a positive account to his negative 
critiques (e.g., a more imaginative way of viewing concepts is a way to move from 
simple to complex concepts). Bringing Adorno into conversation with more 21st century 
thinkers is an important step in keeping Adorno literature alive and thriving. 
 The motivation for this project was always imagination and insofar as imagination 
is at the center of the project, my research is important because it furthers the discussion 
of imagination, specifically moral imagination. Not only do I synthesize and analyze the 
major contemporary work on the issue, I also weave it into other philosophical 
discussions in order to demonstrate its import and depth. Incorporating imagination into 
discussions of Adorno’s critique of society, as well as education post-Auschwitz, reveals 
the importance of imagination, its flexibility, and its potency. Insofar as my project 
elevates imagination’s role in philosophy in any capacity, I find my project to be 
important. 
 
 
 Limitations and Further Research 
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 Though my project may offer contributions to a number of fields, including 
Holocaust literature, education discussions, and general understandings of the theory of 
moral imagination, there are a number of limitations to my research, many of which I 
acknowledged within the project, but that should be clarified here. Though I argue that 
including imaginative activities in post-Holocaust education can be a powerful tool, I do 
not think that imagination alone can counteract the conditions that contributed to 
genocide. Rather, I think that imagination is a competent tool within an arsenal. Further, 
that it is a tool that has been, generally, ignored or dismissed. 
 Additionally, I am not sure that an imaginative education works for every person, 
every situation, or every education initiative. I certainly do maintain that insofar as 
imagination is crucial to our everyday moral activities, engaging with it can and should 
be beneficial in the long run. However, I don’t think you need to force perspective taking, 
for instance, to the point that you traumatize, or re-traumatize people. Also, insofar as no 
single educational initiative can successfully reach every person, every time, I 
acknowledge that an imaginative education is not a panacea. That doesn’t, however, 
mean that it can be a potent tool.  
Looking forward, I see three major areas for future research. First, as I briefly 
mentioned at the end of Chapter Four, I am interested in exploring the ways in which the 
imaginative, Adornian education that I suggested can be extended to other cases of 
genocide. In order to make such an argument, I would first need to analyze the conditions 
that lead to other genocide, and demonstrate that they too are in line, or at least the extent 
at which they are in line, with Adorno’s theory. For example, examining the propaganda 
associated with the Rwandan genocide, and the ways in which it promoted Enlightenment 
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thinking. I see my research extending beyond a specific genocide, and looking at whether 
genocide thinking, both before and after, match up with the work I have done in this 
project. 
 Second, I would like to develop my research to meet the needs of the changing 
Auschwitz education. As I mentioned in Chapter Four, Auschwitz is looking forward to 
adapting their message as more survivors pass away and as they shift from a message of 
“Never Forgetting” to a new, more modern message. I would like to pursue my research 
therein and contribute to the shift. Not only in what the content of the education might 
look like, namely, imaginative, but also the focus, or more likely foci, of this future 
education. For example, while ‘never forget’ may still remain a focus, it is certainly not 
going to be the only one looking forward; what else falls into that umbrella is a place I 
would like my research to grow and contribute to. 
Third, I would like to further my work on imagination in general. I would like to 
further explore the philosophical spaces where imagination can be incorporated, 
including perhaps different areas of morality, as well as processes related to my 
discussion here, for instance the ways in which imagination is involved in deliberation 
per se, how imagination perhaps works differently in moral deliberation as opposed to 
any other form. I would like to see, and be a part of, the inclusion of imagination in more 
philosophical discussions, exploring its activities, definition and its integral and unique 
qualities.  
 
 
 
 
  234         
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Adorno, Theodor. (2003). Can One Live After Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader.  
Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford University  
Press. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. (2005). “Philosophy and Teachers.” Critical Models. 
 Trans. Henry W. Pickford. New York: Columbia University Press, 19-35. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. (1973). Negative Dialectics. Trans. E.B. Ashton . 
New York: Seabury Press. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. (1974). Minima Moralia.  “Antithesis.” Trans E.F.N. Jephcott. 
 London: NLB. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. (2005). “Free Time.” Critical Models. Trans. Henry W. Pickford. 
 New York: Columbia University Press, 167-176. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. (Spring 1977).“The Actuality of Philosophy.” Telos. 31:120-133. 
 
Adorno, Theodor and Horkheimer, Max. (1972). Dialectic of Enlightenment.  
Trans. John Cumming. New York: Herder & Herder. 
 
Auschwitz. (n.d.) “Concentration camp, Poland.” Retrieved January 10, 2016,  
from http://www.britannica.com/place/Auschwitz. 
 
Aristotle. (1999). Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Martin Oswald.  
Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
 
Bernstein, J.M. (2001). Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics. New York:  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. (2009). The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborne.  
New York: Verso. 
 
Blum, Lawrence. (1991). “Moral Perception and Particularity.” Ethics. 10(4): 701-725. 
 
Boschki, R., Reichmann, B., & Schwendemann, W. (2010). “Education after and about 
Auschwitz in Germany: Towards a theory of remembrance in the European 
context.” Prospects, 40, 133-152. 
 
Chin, Sharon M., Fabian Franke, and Sheri Halpern. (2011). "A Self-Serving  
Admission of Guilt: An Examination of the Intentions and Effects of  
Germany's Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe." Reflections on the  
  235         
Holocaust. Ed. Julia Zarankin, New York: Humanity in Action, Inc., 13-21. 
 
Cho, D. (2009). “Adorno on Education or, Can Critical Self-Reflection Prevent the Next  
 Auschwitz?” Historical Materialism, 17(1): 74-97. 
 
Cook, Debora. (2008). “Influences and impact.” Theodor Adorno: Key Concepts. 
  Ed. Cook, Deborah. Stocksfield: Acumen, 21-37. 
 
Cook, Deborah. (2008). “Introduction,” Theodore Adorno: Key Concepts.  
Ed. Deborah Cook. Stocksfield: Acumen. 3-19. 
 
Decety, J., & Jackson, P. (2004). “The functional architecture of human empathy.” 
Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews. 3, 71–100. 
 
De Waal, F. B. M. (2008). “Putting the altruism back into altruism:  
The evolution of empathy. “Annual Review of Psychology. 59, 279–300.  
 
Dewey, John. (2005). Art as Experience. New York: Penguin Group. 
 
Dufrenne, Mikel. (1973). The Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Experience. 
 Trans. Edward Casey. Evanston: Northwestern University 
 
Durando, J. (2014, July 23). “Auschwitz selfie girl defends actions.” 
 USA Today. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/07/23/selfie-auschwitz-
concentration-camp-germany/13038281/. 
 
Eisenman, P. (n.d.).” Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas:  
Peter Eisenman.” Retrieved October 4, 2015.  
http://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/en/memorials/the-memorial-to-the-murdered-
jews-of-europe/peter-eisenman.html/ 
 
Finlayson, J. (2002). “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable.” European  
Journal of Philosophy, 10(1): 1-25. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. (1893). “Studies on Hysteria.” Complete Works. Trans. Ivan Smith.  
Retrieved April 27, 2015, from 
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. (1893). “The Interpretation of Dreams.” Complete Works.  
Trans. Ivan Smith, Retrieved April 27, 2015, from  
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. (1893). “Psychical (or Mental) Treatment.” Complete Works. Trans. 
 Ivan Smith. Retrieved April 27, 2015, from  
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf.  
  236         
 
Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). “Perspective-taking: Decreasing 
 stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism.” 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 78: 708–724. 
 
Gilad, M. (2014, April 29). “French town reluctantly takes credit for saving  
more than 1,000 Jews.” Haaretz. Retrieved from  
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/.premium-1.587866. 
 
Giroux, H. (2004). “What Might Education Mean After Abu Ghraib: Revisiting 
 Adorno's Politics Of Education?” Comparative Studies of South Asia,  
Africa and the Middle East, 24(1): 5-27. 
 
 Green, Gerald. (1978). The Artists of Terezin. New York: Hawthorne Books. 
 
Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. 2010. “Empathy constrained: Prejudice predicts  
reduced mental simulation of actions during observation of outgroups.”  
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. (46): 841-845. 
 
Guyer, Paul. (2000). “Editors Introduction.” Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Harding, L. (2003, October 27). “Berlin's Jewish memorial halted after firm linked with 
 supply of Nazi gas.” The Guardian. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/27/germany.arts. 
 
Heins, V. (2012). “Saying things that hurt: Adorno as educator.” Thesis Eleven, 11(1): 
 68-82. 
 
Herf, J. (2008). The Jewish enemy Nazi propaganda during World War II 
 and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
 
Hofstadter, L., & Kuhns, R. F. (1976). Philosophies of art and beauty,  
selected readings in aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger. Chicago:  
University Of Chicago Press. 
 
Holocaust Memorial Museum. (August 18, 2015). “SS and the Camp System.”  
Holocaust Encyclopedia. Retrieved January 10, 2016, from 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007399. 
 
Horkheimer, Max. (1974). Eclipse of Reason. New York: Continuum. 
 
Imhoff, Roland and Banse, Rainer. (2009). “Ongoing Victim Suffering Increases  
 Prejudice: The Case of Secondary Anti-Semitism.” Psychological Science.  
20(12): 1443-1447. 
 
  237         
 
Inzlicht, Michael, Gutsell, Jennifer, & Legault, Lisa. (2012). 
 “Mimicry reduces racial prejudice.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.  
48(1): 361-365. 
 
Jarvis, Simon. (2008). Adorno: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge. 
 
The Jewish Agency Executive Communication. (November 23, 1942). “Decree of  
Deportation and Murder of All Polish Jews.” Jewish Virtual Library. Retrieved 
October 4, 2015 from 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Haaretz112342.html. 
 
Johnson, Mark. (1993). Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Johnson, Mark and Lackoff, George. (2003). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago:  
Chicago University Press. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. (2008). Anthropology, History, and Education. Trans. Allen Wood,  
Paul Guyer, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. (2009). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Allen Wood & 
 Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. (2000). Critique of the Power of Judgment. Trans. Paul Guyer.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. (1956). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  
Trans. H.J. Paton. New York: Harper . 
 
Kant, Immanuel. (1993). Grounding for the metaphysics of morals;  
with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns.  
Trans. J. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
 
Kimmelman, M. (February 18, 2011). “Auschwitz Shifts From  
Memorializing to Teaching.” New York Times. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/arts/19auschwitz.html. 
 
Laurence, R. (2005). “Factories of Death.” [Television series episode]. Auschwitz:  
Inside the Nazi State. Netflix. 
 
Lewis, Tyson. (2006). “Utopia and Education in Critical Theory.” Policy  
Figures in Education. Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles. 
 
Luxemburg, Rosa. (1915). “The Junius Pamphlet.” Trans. Dave Hollis. 
Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
  238         
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1915/junius/index.htm. 
 
Marx, K. (1844). “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” 
 The Power of Money. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from  
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/power.htm. 
 
Marx, K., (January 1, 1995). “Economic Manuscripts: Capital Vol. I. Chapter Three.”  
Trans. S. Moore, S., & E. Aveling. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm. 
 
Mazza, E. (2015, August 11). “CrossFit Guru Does A Handstand On 
 Holocaust Memorial” Huffington Post. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dave-driskell-holocaust 
handstand_55c96c1ae4b0f73b20ba7ebd. 
 
McCollough, Thomas. (1991). The Moral Imagination and Public Life. Chatham: 
 Chatham House Publishers. 
 
McCracken, P. (June 9, 2010). “Exhibit at Schindler factory site recalls  
Nazi-era Krakow.” Jewish Telegraph Agency. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
http://www.jta.org/2010/06/09/news-opinion/world/exhibit-at-schindler-factory-
site-recalls-nazi-era-krakow. 
 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. (n.d.). “History of the 
 Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe.” Retrieved October 4, 2015 from 
http://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/en/memorials/the-memorial-to-the-murdered-
jews-of-europe/history.html. 
 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and Information Center. 
 Information brochure. Acquired January 6, 2014. 
 
Mussell, S. (2013). “'Pervaded by a chill': The dialectic of coldness in  
Adorno's social theory.” Thesis Eleven, 117(1): 55-67. 
 
Nicholsen, Shierry. (1999). Exact Imagination, Late Work. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. (1992). Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
O’Connor, Brian. (2004). Adorno’s Negative Dialectic. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
O’Connor, Brian. (2008). “Philosophy of History.” Theodor Adorno: 
 Key Concepts. Ed. Deborah Cook. Stocksfield: Acumen, 179-195. 
 
 
 
  239         
Oskar Schindler’s Enamel Factory. (June 18, 2013). “Kraków under Nazi  
Occupation 1939–1945.” Retrieved November 10, 2015 from 
 http://www.mhk.pl/exhibitions/krakow-under-nazi-occupation-1939-1945. 
 
Pascual-Leone, A. (2001). “The Brain That Plays Music and Is Changed by It.”  
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 930: 315–329. 
 
Phills, C. E., Kawakami, K., Tabi, E., Nadolny, D., & Inzlicht, M. (2011).  
“Mind the gap: Increasing associations between the self and Blacks  
with approach behaviors.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.  
100: 197–210. 
 
Ravenscroft, Ian. (2012). “Fiction, Imagination and Ethics.” Emotions, 
 Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Ed. R. Landgon & C. Mackenzie. New York:  
Psychology Press, 71-90. 
 
Schecter, Darrow. (2010). The Critique of Instrumental Reason from  
Weber to Habermas. New York: Continuum. 
 
Shuster, M. (2014). Autonomy after Auschwitz: Adorno, German idealism, and  
modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Silbermann, A., & Stoffers, M. (2000).Auschwitz. Never heard of it? Remembering and 
 forgetting in Germany. Berlin: Rowohlt. 
 
Smith, Eliot. (1993). “Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New  
Conceptualizations of Prejudice.” Affect, Cognition and Stereotyping:  
Interactive Processes in Group Perception. Eds. Diane Mackie & David 
Hamilton. New York: Academic Press, 297-313. 
 
Stone, Alison. (2008). “Adorno and Logic.” Theodor Adorno: Key Concepts. 
Ed. Deborah Cook. Stocksfield: Acumen, 47-62. 
 
Stolperstein Gelsenkirchen. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2015. 
 http://www.stolpersteine-gelsenkirchen.de/. 
 
Stolpersteine. (August, 20 2014)/ (@_Stolpersteine_). “Update:  
Rund 48.000 #Stolpersteine in 18 Staaten Europas (inkl. Deutschland). 
 There are 48,000 #Stolpersteine in 18 countries in Europe.” 
https://twitter.com/_Stolpersteine_/status/502186725255700480. 
 
Tiedemann, Rolf. (2003). “Introduction: “Not the First Philosophy, but a Last One”: 
Notes on Adorno’s Thought.” Can One Live After Auschwitz.  
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
 
  240         
Thompson, P. (April 1, 2013). “The Frankfurt school, part 2: Negative dialectics.”  
The Guardian. Retrieved on October 4, 2015 from 
 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/01/negative-dialectics 
frankfurt-school-adorno. 
 
Weber, Max. (1949). “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy” 
The Methodology of the Social Sciences . Ed. and Trans E. A. Shils & 
H. A. Finch. New York: Free Press. 
 
Werhane, Patricia. (1996). Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Weinstein-Dobbs, I. (2015). Spinoza's Critique of Religion and its Heirs:  
Marx, Benjamin, Adorno. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Winklemann, Otto. (May 29, 1961). Otto Winkelmann. “Testimony in the Proceedings  
against Adolf Eichmann at the Competent Court of Justice for  
Bordesholm/Rendsburg District.” The Nizkor Project. Retrieved on November 10, 
2016 from http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-
adolf/transcripts/Testimony-Abroad/Otto_Winkelmann-02.html.  
 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. (August 18, 2015). “Oskar Schindler.”  
Holocaust Encyclopedia. Retrieved on September 14, 2016 from 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005787. 
 
Welzer, H. (2008). Communicative memory: A theory of remembrance. Munich: Beck. 
 
Wikipedia. (November 21, 2014). “Constellation.” 
Retrieved on March 11, 2015 from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?. 
 
Witkin, Robert. (2008).“Philosophy of Culture. Theodor Adorno: Key Concepts. 
 Ed. Deborah Cook. Stocksfield: Acumen, 161-178. 
 
Wittman, Rebecca. (January 1, 2008). “War Crimes Trials: Crystallization of the  
Principles of International Criminal Law.” Jewish Virtual Library. 
 
Wood, Allen. (2005). Kant. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Woods, A. (July 17, 2002). “Civilization, Barbarism and the Marxist view of History.”  
In Defense of Marxism. Retrieved on September 13, 2015 from  
http://www.marxist.com/civilization-barbarism-history170702.htm. 
 
Yad Vashem. Oskar and Emilie Schindler (n.d.) “The Righteous Among The Nations.”  
Yad Vashem. Retrieved on September 13, 2015 from 
http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/schindler.asp. 
 
